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Chief Executive Officers (CEOs) have a strong influence on the tone at the top of 
companies.  How they exercise this influence has the potential to affect the quality of 
financial reporting.  Consequently, it is important that auditors and other users find a 
way of examining and evaluating the tone at the top and the resultant risks to which 
companies might be exposed.
The authors contend that the CEO letter to shareholders in annual reports is one of 
the most important of the mediums used by corporate leaders to communicate their 
attitudes and values. They argue that by analysing the text of such letters, auditors and 
other interested parties can gain insight into the tone at the top of major corporations.
This book demonstrates two complementary methods for undertaking this analysis. First, 
through the use of the text analysis software package DICTION to analyse the CEO 
letters of FTSE 100 companies and the top 100 FORTUNE 500 companies. Second, 
through conducting a close reading or forensic examination of selected company letters 
(General Electric, Enron, BP and New Century Financial) to understand their inherent 
ideology, rhetoric and use of metaphors, and to highlight any silences. The two methods 
should be used in conjunction with each other to enhance ensuing understandings of 
tone at the top and its effects.
The authors contend that the combination of close reading and software analysis 
techniques can furnish valuable understandings of the culture of an organisation and 
the intentions of top management teams. The techniques they demonstrate could be 
of value to auditors.  The authors conclude that a closer scrutiny of corporate activity 
is important and that the methods they highlight should be regarded as highly useful 
tools in conducting much needed audits of corporate culture and communication.
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Foreword
Chief Executive Officers (CEOs) have a strong influence on the “tone 
at the top” of companies.  If the “tone at the top” has a consequent 
influence on the quality of financial reporting then it may be useful for 
auditors and other users to find a way of examining and evaluating the 
“tone at the top” of companies and the resultant risks to which companies 
might be exposed.
The authors of this study contend that the CEO letter to 
shareholders in annual reports is one medium used by corporate leaders 
to communicate their attitudes and values.  They argue that by analysing 
the text of such letters, auditors and other users can gain an insight into 
the “tone at the top” of major corporations.
This study demonstrates two methods of undertaking this analysis. 
Firstly, the use of a text analysis software package to analyse the CEO 
letters of FTSE 100 and the top 100 FORTUNE 500 companies. 
Secondly, the close reading or forensic examination of selected company 
letters (General Electric, Enron, BP and New Century Financial 
Corporation) is undertaken to seek to understand the ideology, rhetoric 
and metaphors at play and to highlight any silences.
The study finds that the combination of close reading and software 
analysis techniques can furnish a valuable understanding of the culture 
of an organisation and the intentions of top management teams and 
could therefore be of value to auditors and other users.  It is argued 
that an assessment of business leadership risk can be formed by focusing 
closely on the language of CEOs, and that this may help auditors identify 
cultures that are overly partial to risk and those likely to prove too risk 
adverse.  The study recognises that there are alternative methods which 
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auditors use to assess risk and this technique whilst useful would not 
necessarily replace these other methods.
The authors conclude that a closer scrutiny of corporate activity 
is essential in the current climate and that the methods highlighted 
in this book are critical tools in conducting much needed culture and 
communication audits.
This project was funded by the Scottish Accountancy Trust for 
Education and Research (SATER).  The Research Committee of The 
Institute of Chartered Accountants of Scotland (ICAS) has also been 
happy to support this project.  The Committee recognises that the views 
expressed do not necessarily represent those of ICAS itself, but hopes 
that the study will add to the existing understanding of corporate culture 
and “tone at the top”.
David Spence
Convener, Research Committee
March 2010
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Executive summary
Introduction
Chief Executive Officers (CEOs) traditionally have placed a strong value 
on the creation of unified corporate cultures, devoted to the achievement 
of strategic objectives.  They strive to create a ‘tone at the top’ that will 
set a powerful example for important internal and external stakeholders. 
CEO letters to shareholders in annual reports are a potentially 
important vehicle for communicating the attitudes, values and 
behaviours of those in senior leadership roles.  These letters deserve much 
closer examination and auditor scrutiny than has occurred in the past. 
They are authorised and signed by CEOs, many of whom participate 
pro-actively in their composition.  CEOs have a legal responsibility for 
the content of their letters, and because of this, the letters are a useful 
medium for assessing the intentions of CEOs as they struggle to set a 
tone at the top.  For example, they can be crucial in showing how CEOs 
interpret important external challenges and how they visualise solutions 
to whatever problems their organisation is currently facing.  
The growth in CEO power in recent decades further highlights the 
importance of this issue.  Simultaneously, there has been a growth of 
‘heroic’ models of leadership, which encourage many CEOs to exaggerate 
their proficiency, level of insight, and ability to command events (many 
of which are beyond their control).  A growing concern has developed 
in the USA regarding the tone at the top of organisations, especially 
after the collapse of Enron in 2001 and the passage of the Sarbanes-
Oxley Act in 2002.  The financial crisis of 2008 and the onset of global 
recession have also raised critical questions by the public, policy makers 
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and media about the manner in which CEOs perform their role.  How 
CEOs respond to this heightened scrutiny will be a vital issue for the 
global economy in the years ahead.  
CEO letters to shareholders therefore have a great importance.  This 
study of their content over the past decade has the potential to reveal 
how CEO mindsets function in a period of global boom and expansion, 
and help us to assess such matters as risk management policies and 
practices.  An understanding of these matters is of relevance to auditors 
and others who are interested in obtaining early indications of potential 
future problems.
Measuring and assessing tone at the top in CEO 
letters
Our main aim in this book is to demonstrate, through critical 
investigation, certain methods for analysing text such as CEO letters, 
with a view to gaining insight into tone at the top.
The tone at the top is explored through the medium of CEO 
letters to shareholders.  The significance of such letters and what they 
demonstrate about the culture of organisations, and the personalities 
of CEOs, is assessed.
Two main analytical approaches are employed on selections of CEO 
letters drawn from the UK and the USA – a qualitative approach and 
a quantitative approach.  Qualitatively, selections of CEO letters are 
subjected to ‘close reading’, or forensic examination from a variety of 
perspectives, to seek to understand the ideology, rhetoric, and metaphors 
at play – and to highlight any ‘silences’. Detailed examples of such 
analyses are provided, focusing in particular on the communications 
of General Electric’s Jack Welch, British Petroleum’s Lord Browne, the 
letters of Skilling and Lay at Enron, and an instance of the use of both 
techniques in combination – an exploration of US sub-prime mortgage 
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company New Century Financial Corporation’s CEO communications 
pre-bankruptcy.  
Quantitatively, the software package DICTION is used to analyse 
collections of CEO letters to shareholders in 1998 and 2006 for large 
US and UK based companies.  DICTION subjects 500 word segments 
of text to analysis, searching for distinctive linguistic markers – such 
as master variables labelled ‘insistence’, ‘embellishment’, ‘complexity’, 
‘optimism’, ‘certainty’ and ‘realism’.  
DICTION is used to analyse two data sets comprising the text 
of CEO letters to shareholders for large UK-based companies and for 
large US-based companies.  The UK companies were those designated 
as comprising the Financial Times Stock Exchange (FTSE) 100.  An 
analysis was undertaken of 91 FTSE 100 company CEO letters for 
2006, and 71 letters for 1998.  The US companies of interest are those 
designated as the top 100 companies in the annual FORTUNE 500 
listing of America’s largest corporations according to annual revenues. 
An analysis was undertaken of 94 FORTUNE 100 company CEO letters 
for 2006, and 81 letters for 1998.  In total, approximately 600,000 words 
of text were analysed.
Findings
The data show that close reading analysis combined with DICTION 
analysis generates valuable insights to the intentions of CEOs, and the 
intended culture and tone at the top of their organisations.  Several clear 
examples are cited below.
(a) The analysis of Jack Welch’s communications when he was CEO 
of General Electric shows a tone at the top which stressed the 
DICTION variables certainty, optimism, activity and realism, 
but excluded commonality.  This approach is characteristic of 
transformational leadership models which emphasise the importance 
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of charismatic leaders, but which understate the importance of such 
leaders in creating conduits for corrective feedback to them from 
their employees and other stakeholders.  
(b) The Enron letters are marked by very strong indicators of hubris and 
haughtiness, with indications that Skilling and Lay thought their 
organisation was immune to wider processes in the macro-economy. 
The DICTION indicators are particularly strong for hubris.  Given 
Enron’s aspirations to become ‘the world’s leading company’ before 
it collapsed spectacularly, this sense of over-optimism is of major 
interest.  Analytic tools which disclose such potentially destructive 
linguistic markers could be of value to auditors, and have the 
potential to reveal difficulties when organisations can still do 
something to avert collapse.
(c) The analysis of BP’s CEO letters from 1998 to 2006 illustrates 
how qualitative thematic and metaphor analysis may reveal insights 
into top management’s approach to conducting leadership through 
language and setting a problematic tone at the top.  In the specific 
case of BP, subsequent official investigations into, for example, 
safety issues, provided some support for questioning the ‘heroic’ 
leadership and ‘speed’ themes, among other examples, in the letters 
beginning in 1998.  More generally, we believe that useful ways of 
gaining insight into tone at the top are offered by qualitative case 
studies of leadership language use based upon: (i) a longitudinal 
approach over time; (ii) more than one methodological perspective 
(for example, thematic analysis and metaphor analysis); and (iii) 
external independent indicators of tone at the top.
(d) The analysis of New Century Financial Corporation shows that, 
while there was regular acknowledgment of an increasingly harsh 
operating environment, there were also indications of excessive 
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optimism about the organisation’s ability to handle it.  Even on the 
brink of bankruptcy, the [then] current year was being described as 
‘the best year in the history of (the company)’.  Hyperbole is clearly 
present – the CEO sought to commit the organisation to becoming 
‘A New Shade of Blue Chip’.  This emphasis on becoming something 
‘new’ implies an abandonment of something traditional, a move 
into a fresh paradigm, and therefore to greater risk taking.  While 
optimism is a necessary quality in the leadership of organisations, 
when taken to excess, it can indicate an inadequate understanding 
of the perils ahead – and therefore suggest insufficient readiness 
to cope.  Such over-optimism sounds a warning note.  The early 
detection of such optimism, including by auditors, is potentially 
of great value.
(e) Related to this, quantitative analysis of CEO letters in the US and 
UK in 2006 reveals linguistic variables that are associated with a 
tone of self-assured smugness and confidence, suggestive of a general 
lack of humility by the signatories.  Rather than reporting in a more 
matter-of-fact manner, there is evidence of brash boasting about 
product launches, and lack of perspective about the real priority 
of various products in customers’ lives.  Alongside this, there are 
frequent assertions about the values and emotions of employees that 
imply the CEOs concerned have some particularly acute insight into 
the feelings and mindsets of employees.  This is questionable, since 
employees rarely communicate their deepest thoughts about where 
they work to those in charge.  But an apparent CEO conviction 
that they do so may reinforce the creation of organisational visions, 
strategies and goals that are less readily acceptable to internal 
stakeholders than is imagined by CEOs.  Nevertheless, the growing 
tone of certainty, insight and optimism identified remains consistent 
with a transformational leadership model.  Some of the rhetoric 
indicates a corporate and individual mood that is consistent with 
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what has been dubbed ‘irrational exuberance’, and which therefore, 
in retrospect, can be viewed as a harbinger of imminent economic 
problems.
Discussion and implications
While recognising that assessing tone at the top in a comprehensive 
fashion requires analysis of a broader array of corporate communication 
media, the above findings point to the analysis of CEO letters to 
shareholders as being a very a fruitful contribution to this process. 
Importantly, neither close reading nor DICTION analysis, used in 
isolation, can yield a comprehensive insight into what CEO letters 
disclose about the tone at the top.  However, when used in combination, 
they have strong potential to add a great deal and to furnish valuable 
understandings of the culture of the organisations concerned and the 
intentions of top management teams.
There are considerable implications for the accounting profession 
and academic researchers, as well as shareholders and, indeed, all 
stakeholders.  Analysis of company accomplishment has tended to rely 
on financial metrics of performance.  In the aftermath of Enron’s demise, 
and the more recent $50 billion fraud allegedly perpetrated in the US by 
Bernard Madoff, the limitations of this approach are evident.  A closer 
and more well-rounded scrutiny of corporate activity seems essential 
and inescapable.  
International Standard on Auditing 315: Identifying and Assessing 
the Risks of Material Misstatements through Understanding the Entity and 
its Environment stresses the importance of understanding audit risk in 
a comprehensive fashion.  Our approach highlights how assessments 
of business leadership risk can be formed by focusing closely on the 
language of CEOs.  Although it is recognised that auditors will also 
make use of internal information and evidence in making their risk 
assessment.  Understanding an organisation’s culture, as envisaged and 
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determined by the tone at the top, is a vital part of assessing its trajectory 
and prospects.  Such understanding would enable auditors to identify 
cultures that are overly-partial to risk – and those likely to prove too 
risk averse.  Analysts and auditors need to look more carefully at how to 
assess an organisation’s going concern status; and how they diagnose an 
organisation’s problems (e.g. whether CEOs accept responsibility for the 
consequences of their previous decisions, or seek to deflect responsibility 
to other stakeholders or the external environment).
We believe that close reading and DICTION analysis are critical 
tools in conducting much needed culture and communication audits. 
While these techniques, which are introduced and demonstrated in this 
book, need to be refined and developed, the initial analysis provided 
demonstrates that they offer multiple opportunities for insight, diagnosis 
and prescription.  
1 tone at the top and corporate culture:  an auditing perspective
Introduction
Our main aim in this book is to critically investigate and demonstrate 
methods for analysing text such as CEO letters, with a view to gaining 
insights into tone at the top of major corporations.
This book addresses the role of the CEO in influencing the tone 
at the top of a large corporation and, through this, the quality of the 
company’s financial reporting.  A major theme endorsed is that a 
corporation’s leadership, as represented by the CEO, strongly influences 
the tone at the top of a company and the culture of a company.  Such 
a view is consistent with the assertion of Edgar Schein, a prominent 
management scholar, that:
Culture is created by shared experience, but it is the leader who 
initiates this process by imposing his or her beliefs, values, and 
assumptions… (Schein, 2004, p. 225)
Addressing the topic of organisational culture contributes to a 
literature which, over the past thirty years, has produced at least three 
major handbooks, thousands of studies, and a multitude of instruments 
each purporting to measure, or audit, its multi-faceted forms.  The 
study of organisational culture is fraught with controversies.  How 
should culture be defined to encompass its impact on organisational 
performance? How should culture be audited? What represents best 
practice in terms of the management of culture? 
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This chapter reviews some of the key issues in debates about culture 
and the relationship of culture with communication processes generally. 
It addresses some overarching concerns about tone at the top and posits 
that those interested in this area, such as auditors, should devote more 
attention to studying CEO discourse from the perspective of ascertaining 
a CEO’s intended impact on organisational culture.  This chapter outlines 
why a cultural audit or audit of tone at the top is important, and discusses 
some key features of tone at the top and a cultural audit.  It sets the scene 
for subsequent chapters which outline why and how the CEO’s letter to 
shareholders in a company annual report can be analysed qualitatively 
and quantitatively to assess corporate culture and tone at the top.  The 
chapter offers support for the case that auditors should analyse a CEO’s 
annual letter to shareholders because such letters can reflect, and help 
constitute, the tone at the top of a company.  Analysis of CEO letters 
can lead to many other beneficial outcomes, for example, in the area of 
corporate governance.
CEO letters are, of course, only one medium through which 
corporate leaders express their leadership through language; the speeches 
that CEOs deliver are another important medium.  In addition, auditors 
have access to other sources of internal communication, policy making 
and decision making, which might be less easily observable externally. 
However, as we suggest in the next chapter, CEO letters deserve a 
prominence amongst the various means of CEO communications.  
Concern for tone at the top 
Interest in the ethical values and the tone at the top of organisations 
has increased in recent years as stories have unfolded of major company 
crises in which the influence of CEOs and other senior managers 
has contributed to a dysfunctional tone at the top.  In particular, the 
financial crisis of late 2008 has focused attention on these issues again: 
dysfunctional practices took root, leading to a series of collapses that 
imperilled prosperity in the global economy, and led ultimately to a new 
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relationship between the State and the finance system in many countries. 
A crucial issue is how those at the top of investment banks, mortgage 
lenders, and other financial and non-financial organisations articulated 
values, condoned practices and set a tone which persuaded regulators, 
politicians, shareholders and staff to embrace the business models in 
question enthusiastically.
In his testimony regarding the bailout of American insurance giant 
AIG before the US Congress’s Committee on Oversight and Government 
Reform, former Chief Accountant of the Securities and Exchange 
Commission (SEC) Lynn Turner said: 
…with respect to AIG, there has been, in my opinion, poor 
management and governance that has led to a poor tone at the 
top… (lines 549-551, Preliminary Hearing Transcript www.
oversight.house.gov/story.asp?ID=2211; accessed October 
18, 2008)
But what does tone at the top mean? Why is it important? Is 
it synonymous with ethical culture? How might anyone, including 
auditors, assess tone at the top? These questions are explored now and 
in later chapters, to demonstrate quantitative and qualitative techniques 
that can be used by external auditors or internal auditors.  In doing so, 
attention is drawn to calls for the conduct of cultural audits: that is, 
audits which include examination of CEO-inspired tone at the top. 
Additionally, and importantly, is our promotion of the idea that auditors 
should address the issue of business leadership risk in assessing audit 
risk – that is, that they should give particular attention to the risk of an 
organisational leader setting an inappropriate tone at the top.  
Concern for tone at the top has been especially prominent in the 
USA following the collapse of Enron in 2001, and the passage of the 
Sarbanes-Oxley Act in 2002.  On December 3, 2004, the importance 
of tone at the top was emphasised in a high profile speech, ‘Tone at the 
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Top: Getting it Right’, by the SEC’s Director, Division of Enforcement, 
Stephen Cutler (2004).  He argued that tone at the top is constituted 
by the words and deeds of top management; and that since leadership 
is at least partly enacted by means of language, the link between the 
language of corporate leadership and the tone at the top is very close.
Tone at the top was given considerable prominence in 2006 in 
post-mortems on the 2004 crisis at the Federal National Mortgage 
Association (commonly known as Fannie Mae).  The US government’s 
Office of Federal Housing Enterprise Oversight (OFHEO) report on 
the failure of Fannie Mae concluded that ‘Fannie Mae’s corporate culture 
was intensively focused on attaining EPS [earnings per share] goals. 
Decisions by Mr Raines [Fannie Mae’s CEO] shortly after he became 
CEO in 1999 set an inappropriate tone at the top that permeated the 
enterprise throughout his chairmanship’ (OFHEO, 2006, p. 3).  The 
problems of tone at the top at Fannie Mae at that time were illuminated 
further by the allegations of Christian (2005, p. 48) that:
…there seems to have been a tone at the top that FAS-133 
[Financial Accounting Standards Board, Statement of Financial 
Accounting Standards No. 133, Accounting for Derivative 
Instruments] did not really apply at Fannie Mae and, while it 
was [a component of ] generally accepted accounting principles 
(GAAP) … the mindset was that if management did not agree 
with the rules, it would just not follow them.
At Enron the tone at the top was such that the company’s written 
code of ethics did not need to be followed and that the ‘culture of the 
organisation almost encouraged breaking the rules and pushing the 
envelope – anything to keep the stock price propped up’ (Cunningham, 
2005, p. 6).  A process described as ‘ethical drift’ set in, whereby top 
leaders openly encouraged an atmosphere of hubris, narcissism and 
indulgence that fatally untethered the organisation from the real world 
around it (Salter, 2008).  
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Tone at the top has been implicated as well in lesser-known 
corporate contexts.  For example, on 5 December, 2005, Stone Energy 
Corporation, an independent oil and gas company headquartered 
in Louisiana ‘announced the findings of the independent review by 
the audit committee of Stone’s board of directors concerning the 
downward revision to its proved reserves’ (retrieved 4 May, 2007 from 
w w w . s t o n e e n e r g y . c o m / l i n k _ p a g e s / p d f d o c /
pressreleases/2005pressreleases/ReviewFindings.pdf ).  Among the 
findings which contributed to the need for substantial write-downs of 
stated reserves was the announcement indicating that: 
… there was an optimistic and aggressive ‘tone from the top’ with 
respect to estimating reserves.  Some on the Stone technical staff 
felt pressure to interpret the geological and engineering data in an 
aggressive manner; and there were several factors that may have 
prevented or discouraged the technical staff from pushing back 
against the optimistic tone from the top and the pressure that some 
perceived with respect to reserve estimation… (p. 1)
The International Federation of Accountants (IFAC), in referring 
to audit firms, asserted that ‘…the tone at the top is an important driver 
of audit quality’ (IFAC, 2007, p. 4).  
The importance of tone at the top is not confined to for-profit 
organisations.  The United Nations Organizational Integrity Survey 
2004, Final Report, for example, stressed the importance of the United 
Nations having an appropriate tone at the top if it was to encourage 
good ethical behaviour: 
Changing Tone at the Top will improve staff perceptions of 
Organizational Integrity.  To improve Tone at the Top means the 
UN must focus on changing staff perception of senior leaders.  This 
is particularly true of staff perceptions of how senior leaders place 
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their values and ethics ahead of their personal interests, aspirations 
or prior relationships.  This can be achieved through acts and 
statements that set an appropriate example of ethical behaviour, 
as well as an effort to communicate these behaviours to staff.  In 
other words, leaders must lead by example and be held to an even 
higher standard regarding all things ethical. (p. 7)
Interest in analysing tone at the top in accounting contexts 
was promoted by Castellano and Lightle (2005).  They built on the 
recommendations proposed in 1987 by the National Commission on 
Fraudulent Financial Reporting (known as the Treadway Commission) 
and the Sarbanes Oxley Act 2002, to highlight the importance of 
assessing the tone at the top in internal control reporting.  They argued 
that the tone at the top (set by CEOs and senior managers) affects the 
culture of an organisation; and that an inappropriate tone is likely to 
increase the risk of fraudulent financial reporting and help explain cases 
of corporate collapse.  Castellano and Lightle advocated the conduct of 
a cultural audit in which an assessment is made of ‘the tone at the top 
and the attitude toward internal controls and ethical decision making’ 
(2005, p.10).  They identified three key issues that need to be addressed 
in a cultural audit: pre-occupation with analysts’ expectations; pressure 
of numerical targets; and pre-occupation with compensation plans. 
But they did not propose any protocols for assessing tone at the top. 
Nor did they explore in depth the importance of tone at the top in 
influencing the culture of an organisation.  These matters are addressed 
in the remainder of this chapter.
What is tone at the top?
Tone at the top is defined by Cunningham (2005, p. 6) as ‘the shared 
set of values that an organisation has emanating from the most senior 
executives.  It can be reinforced with written codes and other policies 
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and documents, but, more importantly, it reflects the actions of these 
executives.  Are they “walking the talk”?’  Sheeder (2005, p. 35) claims 
that tone at the top is ‘the company’s “integrity DNA” – the foundation 
of all that it does [where] “integrity” generally means the possession and 
consistent adherence to high moral principles or professional standards 
that one refuses to change’.
In referring to public accounting firms, IFAC’s Transnational 
Auditors Committee contends that tone at the top is ‘the standard set 
by the organization’s leadership whereby performance is measured; the 
culture within which the members of the organization operate; the tone 
set by senior management; irrespective of management’s documented 
strategy and policies, it is the force that drives individual professionals; 
the “unseen hand” that directs activities regardless of management’s 
proximity to the action; and a commitment to the quality of care clients 
receive’ (IFAC, 2007, p. 8).
These definitions suggest that a fuller understanding can be obtained 
from a close reading of how the term is illuminated through metaphor, 
since ‘metaphors reflect…cultural information…’ (Su, 2002, p. 589). 
As explained later, such illumination emphasises the importance of CEO 
communication and language in setting and reflecting an organisation’s 
tone at the top.
One persistent metaphor used to explain tone at the top is that ‘tone 
at the top is a setting’, within which people work in an organisation. 
Thus, tone at the top is conceived to be an atmosphere, a climate, or a 
culture.  The Oxford English Dictionary (OED) (1989) invokes metaphor 
to define tone at the top as an emotional setting; and, in particular, 
‘a state or temper of the mind; mood, disposition’.  Rieger (2006, p. 
28) claims that the phrase ‘tone at the top’ first appeared in 1987 in 
recommendations of the Treadway Commission.  (Retrieved April 3, 
2006 from www.coso.org/Publications/NCFFR.pdf.)  The Treadway 
Commission used ‘tone at the top’ to describe an environment set by 
management in which financial reporting occurs.  A critical, desirable 
aspect of this environment was the establishment of ‘internal controls 
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that provide a reasonable assurance that fraudulent financial reporting 
will be prevented or subject to early detection’ (p. 11).  
The OED (1989) defines tone at the top as ‘the general or prevailing 
state of morals or manners in a society or community’.  Its focus on the 
state of morality (or ethicality) within a social setting is consistent with 
the metaphor that ‘tone at the top is an establisher of ethical values’. 
Mahadeo (2006, p. 1) seems to concur, describing tone at the top as 
‘the ethical (or unethical) atmosphere’ that is created in the workplace 
by ‘an organisation’s leadership’.  Importantly, she cites the exemplary 
‘trickle down effect’ to employees of the tone set by managers regarding 
ethics and integrity (p. 1).  Thus, ‘if employees see managers bend the 
rules, they’ll bend the rules’ (Cutler, 2004).  So, a senior manager, intent 
on fiscal prudence or frugality, can promote the achievement of such an 
aim by setting an example – complying with the same budget allowances 
and privileges as all other staff (e.g. in terms of office furnishings and 
travel allowances).  In other words, senior management generally, and 
corporate leadership in particular, have the potential to create ethical 
mental spaces in their organisation by embedding their beliefs, values 
and assumptions in crafting a healthy organisational culture.
Another related metaphor used to portray tone at the top is that ‘tone 
at the top is a network of cues’ that directs organisational functioning, 
work ethics, and the application of management pressure and control. 
In particular, tone at the top is conceived as the exemplary work ethic 
cues top management provides, through their words and actions, to 
show employees how to behave.  Such cues might include: 
Good cues:
•	 adopting an attitude of zero tolerance to fraud;
•	 committing to ethical values such as honesty, loyalty, responsibility 
and fairness; or
•	 encouraging transparency and openness in financial reporting.
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Bad cues:
•	 cultivating a culture of arrogance, combativeness and intractability; 
•	 pressuring lobbyists to interfere with the activities of regulators in 
order to ensure the organisation’s interests are upheld;
•	 engaging cavalierly in unsound accounting practices (such as income 
smoothing, and failing to establish internal control systems);
•	 adopting an attitude of passivity or complacency; 
•	 promoting a culture of deception and misrepresentation; or
•	 engaging in intimidating behaviour or bullying of employees 
(especially with likely whistle-blowers).
An important cue for (or characteristic of ) the wave of recent 
corporate accounting and financial scandals has been ‘lethal brews of 
overly aggressive financial targets, coupled with a tone at the top that not 
reaching those targets was unforgivable’ (Sayther, 2004, p. 6).  One of 
the world’s most prominent management scholars has characterised this 
approach as ‘America’s monumental failure of management’ (Mintzberg, 
2009), and has argued that it lies at the root of the global financial crisis 
of 2008.  In particular, Mintzberg (2009) criticises many CEOs as 
‘detached and hubristic.  Instead of rolling up their sleeves and getting 
engaged, too many CEOs sit in their offices and deem: They pronounce 
targets for others to meet, or else get fired’.
An example of the harmfulness of overly aggressive financial targets 
is found in the behaviour of [former] CEO, ‘Chainsaw’ Al Dunlap. 
During his tenure as CEO of Sunbeam, 1996-2002, he demanded that 
all earnings expectations be met – no matter what variety of accounting 
had to be deployed.  In this and in other instances, CEO rhetoric 
should be careful to avoid mis-cues or double-talk, such as might arise 
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in situations where senior management has one set of espoused ethical 
values for public consumption, and another set for when it is ‘off-line’, 
‘off-record’ or out of public sight (Cutler, 2004).
The metaphors for tone at the top described above suggest the 
discursive role of top management in enacting leadership through 
language and symbols (including non-linguistic symbols).  This provides 
a link to CEO annual report letters to shareholders, addressed in the 
following chapter.  But first, the meaning of culture and the implications 
of that meaning for the conduct of a culture audit are examined.
Corporate culture: The conundrum of definition
There have long been multiple definitions and conceptualisations 
of organisational culture and how a healthy culture can be created 
(McAleese & Hargie, 2004).  Schein (2004, pp. 245-271) asserts that 
leaders can create a healthy organisational culture by deploying primary 
embedding mechanisms, and secondary articulation and reinforcement 
mechanisms:
Primary embedding mechanisms
•	 What leaders pay attention to, measure, and control on a regular 
basis.
•	 How leaders react to critical incidents and organisational crises.
•	 How leaders allocate resources.
•	 Deliberate role modelling, teaching, and coaching.
•	 How leaders allocate rewards and status.
•	 How leaders recruit, select, promote, and excommunicate.
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Secondary articulation and reinforcement mechanisms
•	 Organisational design and structure.
•	 Organisational systems and procedures.
•	 Rites and rituals of the organisation.
•	 Design of physical space, façades, and buildings.
•	 Stories about important events and people.
•	 Formal statements of organisational philosophy, creeds, and charters.
The mechanisms for creating a culture, suggested by Schein, echo 
work on rhetoric theory that proposes a tension between ‘primary’ and 
‘secondary’ rhetoric.  For the Ancient Greeks, ‘primary rhetoric’ is held 
to be oral persuasion, usually performed on a specific occasion with 
a given audience and purpose in mind.  ‘Secondary rhetoric’ refers 
primarily to written texts, which are held to affect wider audiences in a 
deeper manner.  Secondary rhetoric has been growing in importance for 
centuries (Conrad & Malphurs, 2008).  This book addresses one outcome 
of the capacity for secondary rhetoric (in the form of CEO letters) to 
have a persuasive impact on a variety of internal and external audiences. 
The impact of CEO letters may be heightened since secondary rhetoric 
has the potential, as with some theories of management in general, to 
become a self-fulfilling prophecy.  That is, it can create attitudes and 
promote governance mechanisms to ensure behaviours become aligned 
more closely with the rhetoric in question, however dubious its intrinsic 
merits (Ghoshal & Moran, 1996).
An inherent presumption is that a healthy organisational culture is 
a plausible antidote to widespread corruption within an organisation. 
Such a presumption is consistent with the observation of Ashforth et 
al. (2008, p. 673) that:
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Organizational cultures evolve norms that guide employee practice.  
If those norms and practices operate mainly to serve the competitive 
interests of a company in an unbridled drive for profits at any 
cost, they run the risk of shouldering aside other norms that might 
serve the interests of other stakeholders, including those of the 
larger society.  When that occurs, an organizational culture can 
appropriately be labelled corrupt, as can the organization itself.
Ashforth et al. (2008, p. 674) also emphasise that ‘a formal ethics 
infrastructure does not guarantee a corruption-free organisation. 
What is required is a culture that embeds support for ethical conduct 
throughout its formal and informal systems’.  The language by which an 
organisation’s senior leaders help to craft such a desirable culture seems 
of central importance.
Morgan (1997) has argued that organisational culture can best be 
understood in terms of metaphor – as a form of social glue, a sacred 
cow, an affect regulator or a set of ‘blinders’ that seeks to secure some 
kind of cognitive closure (Alvesson, 2002).  Fletcher and Jones (1992, 
p. 30) assert that organisational culture ‘refers to the overall ethos of an 
organisation; those characteristics, including both psychological and 
structural elements, which affect the perceptions and behaviours of 
employees’.
More typically, culture has been defined as ‘the taken-for-granted 
and shared meanings that people assign to their social surroundings’ 
(Wilkins, 1983, p. 25).  Shared group meanings are embodied in 
values, symbols and ritualised practices (Sergiovanni & Corbally, 1984). 
Culture can be understood as a consistent set of values and attitudes 
held by people in an organisation, expressed in whatever practices flow 
from these values and attitudes (Ashkanasy & Jackson, 2001).  Thus, 
measuring culture requires the exploration of language, artefacts and the 
observable behaviours and rituals of organisational members.  Many of 
these attitudes have a taken-for-granted quality in the minds of those 
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who adhere to them, and determine ways of looking at the world that 
are often applied automatically, unthinkingly and usually with very little 
interrogation (Ashkanasy, 2003).  Expressed in these terms, culture is 
believed widely to have a ‘powerful and sometimes overwhelming impact 
on the organisation’s decision making and performance’ (Wilkins, 1983, 
p. 26).  
Conceptualisations of culture
One of the leading theorists in the field, Edgar Schein, has pointed 
out that: 
A chronic issue in conceptualising ‘culture’ seems to be whether 
we should think of culture as a ‘state’ or static property of a given 
group/organisation or as a human process of constructing shared 
meaning that goes on all the time.  (Schein, 2000, p. xxiv)
In line with this, Chan (2003) challenges the notion of culture 
as some kind of group property that is relatively unchanging, attracts 
consensus and is free of ambiguity.  He cautions that ‘...treatment of 
culture as a fixed, unitary, bounded entity has to give way to a sense of 
fluidity and permeability.  It requires also that explanation of cultural 
forces be situated in a larger context and a wider arena of different forces’ 
(Chan, 2003, p. 313).  Thus, an organisation can have an ‘official’ culture 
articulated by its key managers, and which they wish to believe has strong 
internal support, but which is more contested than is acknowledged 
in officially sanctioned organisational discourse (Tourish & Robson, 
2006).  From this perspective, organisational culture is much harder to 
define, is constantly changing, stimulates controversy, is likely to contain 
sub-cultures, and is continually co-created by organisational members 
as they struggle to make sense of their environment.  
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Martin and Frost (1996) have outlined four common conceptualisations 
of culture:
1.   Integrationist.  This stresses similarities within organisations.  Culture 
is conceived as an organised set of common values which shape 
the ways members of organisations understand their experiences. 
Ashkanasy (2003, p. 302), for example, notes that ‘organisational 
culture… focuses on the consistencies of values, attitudes, and 
behaviours within a particular organisation that distinguish it from 
others’.
2.   Differentiation.  This stresses differences within organisations.  Culture 
is conceived to be associated with different values and practices which 
co-exist within organisations.  Thus, the study of culture requires 
the study of sub-cultures.  For a summary of this view, see Martin et 
al. (2006).  It also follows that such sub-cultures will often contain 
elements that do not conform to managerial ideals.
3.   Fragmentation.  This assumes that meanings within the organisation 
are diverse and disorganised.  Culture is conceived as emanating from 
an organisational tension, with competing perspectives striving for 
dominance, and often in conflict with each other.  Sub-cultures are 
not seen as any more stable than dominant cultural narratives (see 
Martin et al., 2006).  The study of culture therefore becomes a study 
of tension and conflict.
4.   Post-modern.  This asserts that culture is the study of organisational 
sense-making as mediated through power relationships.  Culture 
is conceived as being the handmaiden of managerial rhetoric, and 
often as a device to maintain the control of powerful elites (e.g. 
Deetz & Kersten, 1983).  Such approaches explore how dominant 
organisational actors seek to naturalise ‘a particular way of knowing, 
thus excluding as illegitimate other forms of representing knowledge 
claims’ (Mumby, 2001, p. 601).  Culture therefore tends to be 
understood as a project of oppression.
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The conceptualisation of culture in this book is cognisant of each of 
these different streams of thought but draws more heavily on the post-
modern conceptualisation.  Organisational leaders are urged continually 
to build shared meanings, group identities and cultures among those they 
employ.  Group identity is ‘highly mutable, flexible, open to shaping 
from many directions at once in its changing environments, and most 
importantly, a result of constructions continuously debated and contested 
among its highly independent, even unruly membership.  The discourse 
about corporations as cultures now focuses on this sense of flexibility 
over solidity, multiplicity over standard models’ (Marcus, 1998, p. 6).  It 
is an approach that explicitly directs us to the process of sense-making. 
Sense-making, CEO discourse, corporate culture and 
cultural audits
Weick (1995) argues that while people have many shared 
experiences, these do not necessarily equate to shared meanings – 
irrespective of how much effort is expended in this direction.  Consistent 
with this perspective, the discourse of powerful CEOs is an attempt at 
creating shared meanings and cultures.  From this, assumptions can 
be made about the cultures they would like to see predominate within 
the organisations where they perform their roles.  However, as with all 
social contexts, their efforts can only ever be partially successful.  Culture 
audits can therefore explore the official and unofficial cultures within 
organisations – as these cultures form, evolve and mutate into new forms, 
and as they vary between groups and individuals.
Many organisations promote teamwork, loyalty and belonging as 
a means of creating more liberating cultures – ones that also happen to 
be aligned more closely with corporate purposes.  There is considerable 
evidence to suggest that, in many cases, the outcome is more oppressive: 
for example, where employees are expected to think continually of 
themselves primarily in terms of their designated organisational identity 
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(Kunda, 1992).  Thus, the frequent gap between espoused and enacted 
values has created a great deal of stakeholder cynicism about mission 
statements and values.  A key role for culture audits is to explore these 
tensions.  Culture audits should be alert to the ambiguities of culture 
formation and change, as varied organisational members struggle for 
voice, power, dominance and meaning in enacting relationships with 
each other.  
These issues can be of decisive significance for an organisation’s 
future, and for those who manage its destiny.  For example, failure to 
grasp the importance of deeply embedded cultures that conflict with 
those of a CEO, and the associated difficulty of changing them, seems 
to have been a key factor in the sacking of Carly Fiorina as CEO of 
Hewlett-Packard (Burrows, 2003).  Fiorina championed an ambitious 
programme of change, which nevertheless conflicted with the famed 
‘Hewlett-Packard’ way – a set of cultural norms championed by 
employees and other long-standing stakeholders, including members 
of the Hewlett and Packard families.  Consistent with this example, 
‘Change spawns stories and stories can trigger change.  Stories can also 
block change and can define what constitutes change’ (Brown et al., 
2009: p. 323).  It is much more common to find multiple, contested 
and contradictory stories of organisational change than a single narrative 
account that is consistent with the intentions of top management teams 
(Beech et al., 2009).  The challenge is to explore organisational culture 
in all its multifaceted forms.  This creates a more accurate picture of the 
sense-making heuristics used by employees and managers alike, and so 
provides a more comprehensive assessment of an organisation’s priorities, 
competing cultures, emerging challenges and likely trajectory.
Cultural audit: methodologies, controversies and 
constraints
Wilkins (1983) was one of the first proposers of a culture audit. 
He was frank in acknowledging the difficulties likely to be faced in such 
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an endeavour.  In particular, given that people rarely articulate their 
values and attitudes directly, any attempt to understand them must 
involve sifting ‘through a wealth of concrete and diverse manifestation 
of culture (stories, rituals, language, daily routines, and so forth) 
before we can arrive at our goal’ (Wilkins, 1983, p. 27).  Wilkins did 
not outline any particular technique for conducting a culture audit. 
Rather, he argued that it is a question of watching, observing, and 
interpreting behaviour, while chronicling the stories exchanged and 
seeking to determine how people make sense of them.  Consistent with 
this flexible approach, Denniston (2002, p. 132) has characterised a 
culture audit as a ‘comprehensive assessment, which can entail a variety 
of techniques including surveys, interviews and group discussions 
about an organisation’s philosophies, attitudes, actions and beliefs’. 
But culture audits are fallible.  Wilkins (1983, p. 37) observed that ‘it 
is something of an art to uncover basic assumptions that are buried in 
an organization’s rich collection of observations, stories, language and 
customers.  Because people have the natural tendency to cover up some 
assumptions, observers must be careful to take broad enough samples 
to determine how representative their findings are’.
Wilkins (1983) presents the issue of culture formation, transmission 
and management as largely the preserve of top management.  It is 
assumed that top management can frame a desirable culture for others, 
which they then model.  Top management then rewards compliance in 
an attempt to embed the desired culture deeply in their organisations. 
Thus, a culture audit is envisaged as a management tool, to gauge the 
success or otherwise of these efforts.  According to Denniston (2002, 
p. 132), ‘a comprehensive culture audit can be the first step toward 
a strategic rethinking of management practice, work life issues, ways 
of standardisation and other aspects of above average performance’. 
To this list might be added issues related to a company’s accounting, 
accountability and corporate governance.
Despite a frequent stress on the multi-faceted nature of culture and 
on the need to study its many and varied manifestations, there has also 
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been a plethora of more simplistic approaches to its measurement.  For 
example, Fletcher’s (1991) culture audit uses a pen and pencil self-report 
instrument which assumes that organisational culture can be defined 
as homogeneous or heterogeneous; enriched or managed; developing 
or stationary; balanced or dissonant.  A five-point scale is used in a 17 
page questionnaire with approximately 70 questions and 200 response 
elements.  Thus, no rich stories are produced in such an audit.  Rather, 
overall mean scores are tabulated, from which inferences are made about 
where the organisation sits on the main dimensions of culture chosen 
for inquiry.  Despite obvious limitations, a plethora of such instruments 
has emerged.  One major review identifies at least 18 questionnaires 
that, between them, possess varying degrees of construct validity and 
reliability (Ashkanasy et al., 2000).  
Culture is manifest in communication, and simultaneously 
constituted by it.  Communication perspectives on culture therefore 
acknowledge ‘the symbolic character of ordinary language and the ways 
in which cultural meanings are co-constructed in everyday conversation, 
textual evidence of patterns, and also the entire non-verbal, semiotic 
field’ (Eisenberg & Riley, 2001, p. 295).  This suggests that the study 
of culture must be concerned inevitably with the wider communicative 
processes occurring within an organisation.  A communication audit is 
therefore also valuable in considering how culture can be audited.  
The nature and role of communication audits in 
exploring culture
The ubiquity of the term ‘audit’ often generates confusion (Baker, 
1999).  Historically, the practice of auditing is associated commonly 
with scrutiny of an organisation’s financial health.  This book extends 
the ambit of auditing: if culture is expressed through, and constituted 
by, an organisation’s communication processes, then an audit of 
communication helps to uncover issues of high importance.  At its most 
basic, an audit is simply an evaluation of a designated process (Hogard 
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& Ellis, 2006).  Communication audits typically examine and evaluate 
communications programmes and activities, often with the intent of 
revealing gaps and inadequacies that can then be remedied (Henderson, 
2005).  Communication audits share several characteristics with more 
established audit practices in finance, medicine and accounting, as noted 
below (Tourish & Hargie, 2009).
1.  Accumulation of information 
 In the case of auditing, the goal is to check the efficacy of financial 
accounting procedures by sampling a representative cross section 
of transactions within the organisation.  In communication terms, 
a similar goal is to assess a sample of communication episodes to 
determine key trends.  From these, many inferences about culture 
can be made.  This might be termed the diagnostic phase of the 
auditing process.
2.  Creation of management systems
 Systems are developed to control the flow of information and 
resources over a given period.  This is the prescriptive phase of the 
audit process.
3.   Comparison of communication practices with publicly declared 
standards 
 A finance audit normally ensures that funds are managed 
appropriately and that efficient methods of financial management 
are being applied (Singleton & Singleton, 2007).  Clinical audits 
monitor the effectiveness and efficiency of medical activity, 
and contrast performance against national and international 
benchmarks (Shapiro, 1999).  Communication audits provide 
similar performance benchmarks.  They generate a much enhanced 
ability to measure performance and the impact of specific measures 
designed to improve performance.  This is the accountability phase 
of the audit process.
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In the 1970’s, considerable attention was devoted to the issue of 
communication audits by the International Communication Association 
(Goldhaber & Krivonos, 1977) and by prominent communication 
scholars (e.g. Greenbaum & White, 1976).  A seminal text was published 
from the work of the International Communication Association by 
Goldhaber and Rogers (1979).  This identified several key issues to be 
evaluated by a communication audit: 
•	 the amount of information underload or overload for major topics, 
sources and channels of communication; 
•	 the quality of information communicated between various sources; 
•	 communication relationships, including interpersonal trust, 
supportiveness, sociability and job satisfaction; 
•	 operational communication networks (including for rumours, 
social and job related messages), and how they compare with formal 
networks; 
•	 bottlenecks and gatekeepers of information; 
•	 positive and negative communication experiences; and 
•	 individual, group and organisational patterns of actual communication 
behaviours related to sources, channels, topics, length and quality 
of interactions.
Other suggestions have been made regarding what should constitute 
reasonable communication audit objectives in most organisations. 
Cheney et al. (2004) identified various ingredients of organisational 
communication, which many communication audits therefore seek to 
explore.  These include:
•	 symbols (e.g. logos, architecture, uniforms);
21tone at the top and Corporate Culture: an auditing perspeCtive
•	 structures (e.g. rules, reporting mechanisms, operating procedures);
•	 patterns of practices (e.g. the informal means by which news is 
habitually spread);
•	 discrete messages (e.g. particular announcements, CEO statements, 
or press releases);
•	 interactions (e.g. those that might occur during performance 
appraisal interviews or disciplinary hearings);
•	 relationships (e.g. those between different departments);
•	 narratives (e.g. stories about how the organisation was born, evolved 
or survived a crisis); 
•	 meetings;
•	 networks (formal and informal);
•	 rituals (e.g. coffee mornings or celebrations);
•	 myths or stories (e.g. ‘Jane got early promotion, and you can too’); 
and
•	 broad discourses (e.g. a company’s firm belief in its ethical values).
Much of this ingredient list above relates explicitly to issues of 
organisational culture (e.g. rituals/myths and narratives).  Thus, audit 
measures typically focus on issues such as:
•	 who is communicating with whom?; 
•	 which issues have received the most attention and arouse the most 
anxiety?;
•	 how much information are people receiving and sending on crucial 
issues?;
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•	 how much interpersonal trust exists?; and
•	 how can the overall quality of working relationships be characterised?
Such issues are also among the core concerns of efforts to establish 
‘organisational climate’ – a construct that overlaps organisational culture. 
Thus, climate:
...reflects beliefs about the organisation’s environment that are 
shared among members and to which members attach psychological 
meaning to help them make sense of their environment.  (Dickson 
et al., 2006, p. 351)
Climate is the result of interaction between an organisation’s 
structure, systems, leader behaviours and employees’ psychological 
needs (Srivastav, 2006).  It is determined strongly by people’s emotional 
responses to a wide range of issues, including communication (Patterson 
et al., 2004).  
The growing emphasis on language analysis in organisational 
studies conceives organisations as narrative spaces in which stories and 
accounts are employed by participants to facilitate the process of sense-
making (Cornelissen, 2006; Amernic et al., 2007).  In this context, 
leaders engage ‘in a process of rhetorical negotiation with their audience, 
trying out words, phrases, and literary constructions to better and more 
convincingly communicate their vision of their organisation’ (Cuno, 
2005, p. 205).  It follows that communication audits helping a better 
understanding of culture should pay considerable attention to language-
in-use, for example, in reports, memos, conversation and formal letters. 
The interpretive challenge that this poses is to tease out the implicit, 
probable or possible meanings that different audiences attach to the 
language concerned.  This includes analysing, or auditing, the tone at 
the top, in such forms as CEO letters.  Communication audits have the 
following methodological strengths:
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•	 They permit auditors to identify the subjective interpretations of 
reality held by important actors in organisational life.  This extends 
to customers and clients who are recognised increasingly as having 
a vital contribution to make to the business planning process.
•	 Depending upon the method utilised, people are permitted to voice 
their views and feelings in their own words, while also recording (on 
objective measurement scales) their responses to communication 
issues which can be analysed extensively.  By one means or another, 
audits explore individual perceptions of communication.  Such 
perceptions sometimes disclose a harsher communication reality and 
organisational culture than senior managers had hoped or planned 
for (Tourish & Robson, 2003).  Thus, audits bring to the fore the 
reality of how people feel.  
•	 The understanding that participants have of communication episodes 
can be compared to formal organisational channels and systems, to 
explore the gaps that exist between imagined and real practice.
There is no established method of conducting communication 
audits.  A contemporary handbook on the subject (Hargie & Tourish, 
2009) identifies at least thirteen approaches, including: questionnaires; 
interviews; focus groups; communication diaries; mystery shopping; 
video recording; critical incident analysis; network analysis; and direct 
observation.  Selection of an appropriate method depends on the precise 
nature of the communication being audited (e.g. whether it is written, 
oral, retrospective or occurring in real time); the research aims, objectives 
and/or hypotheses that are being pursued; and the resources available to 
the audit team, including time.  Auditing communication and culture is a 
science, but it is also an art.  This is unlikely to change in the near future.
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Summary
The concept of organisational culture is multi-faceted.  But it is not 
yet completely clear what impact it has on organisational performance. 
What is apparent is that senior managers are often committed to building 
unifying cultures – ones which they assume can impact positively on 
performance.  The financial melt-down in global capital markets in 2008 
created a crisis of managerial legitimacy which makes this task more 
difficult (Khurana & Nohria, 2008).  Communication by CEOs has 
become more complex, contradictory and contested.  This means that 
culture and communication audits must also seek to explore the surface 
and deep structure meanings in the discourse of CEOs, including in 
the letters that they send to shareholders (Amernic et al., 2007).  At the 
very least this means that researchers and auditors can determine the 
culture that an organisation’s leaders are seeking to create or which they 
imagine is already in existence.  Exploring the tone at the top and the 
extent to which tone at the top is shared by other organisational actors 
is a crucial component of this task.  
2 the importance of ceo letters in assessing the tone at the top
Enacting leadership through language
Senior corporate leaders and managers ‘work with words’ (Jönsson, 
1998, p. 11).  The discourse of CEOs, whether formal (in speeches, press 
releases, interviews and narrative parts of annual reports) or informal (in 
meetings or corridor conversations) is a set of complex communicative 
acts with symbolic, emotional, cultural and political overtones.  The 
language used is an inherently strategic form of ‘sense-making’ (Weick, 
1995).  It helps establish an ideological theme for management control 
and reflects the culture and tone of a company.  It even helps to make 
sense of why companies account the way they do and to understand why 
they focus on particular indicators in assessing financial performance.
Indeed, leadership is enacted largely through language – which 
should be interpreted broadly to include all symbolic acts of corporate 
leaders (such as body language, power dressing, ‘casual Fridays’). 
This is consistent with a growing interest in leadership as a discursive 
language-based phenomenon (Fairhurst, 2007, 2008; Tourish, 2008).  In 
particular, charismatic leaders are assumed to communicate a vision for 
their organisation energetically.  This puts a heavy premium on the use of 
language and encourages charismatic or would-be-charismatic leaders to 
exploit the dramatic possibilities of language fully (Westley & Mintzberg, 
1989; Den et al., 1997).  More broadly, emerging communication 
theories of what constitutes a firm suggest that ‘textually mediated 
practice’ is central to how companies and their leaders are constituted, 
secure consent and marshal capital (Kuhn, 2008).  
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This emphasis on language in effecting leadership is evident in 
Smircich and Morgan’s (1982) characterisation of leadership as the 
management of meaning, and in Zarefsky’s claim regarding the office of 
the American president, that a key function of senior leadership rhetoric 
is ‘to define social reality’ (2004, p. 207).  In the process, rhetoric is 
involved heavily in the construction of identity (Heracleous & Barrett, 
2001).  It is therefore an important ingredient in the discourse of any 
CEO concerned with promoting a particular organisational identity and 
loyalty on the part of employees.  Within this framework, organisations 
can be conceptualised as ‘interpretive structures in which identity is 
socially constructed and symbolically mediated’ (Hartelius & Browning, 
2008, p. 26).  
While cognisant that the language of corporate leadership – whether 
evidenced by the CEO letter or the many other forms of corporate leader 
discourse – unfolds within a broader formal and informal discourse 
framework (Holland, 2006), this study focuses at a more micro level 
on the CEO, and in particular on the CEO letter.  CEO letters to 
shareholders in annual reports are important instances of the use of 
language in the discourse of senior corporate leaders.  Such letters are 
narrative accountability texts offering valuable insight to the motives, 
attitudes and mental models of management.  Labels (such as ‘fair 
employer’, ‘good corporate citizen’ or ‘innovative manufacturer’) are 
used therefore to ‘succinctly embody what the organisation means – or 
is hoped or intended to mean – to individuals and groups’ (Ashforth & 
Humphrey, 1997, p. 53).  
Thus, the way CEOs enact their leadership, largely in words, helps 
us to learn and understand their espoused world-view, and ultimately, 
the raison d’être motivating their corporation’s behaviour (Lakoff & 
Johnson, 1980; Lakoff, 1993; Weick, 1995).  In particular, rhetorical 
analysis is ‘a specific kind of discourse analysis that concentrates on 
analysing linguistic strategies of argumentation as individuals seek to 
persuade an audience of a particular construction of reality congruent 
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with their own interests (through justification), while undermining 
others (through criticism)’ (Symon, 2008, p. 78).
Amernic et al. (2007) justify the importance of CEO letters by 
arguing that they help readers to comprehend how powerful corporate 
leaders make sense of the world and attempt to engage the active support 
and involvement of employees and other key stakeholders.  They point 
out that CEO letters should not be regarded merely as ‘mundane, 
common discourses of seemingly minor importance, possessing a 
narrow, “captured” audience of stockholders’ but that they are important 
documents for scrutiny.  This is because ‘they are public documents 
signed by the corporation’s CEO, published annually as an integral part 
of a corporation’s Annual Report, and provide a personal accountability 
narrative’ (Amernic et al., 2007, p. 1844).  The importance of CEO 
letters and the insights they offer have been illustrated also by Kendall 
(1993), Fiol (1989), Prasad and Mir (2002), Palmer et al. (2004), and 
Fanelli and Grasselli (2005).
CEO letters to shareholders have the potential to reveal many 
interesting practical and theoretical aspects of corporations, their leaders, 
and tone at the top.  For example, if the CEO narrative in the annual 
letter to shareholders is read and analysed closely (in terms of content, 
context and ideology) and with regard for cognitive linguistic markers 
(such as metaphor), then the cognitive world of CEOs as senior corporate 
leaders can be made visible, at least partially.  Such analysis of the 1940 
CEO letter of the iconic cultural figure, Walt Disney, revealed a CEO 
who was seemingly ‘a skilful, yet subtle rhetorician, whose …capabilities 
encompass a deft capacity to manipulate accounting data strategically 
…[and whose] use of metaphor … assists us in entering theoretical 
speculations about Disney’s ideological motivations’ (Amernic & Craig, 
2000, pp. 74-75).  Consequently, the study of rhetoric facilitates our 
ability to understand persuasion, power, ideology and manipulation 
(Hartelius & Browning, 2008).
Since the CEO letter to shareholders is an important medium 
through which many of Schein’s (2004) cultural embedding mechanisms 
(see chapter one) can be communicated, it serves essential strategic and 
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accountability functions.  Indicative of this is a statement on the General 
Electric (GE) Company’s website (www.ge.com; visited May 25, 2005) 
which explains that the CEO letter, published as part of GE’s corporate 
annual report ‘includes management’s assessment of the prior year, as 
well as a discussion of future plans.  The letter typically highlights the 
CEO’s priorities for the coming year’.  There is clear evidence that CEOs 
generally take the construction of CEO letters very seriously (see for 
example, Welch 2001, p. 442).
Thus, the annual report CEO letter is a personal account, in a 
fundamental sense, consistent with the literature in sociology on account-
giving (Scott & Lyman, 1968; Franzosi, 1998).  The letter serves CEOs 
in two broad ways.  First, since ‘what most people have missed is the 
use of writing as a tool for comprehension’ (Weick, 1995, p. 196), the 
CEO’s involvement in crafting the annual report CEO letter serves 
as a means by which the CEO structures his or her cognition of the 
organisation and its setting.  As Weick writes ‘if people know what they 
think by seeing what they say, then the variety, nuance, subtlety, and 
precision of that saying will affect what they see, question, and then 
pursue’ (1995, p. 196).  Second, it helps the CEO make meaning for 
stakeholders by identifying, labelling, and organising phenomena such 
as events and ideas (Weick & Sutcliffe, 2007), including strategies and 
performance measures.  If the CEO has included something or written 
about something in a certain way in the CEO letter, that something 
rhetorically cries out to be noticed.  In much the same way as with the 
power of rhetoric of the president of the United States, the CEO of 
a major corporation has a degree of power to define social reality for 
many corporate stakeholders.  Zarefsky (2004, p. 611) describes this 
‘power of definition’, in the context of the American president, in the 
following way:
The key assumption I make is that characterizations of social 
reality are not ‘given’; they are chosen from among multiple 
possibilities and hence always could have been otherwise.  Whatever 
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characterization prevails will depend on choices made by political 
actors.  People participate actively in shaping and giving meaning 
to their environment, and they do so primarily by means of naming 
situations within it.  Naming a situation provides the basis for 
understanding it and determining the appropriate response…
Because of his prominent political position and his access to the 
means of communication, the president, by defining a situation, 
might be able to shape the context in which events or proposals 
are viewed by the public…  
Do CEOs write their letters?
In response to any contention that CEOs are unlikely to have 
personally composed all of the written communications that appear 
above their signature, including the annual report CEO letter, it is 
noteworthy that many prominent CEOs, such as Jack Welch and 
Warren Buffett, have acknowledged publicly their strong personal role 
in drafting CEO letters to shareholders (Jones, 2005).  Some CEOs brief 
professional letter writers and investor relations staff about the tone and 
content they would like reflected in their letters to shareholders.  But 
it would stretch credibility to suggest that CEOs routinely delegated 
responsibility to others for determining the thoughts and issues that 
will comprise their signed, completed, public-domain letters.  It is 
much more defensible to argue that the thinking and issues infusing 
the CEO’s letter are determined primarily by the CEO, and that they 
are indicative of the CEO’s mindset – irrespective of whether or not 
the letters are crafted in their entirety personally by the CEO or by a 
ghost writer.  Schoenberger (2001, p. 281) argues (in the context of 
corporate leader autobiographies) that it is legitimate to regard CEOs 
as the authors of text written for them by ghost writers because CEOs 
have a ‘sense of themselves [that] is too strong to allow themselves to be 
ventriloquised by another person’.  Indeed, as signatories of their letter, 
CEOs assume legal responsibility for its content.  This acts as a strong 
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incentive for them to scrutinise closely, and to approve, the final version 
before signature and publication.  However, more importantly ‘in a 
perverse sense, whether or not a CEO is actively involved in composing 
a letter to stockholders does not matter: the words in the CEO’s letter 
are symbolic and emblematic, and the reader takes them to be the CEO’s 
own’ (Amernic & Craig, 2006, p. 200).
Why are CEO letters useful in assessing tone at the 
top?
There are at least five major reasons why CEOs’ annual letters to 
shareholders are worthy of serious investigation for their capacity to 
reflect and enact the tone at the top.
First, they are the signed, public, written representation of the 
corporate CEO.  The CEO’s signature makes the letter the CEO’s 
personal responsibility, and constitutes a direct and personal claim which 
is publicly visible for all to see.  There is no equivocation about claimed 
responsibility.  Even if others assisted in composing the wording, the 
ultimate attribution is to the CEO.  The fact that the CEO’s letter is 
written, and is not a verbal utterance, makes its attribution more potent 
and enduring.
Second, they are an important annual ritual, in a sociological sense 
(Etzioni, 2000).  They are associated intimately with the other contents 
of the corporate annual report, such as the management discussion 
and analysis, the audited financial statements, and management’s 
representations regarding the financial statements.  The dissemination 
of corporate annual reports, including the CEO letter, is an established 
annual event.  It is an account-giving and an explanation that is expected 
by important corporate stakeholders regarding the year just past and 
plans for the future.  Such narrative accounts are an important part 
of the functioning of society (Franzosi, 1998; Scott & Lyman, 1968).
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Third, they have potential to provide insight to top management’s 
mindset: for example, analysis of the metaphors and metaphorical 
structure of the CEO’s letter can expose implicit ideologies (Craig & 
Amernic, 2004; Amernic & Craig, 2000, 2006).
Fourth, they often emphasise the key performance measures by 
which top management wishes to be held accountable.  For example, 
in their annual report CEO letter for 2000, Enron’s two top leaders, 
Skilling and Lay, wrote that ‘Enron is laser-focused on earnings per share’. 
Such a single-minded and inapt fixation on one accounting measure has 
been claimed to be a key contributor to Enron’s failure (Stewart, 2006).
Fifth, they have potential to provide additional important insights 
about senior leaders.  For example, Barr et al. (1992) compared the 
CEO letters of two US railroad companies from 1949 to 1973.  They 
sought to reveal senior management’s differences in causal reasoning by 
constructing mental maps from the two railroads’ CEO letters over time.
In sum, the CEO’s letter in a corporate annual report offers potential 
to reveal important aspects regarding the tone at the top.  This is because 
leadership is enacted through language and language is an important 
means of crafting corporate culture.  The CEO letter is a privileged 
communication medium by which that enactment occurs.  The letter has 
the capacity to reflect the CEO’s priorities, mindset, implicit ideologies 
and perceived charisma and greatness.  
Linking the CEO letter, leadership and tone at the top
The CEO’s annual report letter is a personal and public statement 
with multiple potentialities.  It can define how performance will be 
measured and assessed; set out a business model, strategy, vision or 
direction; instil confidence; and be an accountability report on the 
organisation’s success or failure in attaining goals.  CEOs frequently 
intend their letters to enact their leadership: by charting an agenda 
behind which all employees must rally; by defining the values and culture 
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to which the organisation will aspire; and by convincing all stakeholders 
of the leader’s virtues.
CEOs now have a relatively short tenure period in which to make 
a difference.  They are claimed to be allowed barely eight months 
to develop a strategy, 19 months to improve the share price, and 21 
months to improve earnings (Haigh, 2003, p. 6).  Given that they have 
less time to make an impact, the rhetorical power of the CEO’s letter 
is stronger.  Paradoxically, the power of CEOs has grown significantly 
too, meaning that CEO communications assume even greater capacity 
to define organisational tone.
There is empirical evidence that the CEO’s letter to shareholders 
communicates important aspects of the tone at the top, thereby exerting 
important social influence over stakeholders.  Segars and Kohut (2001), 
for example, analysed 200 web-based letters of the CEOs of Fortune 
1000 companies.  They concluded that CEO letters have the capacity 
to reflect a CEO’s:
•	 credibility (sincerity and accuracy of interpretation of corporate 
events).
•	 efficacy (capacity to be a controlling force in organisational and 
environmental events).
•	 commitment (capacity to be a good steward).
•	 responsibility (the degree to which the CEO is a good citizen in 
business relationships).  
CEO letters are not monotonic, but vary considerably in the 
tone they project.  They reflect a wide range of leadership styles, CEO 
personalities, and the varied commercial contexts and cultural settings in 
which companies operate.  French CEO letters, for example, unlike those 
of other cultures, are characterised by ‘seduction, charm and obfuscation’ 
(Bournois & Point, 2006, p. 46).  The CEO letters of some companies 
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have statistically different semantic structures from other companies 
(Jang & Barnett, 1994).
Grace (2005) cites examples of the CEO narrative of Al Dunlap 
(Sunbeam), Bernard Ebbers (Worldcom), Dennis Kozlowski (Tyco), 
John Rigas (Adelphia) and Jeffrey Skilling (Enron) to argue that ‘the 
publicly announced tone at the top can sharply differ from the ethical 
and moral values actually observed within the organisation’.  However, 
none of the examples of CEO text cited by Grace was made within the 
formal and legal confines of the CEO’s letter to shareholders.  
Annual report letters of CEOs attempt to engage people’s emotions 
and commitment, and to define their reality; that is, to secure their 
compliance.  In many cases, for example, Enron, these attempts 
succeeded.  With Enron, the desire for compliance extended to the 
utilisation of rhetorical devices by the CEO.  These were aimed at 
producing a conversion experience on the part of employees, thus 
producing devoted believers in the organisational ideology (Tourish & 
Vatcha, 2005).  In other cases, there is either overt or covert resistance. 
But the point remains that, while conceding the existence of dissent and 
resistance, CEOs attempt to limit both by framing reality in particular 
ways and by defining acceptable and unacceptable values and behaviours. 
Their letters to shareholders are one of the most obvious and under-
studied framing devices to which management researchers have access.
The many critiques which challenge the authority wielded by CEOs 
within contemporary organisations (e.g Mintzberg, 2004; Lipman-
Blumen, 2005) do not fully explain the processes whereby the power and 
authority of leaders is manifest in the daily lives of followers.  Much of 
the leadership literature fails to address the issue of power, particularly at 
a ‘deep structure’ level – that is, in terms of the mechanisms and social 
interactions whereby leadership is enacted and expressed (Gordon, 
2002).  CEO letters and the discourse of CEOs generally, constitute 
a relatively unexplored means whereby the power of CEOs is manifest 
in their attempts to reframe reality for organisational actors by setting 
a tone at the top.  
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Summary
This book focuses attention on how to assess tone at the top.  What 
are its characteristics? And, more importantly, what are its implications? 
The focus is principally on the accounting and financial reporting 
consequences.  Will the tone at the top lead to highly conservative 
accounting, ‘adventurous’ accounting, or an accounting that is 
contemptuous of conventional norms, regulations and proprieties?
It is important to audit the tone at the top to understand better 
the motives and rationales underlying the accounting policies and 
procedures that are chosen from those allowable within generally 
accepted accounting principles and International Financial Reporting 
Standards – and the consequences of such choices.  The CEO has a very 
strong role in setting the tone of the company and this tone permeates 
the company and affects the variety of accounting conducted and the 
financial information reported.  For example, a CEO who sets a ‘can 
do, nothing is impossible’ tone at the top seems more likely to engender 
organisational acceptance of values of contempt for formality, disregard 
for administrative propriety, and lack of respect for regulation.  The 
upshot seems likely to be a greater risk of accounting and regulatory 
oversights, and the adoption of dubious or aggressive accounting 
techniques to ensure that ‘can do’ financial targets are reported.
The following chapters propose some qualitative and quantitative 
techniques whereby tone at the top can be assessed.  Some procedures 
that can assist in auditing or analysing an organisation’s tone at the top are 
explained and demonstrated.  The cultural audit proposal of Castellano 
and Lightle (2005) is operationalised by focusing on the words of CEOs 
and what can be discerned about tone at the top from those words.  The 
approach and the catchment of interest is very broad and is not confined 
to the three issues regarded by Castellano and Lightle to be of principal 
interest when conducting a cultural audit: pre-occupation with analysts’ 
expectations, pressure of numerical targets, and pre-occupation with 
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compensation plans.  The medium used in this analysis, for reasons 
just argued, is the CEO’s letter to shareholders in a company’s annual 
report.  Knowledge of tone at the top, evinced from the words of CEOs, 
should be instrumental to auditors in planning their reviews of internal 
controls, in assessing the effectiveness of corporate governance checks 
and balances, and in preparing their audit opinion.
3 Qualitative approaches 
Introduction
Numerous qualitative and quantitative methods are available to 
analyse CEO letters for insight into the culturally-embedded tone at 
the top of a company.  These methods can also help to ascertain any 
inconsistencies and apparent mal-intent therein.  They can be used by 
a broad constituency of stakeholders, including senior managers, as 
part of a self-assessment, and by external auditors, as part of the various 
assessments they are required to make about an auditee company.
In this chapter, a qualitative method is introduced that involves 
a series of ‘close readings’ (Amernic & Craig, 2006) drawing upon 
the nine focal points of a framework of qualitative inquiry suggested 
by Peshkin (2001).  In the following chapter, a computer-assisted 
quantitative approach is explained for assessing the tone at the top of 
a company.  This involves use of the DICTION text analysis software 
program (Hart, 2000).  
Close reading
The technique of close reading has been used to elicit understanding 
of CEO narrative and to reveal a CEO’s ‘emotionally charged beliefs, 
values, and norms’ (Trice & Beyer, 1993, p. 33).  This technique has 
been described as subjecting ‘selected samples of CEO text to multiple 
(usually three) close readings, conducted from different (but mutually 
reinforcing) perspectives.  Each close reading constitutes an intensive, 
almost forensic, scrutiny of the explicit and implicit composition of 
the text.  We typically conduct one close reading for ideology, one for 
rhetoric, and another for metaphor’ (Amernic & Craig, 2006, p. 6).
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Those engaging in close reading should consider using five of the 
strategies of textual analysis proposed by Martin (1990): dismantle 
dichotomies; examine silences; fill voids of understanding; decipher 
taboos; and interpret metaphors.  One highly beneficial way of using 
close reading to assess the tone at the top, which is also consistent with 
Amernic and Craig (2006), is to apply an ‘angle of vision’ perspective 
(Peshkin, 2001).  All references in the following section are taken from 
the latter source, unless otherwise indicated.
Angles of vision
Peshkin (2001) recommended the use of a range of possible focal 
points or ‘lenses through which to perceive’ (p. 242).  Such focal points or 
lenses are not mutually exclusive ways of learning about a phenomenon, 
such as the tone at the top, but help develop awareness that ‘other things 
come into focus and get connected, so that we move away from our 
[conditioned] starting point’ (p. 244).  
Peshkin’s nine focal points, and how they can assist in assessing tone 
at the top from the CEO letter, are explained briefly.
1. Patterns
 As a way of perceiving, one should identify what occurs regularly 
in the CEO letter.  For example, like most CEO letters, the letters 
crafted by Jack Welch during his 20 year tenure as CEO of GE begin 
with a recitation of financial results for the preceding year.  This is 
a recurrent feature of his CEO letters.  But, at times, this pattern 
was breached, and this is where insight might be available.  For 
instance, in 1983, contrary to his prior practice, Welch began his 
CEO letter with a discussion of GE’s strategy.  He thus framed his 
audience’s (and his own) attention on strategy (a proactive theme) 
rather than past financial results (a passive theme).
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2. Time
 Peshkin suggests that ‘the arrogance of presentism’ should be 
shunned.  With such a perspective, the CEO letter can be explored 
through the lens of history to help ‘grasp meaning’ (p. 243) and 
‘uncover honor, respect, concern and importance’ (pp. 243-44). 
Examining CEO letters over time and within different contexts, 
especially over the long-term tenure of a single CEO (for example, 
Walt Disney or Jack Welch), or of a set of companies over time, 
helps to understand the evolution of leadership approaches and 
adaptation (Amernic et al., 2007; Barr et al., 1992).  Cross-sectional 
comparison of CEO letters from companies in the same industry, 
in the context of an event affecting them all, is worthwhile too 
(Amernic & Craig, 2004).
3. Emic
 We can learn by showing respect ‘by taking seriously what [CEOs] 
say, what they think they are doing, what they make of things’ 
(p. 244).  This will help dispel ‘pre-conceived notions of the type 
that preclude careful, serious listening [reading]’ (p. 244).  Thus, 
one useful way of investigating a CEO letter to assess tone at the 
top is to imagine the motivations of the CEO for writing the 
letter as written, and for deploying the words used.  For example, 
during his ten years as CEO, Michael Eisner of the Walt Disney 
Company made frequent use of the word ‘Walt’ in his CEO letters 
to evoke the cultural image of the company’s founder and long-time 
CEO, Walter Elias Disney – a person who became an enduring 
cultural icon (Amernic & Craig, 2000).  A great deal can be learnt 
about CEO Eisner’s intent by enquiring why he repeatedly and 
consistently made the decision to draw rhetorically upon Walt in 
his CEO letters, at different times, and in different ways.  
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4. Positionality 
 Peshkin writes that ‘a strength of researchers is their capacity to take 
the role of others’ (p. 245).  Thus, in addition to critically reading a 
CEO letter from a more abstract, disinterested perspective, further 
valuable insights to tone at the top might be obtained by adopting 
the roles or mindsets (as we perceive them) of other corporate 
stakeholders, such as shareholders, employees, and competitors.  To 
‘truly understand’, Peshkin urges us to ‘de-centre’ ourselves so that we 
‘do justice to how someone can think and feel and conclude the way 
they do when all of this is, possibly, antithetical to how we ourselves 
think and feel!’ (p. 245).
5. Ideology
 Peshkin maintains that ‘the lenses of ideology are a powerful means of 
perception’ (p. 246).  Thus, implicit or explicit ideological stances – of 
the researched (that is, CEOs and their letters) and the researchers 
– require reflective consideration in assessing tone at the top.  If, for 
example, a CEO appeared to reflect a ‘strict father’ ideology of the 
type described by Lakoff (1996), the tone of the organisation would 
be expected to be one that was committed to conservative values, 
strict reward and punishment systems, and more importantly, a top-
down management style.  In such an ideological context, tone at the 
top would be particularly important.  It would be imposed on the 
organisation without genuine consultative processes.  (See Amernic 
(1998) for an analysis of the ideology in Walt Disney Company CEO 
Michael Eisner’s CEO letters.)  
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6. Themes 
 The themes pursued in CEO letters are likely to indicate attitudes 
with respect to power, ‘adaptation, transition and change’ (p. 247). 
Of particular interest should be binary themes such as conflict and 
co-operation, order and confusion, success and failure, resistance and 
compliance, and themes related to race, class, gender and ethnicity (p. 
247).  To illustrate this, a thematic analysis of the first three paragraphs 
of Jack Welch’s 1981 letter to shareholders of GE is provided in Table 
3.1.  This analysis draws on the techniques for theme identification 
proposed by Ryan and Bernard (2003).  
Table 3.1   Theme identification in Jack Welch’s 1981 CEO letter to the 
shareholders of General Electric
Text of 1981 CEO Letter Preliminary theme identification
Para 1: Your company’s 
underlying strength and 
resiliency were reflected in its 
1981 performance and year-
end financial position.
1.  The company has underlying strength and resiliency.  Could these 
be human characteristics?
2.  1981 performance and year-end financial position reflect this 
underlying strength and resiliency.
3.  Paras 1 and 2 together support the theme that: The company 
has underlying strength/resiliency which is reflected in its 1981 
performance and year-end financial position; and which is (or 
perhaps is shown by) the financial accounting measures listed 
in para 2.  
Para 2: Sales of $27.24 
billion were up 9% over 
1980.  Earnings of $1.65 
billion – $7.26 a share – were 
also 9% ahead of 1980.  
Total assets exceeded $20 
billion for the first time: our 
debt-to-capital ratio was 
19.4%; cash and marketables 
increased 12%, to almost 
$2.5 billion.
1.  The words ‘up’, ‘ahead’, ‘exceeded’, ‘increased’ all laud growth.  
The theme perhaps is: growth is good.
2.  Why are these particular financial accounting numbers chosen? 
Possible theme: Only a subset of financial accounting numbers 
reflects the company’s underlying strength and resiliency.
3.  Doing things ‘for the first time’ is lauded.
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Table 3.1   Theme identification in Jack Welch’s 1981 CEO letter to the 
shareholders of General Electric (Cont.)
Text of 1981 CEO Letter Preliminary theme identification
Para 3: These 1981 earnings 
were produced in the face of 
weak economic conditions 
in the United States and 
most foreign markets; they 
also came on top of record 
levels of expenditures for 
research and development 
($1.7 billion) and company 
investments in plant and 
equipment ($2 billion).  
A number of electronics 
and computer software 
companies were acquired, 
strengthening General 
Electric in two areas targeted 
for high growth.
1.  The company achieved laudatory ‘earnings’ (an accounting 
construct) in the face of adversity (‘weak economic conditions’ 
external to the company and perhaps beyond management’s 
control).
2.  The company’s ‘earnings’ achievements were in spite of ‘weak 
economic conditions’ and ‘record levels’ of R&D and P&E, two 
categories of forward-looking expenditures.  R&D and P&E 
are more controllable than ‘weak economic conditions’.  So, 
para 3 generally has as a theme: Management can overcome 
a poor external environment and earn a profit, and at the 
same time look to the future by making record R&D and P&E 
investments.  
3.  The last sentence reinforces the theme in para 2 by signalling 
that companies with technical virtuosity and innovation were 
acquired, and that management has a ‘high-growth’ strategy.
4.  Growth, and especially ‘targeted’ ‘high-growth’, is lauded.
5.  ‘Targeted’ is a thematic metaphor: top management is a military 
leadership.
6.  The words ‘were produced’, ‘were acquired’, and ‘targeted’ all are 
consistent with an underlying theme of top management agency.  
R&D = Research and development
P&E = Plant and equipment
7.   Metaphors
 Lakoff and Johnson (1980, p. 3) have noted that ‘our conceptual 
system is largely metaphorical …the way we think, what we 
experience, and what we do every day is very much a matter of 
metaphor’.  Metaphors go beyond directly evoking a straightforward 
comparison between a term and a concept: they also ‘generate 
inferences beyond the similarities required for their comprehension’ 
(Cornelissen, 2005, p. 754).  Metaphors accomplish this by linking 
abstract concepts to concrete things, and tie the familiar to the 
unknown by providing a ‘cognitive bridge between domains’ 
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(Putnam & Boys, 2006, p. 542).  Thus, message recipients 
actively construct a relationship between the explicit semantic 
domains contained in terms used and the concepts that they seek 
to evoke.  They cannot therefore be reduced to literal propositions 
(Cornelissen, 2006).
  Metaphors are often embedded in the deep structure of a text, 
rather than stated overtly.  In addition to their formal intent, they 
challenge analysts to tease out their implied and explicit inferences, 
paradoxes and outright contradictions.  The linguistic metaphors 
evident in the words and sentences of CEO letters reveal underlying 
cognitive metaphors that potentially structure the way CEOs 
think – including how they reason and perceive the world and 
their company’s place in it.  Identification of such metaphors in 
CEO letters, along with their entailments, should provide insight 
to how CEOs portray the way they intend their leadership to be 
regarded.  As the analysis in Table 3.1 reveals, Welch seemed to have 
a militaristic view of leadership.  Such a conclusion is consistent with 
analysis of the corpus of Jack Welch’s 20 CEO letters to shareholders 
of GE in which one of the pervading root metaphors was claimed 
to be ‘Jack Welch is a commander’ (Amernic et al., 2007).  
  As a further example, the following appeared in the 1991 CEO 
letter to shareholders for GE, signed by Jack Welch as CEO:
1991 did, however, once again remind us how absolutely 
critical productivity growth is in the brutally Darwinian 
global marketplaces in which virtually all of our businesses 
compete.  We are aware, for instance, that if we had the same 
productivity growth in ’90 and ’91 that we had in ’80 and 
’81, our ’91 earnings would have been more like $3 billion 
rather than $4.435 billion.  We also are acutely aware that, 
without productivity growth, it is possible to lose in 24 
months businesses that took a half-century, or a century, to 
build.  Productivity growth is essential to industrial survival.
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 It is relevant to consider how the metaphor, ‘the marketplace is 
brutally Darwinian’, structures Welch’s thinking and (apparently) 
his behaviour as CEO, and helps create a tone at the top.  The 
image is clearly intended to be one of brutal competition, in 
which ‘the survival of the fittest’ is assured.  Competition of this 
kind is therefore depicted as beneficial, whatever its immediate 
unpleasant effects.  But the invocation of Darwin goes beyond this. 
It also, subtly, frames business action as a natural and inescapable 
phenomenon, and thus, in some sense, a process that goes beyond 
the mediating power of human volition.  Organisations can depict 
themselves as reacting impersonally to impersonal historical 
processes, rather than deliberately choosing particular courses of 
action – such as downsizing.  Of course, business is not alone in 
invoking the spectre of Darwinism.  But, as others have suggested, 
this often means that Darwinian ideas are misrepresented, applied 
to inappropriate contexts, and erroneously employed to justify 
unethical practices and ideas (such as that of racial superiority) 
(Gould, 2007).  Welch’s use of Darwinian ideas in this context 
carries rhetorical power.  Whether those ideas explain much about 
what GE was doing at the time may be another matter.
8.   Irony 
 ‘Irony is an enabling perspective for enhancing perception’ (p. 
248).  It helps us to become more aware of something by seeing 
‘the viewpoint of its antithesis’.  Thus, we might appreciate the 
CEO’s ‘contradictions between prevailing beliefs and the realities of 
mass society’ (p. 248).  From irony we can learn about ‘that which 
is contradictory; and incongruity or paradox’ (p. 249).  Thus, if a 
CEO lauds corporate success despite financial results indicating 
serious problems, or when a CEO claims that ‘our people are our 
most important asset’ in the midst of a major corporate downsizing, 
the attendant irony might suggest a disconnection in the CEO’s 
perceptions of reality – or an almost callous disregard for such reality.
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9.   Silence 
 It is important to understand what is excluded from a CEO’s 
text.  ‘Detecting silence opens us to an institution’s injustices, and 
missed opportunities’; and, quite often, what is missing in analysis 
‘is disappointment, apathy, alienation, or sadness’ or ‘those silences 
indicative of achievement that tell us we are somewhere worth being, 
that success is happening, that goals are being achieved’ (p. 250). 
Thus, although high performing organisations tend to cultivate a 
climate in which the ‘brutal facts of reality’ are confronted head on 
(Collins, 2001, p. 67), much CEO rhetoric avoids a frank discussion 
of difficulties.  For example, as shown in chapter five, BP’s (British 
Petroleum) Chief Executive’s letters to shareholders between 1998 
and 2006 contained virtually no disclosures about the operational 
safety and cost control issues implicated in that company’s refinery 
disaster at Texas City in 2005.  Nonetheless, a major investigatory 
committee concluded that the problems were systemic:
Process safety leadership in an organization must start at 
the top.  The Board of Directors of BP plc, its Group Chief 
Executive, and corporate management as a group must set 
the process safety ‘tone at the top’ and establish appropriate 
expectations regarding process safety performance.  Those 
expectations must reflect an unwavering commitment to 
process safety and infuse into BP’s workforce the mindset that 
process accidents are not acceptable.  Those expectations must 
also be translated into measurable goals designed to move 
BP toward the achievement of excellence in process safety 
performance.  (Report of the BP US Refineries Independent 
Safety Review Panel, 2007, p. 244)
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It is striking that these issues are long standing in the oil industry. 
Researchers have documented a substantial gap between the declared 
aspirations, perceptions and language of senior managers on the issue, and 
the reality of practice on the ground (e.g. Collinson, 1999).  Assessing tone 
at the top in BP communications on this issue today, and contrasting it 
with other information sources, exposes such tensions to public scrutiny, 
and enables an assessment of how much, or how little, has changed over 
the years on this vital issue.
Summary
The nine focal points described above can assist in learning about 
tone at the top.  For example, a picture might emerge of a company that 
is static, and maintains the same organisational characteristics and values 
from year to year (‘patterns’, ‘time’); promotes a behaviour and a culture 
that reflects the social construction of the CEO (‘emic’, ‘positionality’); 
is obsessed with the virtues of a free market and a ‘survival of the fittest 
mentality’ (‘ideology’); is resistant to change, pro-conflict and success-
obsessed (‘themes’); is motivated by the ‘business is war’ metaphor to 
the extent that it is overtly aggressive, lacking compassion, and non-
conciliatory (‘metaphor’); is disingenuous in pleading the need for cost 
cutting and wage restraint while substantially increasing the remuneration 
benefits of directors and senior executives (‘irony’); and declines to disclose 
fully the ramifications of a pending class action law suit (‘silences’).
The analysis of themes in the first three paragraphs of the CEO 
letter of GE (presented in Table 3.1) can be supplemented extensively 
by the various perspectives offered by Peshkin’s (2001) other eight angles 
of vision.  Such analysis adduces important features of the ambient tone 
at the top of GE during Jack Welch’s leadership.  It reveals a company 
and a leader who are asserted to be strong, resilient, confident, canny, 
omniscient, smart, militaristic, and aggressive; and with employees 
who are regarded as subservient resources rather than as human beings 
deserving to be consulted about decisions affecting their welfare.  
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Chapter five presents a detailed example of the capacity of close 
reading techniques to discern aspects of the culturally embedded tone at the 
top of BP plc during the period 1998-2006, but with special emphasis on 
1998.  For the moment, the following chapter introduces a quantitatively-
based approach for assessing the tone at the top.
4 Quantitative approaches
Introduction
This chapter introduces a quantitative, computer-assisted approach to 
assessing tone at the top which involves the dictionary-based software 
DICTION (Hart, 2000).  The use of DICTION is illustrated by applying 
it to the CEO letters to shareholders of GE for 1981-2000 signed by 
Jack Welch; and to the last CEO letter to shareholders of Enron before 
its collapse in 2001.  Chapters seven and eight present more detailed 
examples to reinforce claims about the capacity of DICTION to reveal 
important features of tone at the top, especially when used in conjunction 
with qualitative approaches.
DICTION analysis
Computer-assisted text (or content) analysis has been used in a 
wide variety of research settings.  For example, Williams et al. (2003) 
related the reduction of language complexity over a several-year period 
to the cognitive illness of a historical figure.  Hogenraad (2003) analysed 
the content of literary stories and real-life documents concerned with 
conflict to see whether certain words might predict war.  Magnusson et 
al. (2005) used data-mining techniques to ascertain whether changes in 
the text of quarterly reports indicated a change in financial data in the 
next quarter.  More particularly, in their study of the leadership language 
of US president G.W. Bush, Bligh et al. (2004) contended that:
…content analysis allows the investigator insight into the often 
symbolically laden connotations used by leaders themselves in 
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context, making it a valuable tool for researchers specifically 
interested in leadership as the management of meaning… (p. 563)
Analysis of large corpora of text has been revolutionised over the 
past decade by the availability of numerous low cost computer-assisted 
software packages.  In addition, the body of knowledge pertaining to 
computer-based text analysis has expanded greatly (see, for example 
Pennebaker et al. 2003; Hart, 2001; West, 2001).  
A review of several computer-based text analysis packages for this 
project led to the choice of DICTION (Hart, 2000), supplemented at 
times by the use of ‘Word’ and ‘ANTCONC’ (for its ‘keyword-in-context’ 
(KWIC) and other corpus-analysis features; see Anthony, 2005).  The 
choice of DICTION as the main quantitative computer-assisted text 
analysis tool was influenced by its widespread recent use in the leadership 
literature, and its introduction into the accounting and related literatures.
An extensive list of research works that have employed DICTION is 
posted to the website dictionsoftware.com.  Recently, for example, in the 
leadership literature, DICTION has been used by Bligh and Hess (2007) 
and Bligh et al. (2004); and in the accounting and related literatures by 
Sydserff and Weetman (2002) and Yuthas et al. (2002), among others. 
To justify their support of DICTION, Sydserff and Weetman (2002) 
contend that:
…DICTION offers considerable potential for the accounting 
researcher.  It is simple to use, it is automated, and yet it embraces 
a considerable degree of sophistication.  The dictionaries have been 
constructed by experts in linguistics… (p. 533)
In relation to validity and reliability, the objectivity of DICTION 
analysis is a particular strength.  Its automated nature, both for 
coding and quantification, renders it attractive as a research 
instrument…In particular, the specific theoretical basis of the 
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approach in linguistic semantics, the fact that the approach is well 
established in the applied linguistics literature and the independent 
attestation of the approach all point to strength in face validity.  
(p. 534) 
DICTION is especially attractive to those interested in the influence 
of communication and language of senior corporate leadership on the 
tone at the top.  This influence is a political function, and DICTION 
was developed especially for assessing political leadership discourse 
(see Hart, 1984, 2001).  Bligh and Hess (2007), for example, in their 
study of former US Federal Reserve Chairman Greenspan’s rhetorical 
leadership, claim that:
DICTION was a natural choice as it was explicitly developed 
for political leadership discourse while paying careful attention 
to linguistic theory…To our knowledge, DICTION is the only 
existing content analysis program that has been specifically designed 
for public policy dialogue… (p. 92)
Bligh et al. (2004), in their study of US presidential rhetoric pre-
9/11 and post-9/11, justify their use of DICTION in the following way:
...the choice of a program should not be taken lightly in content 
analysis.  There are a wide variety of pre-existing dictionaries and 
software packages to choose from, but caution should be exercised 
in evaluating the purposes of the dictionaries and the extent to 
which previously developed constructs are consonant with the 
current research question.  To our knowledge, DICTION is the 
only software program that was explicitly designed to examine 
the linguistic elements of political leaders.  In addition, the 
construction of its dictionaries was based on careful attention to 
linguistic theory …  DICTION uses 31 pre-defined dictionaries, 
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containing over 10,000 search words, to analyze a passage…All 
of the dictionaries contain individual words only, and homographs 
are explicitly treated by the program through statistical weighting 
procedures… (p. 564)
How does DICTION work?
DICTION uses 31 word-lists or dictionaries to search a given text. 
It produces 31 corresponding raw frequency measures based upon 500-
word segments of text (Hart, 2000).  DICTION permits users to analyse 
text in a variety of optional ways: 
•	 only the first 500 words;
•	 an average for a complete text (up to 500,000 words) as averages of 
500-word segments; and
•	 in separate 500-word segments.
In addition, for texts and text segments of less than 500 words, 
DICTION permits the user to choose either a raw score option or 
an option that extrapolates the result for the small file to a 500-word 
segment.
The 31 dictionary measures have labels such as ‘numerical 
terms’, ‘ambivalence’, ‘self-reference’, and ‘tenacity’.  In addition, 
DICTION produces measures of four calculated variables (‘insistence’, 
‘embellishment’, ‘variety’, ‘complexity’) by linguistically-based methods 
of calculation.
Finally, five master variables (‘activity’, ‘optimism’, ‘certainty’, 
‘realism’, ‘commonality’) are constructed using various combinations of 
the 31 dictionary measures and the four calculated variables.  Thus, 40 
measures are produced by the program.  A complete set of DICTION’s 
40 measures, along with explanations, are provided in Appendix 1. 
The master variables are defined in Table 4.1.
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Table 4.1 Definition of master variables
Master variable Definition (Hart, 2000)
Certainty Language indicating resoluteness, inflexibility, and completeness 
and a tendency to speak ex cathedra
Optimism Language endorsing some person, group, concept or event or 
highlighting their positive entailments
Activity Language featuring movement, change, the implementation of 
ideas and the avoidance of inertia
Realism Language describing tangible, immediate, recognisable matters 
that affect people’s everyday lives
Commonality Language highlighting the agreed-upon values of a group and 
rejecting idiosyncratic modes of engagement
As a caveat in interpreting DICTION’s normative values for 
comparison purposes, Sydserff and Weetman’s (2002) comments are 
kept in mind:
A distinctive feature of DICTION 5.0 is the availability of a 
number of normative values for comparative purposes.  One of 
these is ‘corporate financial reports’, which consists of a sample of 
48 annual financial reports from Fortune 500 companies.  The 
texts analysed comprise the president’s letter and sections of the 
management discussion and analysis (MD&A).  Use of such 
comparatives would require some caution, because the sample 
relates to US companies and to relatively large companies.  (p. 533)
Use of large companies in constructing DICTION’s normative 
values is consistent with the subject-matter of this report, large 
companies.  However, for the FTSE 100 companies such norms must 
be used with caution.  Even for FORTUNE 100 companies analysed 
later as well, the norms are suggestive only, and more material changes in 
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DICTION variables should be the focus.  With these limitations in mind, 
the GE example, focusing on the DICTION master variables, follows.
General Electric
DICTION’s master variables are computed for the first 500-words 
of Jack Welch’s CEO letters to shareholders of GE for 1981 to 2000, as 
shown in Table 4.2. 
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Table 4.2   DICTION master variable measures for Jack Welch’s 1981-
2000 CEO letters to shareholders of General Electric
Activity Optimism Certainty Realism Commonality
Year Score Score Score Score Score
1981 42.59 51.94 50.09 47.09 54.57
1982 54.38 56.78 51.85 58.48 49.86
1983 48.65 57.79 50.14 52.25 52.59
1984 49.32 53.74 47.00 45.67 50.09
1985 49.31 53.47 54.05 55.36 52.23
1986 51.26 51.67 49.95 53.81 52.71
1987 52.29 46.57 55.90 55.90 50.79
1988 51.91 51.85 53.76 57.35 50.56
1989 48.05 53.81 49.13 47.22 43.28
1990 51.33 54.71 49.33 56.05 50.37
1991 49.87 53.49 48.31 53.03 51.15
1992 52.62 54.57 49.04 54.84 51.71
1993 55.65 50.19 48.06 47.98 49.29
1994 50.48 52.47 49.40 56.78 49.72
1995 54.27 47.83 45.07 48.56 48.06
1996 51.98 52.30 51.67 52.49 48.71
1997 50.41 52.50 46.77 56.74 50.72
1998 55.13 51.99 51.72 54.25 47.81
1999 49.96 54.79 51.89 56.89 49.13
2000 49.51 54.21 52.86 56.00 49.90
Notes:
First 500 words analysed (Class = Business – Corporate financial reports).  
Normal range for measures are as follows:
Activity low 48.16 high 53.97
Optimism low 48.21 high 52.50
Certainty low 48.44 high 50.26
Realism low 44.40 high 46.85
Commonality low 48.40 high 55.30
All out-of-normal range scores are in bold typeface.  Low out-of-range scores are italicised.  High 
out-of-range scores are underlined.
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 Some interesting patterns are revealed in the data for the first 500 words 
of these twenty CEO letters of GE.  Language displaying strong realism 
appears throughout the 20 years, except for 1984.  Language displaying 
certainty appears to flow, then ebb, and then flow again throughout 
Welch’s tenure, reaching a low point at the start of the 1995 letter, 
and recovering during the last three years of Welch’s tenure as CEO. 
Optimism also seems to go through cycles, not necessarily in the same 
years as certainty, but it also ends with a flourish as Welch approaches 
retirement.  There is no unusually high or low frequency of use by Welch 
of words that indicate commonality in the beginning 500 words of his 
CEO letters.  
1982 seems to have been an unusual year, as far as semantic tone 
measured by DICTION is concerned.  The CEO letter for that year scores 
significantly higher than the norms for activity, optimism, certainty, 
and realism.  Since Hart (2001) has shown that ‘virtually no statistical 
relationship exists among the five variables’ (p. 45) based upon his 
analysis of over 20,000 verbal texts, this particular letter is semantically 
potent, perhaps signalling a take-charge, top-down communicative 
approach to leadership.  Since 1982 was only the second CEO letter 
signed by Welch, was he attempting to establish his particular view of 
what leadership should be all about? Notice that the realism score for 
this year is especially high, perhaps to condition GE stakeholders to the 
need to acquiesce and comply with the new leader’s direction? 
Because of the pattern in this year, the semantic tone suggests a 
leadership language tone at the top that emphasises Hart’s definitions of 
certainty, optimism, activity, and realism, but not commonality.  Such a 
pattern offers hints about the tone at the top being constructed by GE’s 
new leader.  However, it signals that other aspects related to tone at the 
top (including other speeches by the CEO and other senior corporate 
leaders, changes to performance measures embedded in compensation 
plans, etc.) might merit close scrutiny in order to understand whether 
a new, perhaps risky, culture was being nurtured.  
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Enron
Now, a brief analysis of the dictionary variables of Enron’s last pre-
bankruptcy CEO letter (for the year 2000) is provided.  Five of the 31 
dictionary variables that scored more than two standard deviations from 
the norms are examined in Table 4.3.
Table 4.3    Extreme out-of-range DICTION variables in Enron’s last 
letter to shareholders
DICTION 
dictionary % of words
Normal range
Standard
variable Frequency analysed Low High score
Praise 8.57 1.71 0.00 5.13  2.25
Familiarity 87.00 17.40 106.54 137.49 -2.26
Present concern 13.05 2.61 1.06 8.54  2.21
Human interest 34.00 6.80 0.00 12.10 3.56
Diversity 7.00 1.40 0.00 3.53 2.77
The word frequency in the CEO letter for these variables was 
either extremely high (for praise, present concern, human interest, and 
diversity) or extremely low (for familiarity).  (The definitions of these 
variables are provided in Appendix 1).  This pattern is suggestive of a 
CEO who is prone to promote the accomplishments and qualities of his 
company (praise) in a way that has a ‘life-like’ character (human interest) 
but which lacks a common touch (familiarity).  The portrait is that of a 
physical achievement-oriented, but aloof, CEO.  It is a portrait which 
is consistent with the conclusion of a previous qualitative analysis of 
Enron’s 2000 CEO letter by Craig and Amernic (2004):
If we read the 2000 letter generously (that is, without assumptions 
of deceit on the part of the letter’s authors), Lay and Skilling seemed 
to have been caught up in their own hubris and haughtiness – 
deluded into thinking that Enron was so influential that it was 
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immune to the effects of any recession in the macro-economy… A 
hubristic stance is reflected also in the ‘imperialistic’ words used 
in the letter… (p. 826)
Although computer-assisted textual analysis has the potential to 
offer intriguing overviews of a text, it should not stand alone, but should 
be used with qualitative close reading analyses for a deeper appreciation 
of tone at the top.  For example, one of the angles of vision Peshkin 
(2001) described was the identification of themes.  With computer 
assistance, trends and patterns can be discerned in the use of keywords 
and constructs (using ANTCONC).  Thus, qualitative analysis is 
complemented by identifying more extensive themes than might have 
been possible by non-computer means alone.  As a particular instance, 
how often, and in what contexts, does a CEO letter contain personal 
pronouns (‘I’ for a single CEO; ‘we’ for a jointly-signed letter)? Are such 
uses of personal pronouns similar to the uses by CEOs of peer companies? 
Furthermore, patterns in DICTION results can be revealing.  For 
example, the fact that the language in Jack Welch’s CEO letters always 
(except for one year out of the twenty) scored significantly higher than 
the norm on the master variable realism, suggests enduring construction 
of a culture that must recognise and adapt to immediate, tangible 
matters.  Of course, deciding what should be included as immediate and 
tangible (in other words deciding on what qualifies as being the ‘reality’ 
to which the company must adapt) seems to be guarded jealously as a 
senior management prerogative.  Thus, the language of the letter signals 
a rigid, top-down leadership style and an accompanying tone at the top. 
DICTION as a potential diagnostic tool for auditors
DICTION can be used to alert auditors to the possibility of an 
entity’s exposure to business leadership risk.  Auditors can draw upon 
extant literature and their reading of emerging threats, trends and issues 
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that are critical to the construction of whatever master variable they 
conclude will help them to detect an ‘undesirable’ tone at the top.  They 
could then analyse CEO text using DICTION and be watchful for any 
out-of-range observations in respect of this variable.  If such out-of-
range observations were detected, these could be used to prompt the 
deployment of closer audit monitoring and more stringent corporate 
governance controls.
For example, auditors might contemplate constructing a master 
variable that sought to detect extremely low out-of-range scores for 
humility.  Such an approach could draw, indirectly at least, from the 
theory of leader ‘humility’ which is based upon ideas such as those of 
Collins (2001).  These ideas are that long-term organisational success 
is likely to result when a leader proffers a blend of humility and strong 
personal will.  So, what might be of particular interest would be the 
corollary or obverse of this idea: that what is undesirable is the opposite 
of humility and strong personal will – a blend of hubris and personal 
abandon.  
Morris et al. (2005) outline theoretical aspects of humility in 
leadership.  They regard the construct of humility as being central to 
good leadership:
Specifically, the superior performance of the organization led 
by the ‘humble’ CEO is continually sustained over long periods, 
often spanning decades.  Second, the organization is quite often 
the benchmark performer in its particular industry.  Third, if 
the humble leader retires, resigns, or otherwise leaves the helm 
of the organization, the sustained superior performance of the 
organization continues long past the tenure of the humble leader.  
Finally, ‘embarrassments’ such as mistresses, theft for personal gain, 
‘cooking the books’, excessive perquisites, etc., do not seem to arise 
in connection with the leadership of the ‘humble’ CEO.  (Morris 
et al., 2005, p. 1,324)
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The CEO who might be a business risk (leading to doubts, albeit 
possibly remote, about an entity’s going concern status) could be theorised 
as likely to present the obverse profile; that is, one in which we might 
expect DICTION variables such as the master variable certainty and the 
dictionary variables blame and levelling to be rather high or moderate, 
while human interest and cooperation might be expected to score rather 
low.  A difficulty, of course, is that true humility in leadership, or its 
obverse of hubris, are difficult to observe unambiguously.  Therefore, 
in constructing DICTION expectations of hubris, an auditor should 
look for words used in CEO’s letters that seem plausible indicators of 
predictors of hubris.  
Amernic and Craig (2006), in their summation of a decade of 
research during which they analysed CEO letters to shareholders, 
described a common portrait of some CEOs as characterised by 
‘hubris, greed, contempt, deceit’.  To this portrait one might add the 
common features which seem to have characterised CEO behaviour 
in the prelude to corporate failures in the past few decades: a CEO 
exuding over-confidence, cockiness and a ‘can-do’ mentality.  The tone 
at the top engendered by such characteristics and behaviour is likely 
to be unconducive to sound corporate governance, respect for ethical 
principles, and adherence to the law and regulation (including to 
accounting norms such that companies present their financial statements 
‘fairly’.) 
In this regard, auditors might, for example, construct a hubris (or 
similarly titled) master variable in the DICTION style and commit to 
investigating more closely any extremely positive out-of-range measures. 
Such an index could be compiled by combining scores for praise 
(representing a propensity for ‘affirmations’), accomplishment (reflecting 
a ‘can-do’ mentality’), and tenacity (reflecting confidence).  Thus:
Hubris = praise + accomplishment + tenacity
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In the case of Enron’s final CEO letter before its collapse, the out-
of-range standard deviations were as follows:
Hubris = 2.25 (praise) + 1.89 (accomplishment) + 0.78 (tenacity)
Thus, on average, this (alleged) indicator of hubris was 4.92/3 = 1.64 
standard deviations from the mean expected score.
An auditor prepared to accept an audit risk of 5.05% (that is, of 
observations, more than +1.64 standard deviations from the mean.  See 
normal distribution tables) would be indifferent as to whether or not 
to investigate this further.  But if the audit risk was greater than 5.05% 
such a result could trigger further audit scrutiny of the CEO’s leadership 
and the attendant business leadership risks.
Summary
Our approach to employing DICTION to assess tone at the 
top is experimental.  No rigid formulaic method seems appropriate. 
Nonetheless, it is important to analyse whatever metric is chosen not 
only cross-sectionally, but also longitudinally, for emerging trends. 
Further, it is important to use quantitative techniques cautiously and 
in conjunction with qualitative techniques.
Three further broad suggestions are pertinent.  First, initially 
attempt to interpret patterns in the DICTION results of an individual 
company and for groups of companies.  In doing so, keep the context 
of the company of interest in mind to the extent feasible.  For example, 
the DICTION results for GE’s 1982 CEO letter (included in Table 4.2) 
were interpreted within the context that a new CEO would intend to 
firmly establish his rhetorical leadership.
Second, look for material changes in DICTION’s dictionary 
variables, calculated variables, and master variables, or in clusters of these 
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measures.  For example, in Table 4.2, 1982 seems to be an unusual year 
for GE in terms of its semantic tone, at least according to DICTION. 
Chapter six illustrates such an apparent material change in the 2004 
CEO letter for the American company, New Century Financial, a major 
contributor to the sub-prime mortgage crisis in the USA.
Third, another useful activity can be to match DICTION measures 
with theories of leadership that indicate positive or negative aspects of 
tone at the top.  For example, transformational leadership, especially 
more extreme varieties, might suggest the possibility of dysfunctional 
tone at the top (Tourish & Pinnington, 2002).  Amernic et al. (2007, 
p. 1839) examine transformational leadership ‘as a rhetorical artefact 
of one-sided dialogue emanating from a powerful leader’.  This implies 
that the DICTION master variable certainty, and the calculated variable, 
insistence, might both be unusually high, as would the dictionary 
variables tenacity and self-reference.  
Quantitative, computer-assisted text analysis of CEO letters can 
help to understand how tone at the top is enacted linguistically and 
reflected in CEO letters.  The value in employing text analysis software 
such as DICTION is in providing a bird’s-eye view, with consistency, of 
word usage in a large corpus of texts (Hart, 2001).  But its potential for 
brute empiricism should be blunted by theorising about patterns and 
expectations, and its use as part of a combined qualitative-quantitative 
analysis.
The techniques discussed here and in chapter three have the 
potential to generate multiple insights into organisational discourse. 
They can enable enquirers, such as auditors, to discern the tone at the 
top much more accurately.  From there, a clearer understanding can be 
developed of leadership patterns, styles and intentions.  In turn, such 
analysis can foster a much better appreciation of an organisation’s culture 
and associated communication dynamics.  
5 ‘close reading’ of leadership language
 
Introduction
The following quotes demonstrate, the importance of the tone at the 
top and CEO language:
Tone at the top is your best defense.  (Sutton, 2007, p. 10)
The CEO sets the tone – good or bad. (Edersheim, 2007, p. 43)
Generally written as a signed personal letter, the document [the 
CEO letter] has enormous rhetorical importance in building 
credibility and imparting confidence… (Hyland, 1998, p. 224)
We got the [annual report CEO] letter done, as we always did.  
The 1995 letter started out with one hundred drafts, several of 
them major… (Bill Lane, Jack Welch’s speechwriter for 20 years, 
in Lane, 2008, p. 241)
…letters to shareholders provide a unique glimpse into the minds of 
CEOs in a way that is impossible to obtain through other means. 
(Yadav et al., 2007, p. 89)
A more critical awareness of the language used by leaders…would 
enable a more fruitful debate about the actual contribution of 
leadership to organisational outcomes. (Tourish et al., 2010)
This chapter analyses the text of the Chief Executive’s letters to 
shareholders of British Petroleum (BP) from 1998 to 2006.  These 
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temporal endpoints are significant because the years 1998 to 2006 were 
momentous in BP’s history.  In 1998, BP and the American petroleum 
company Amoco merged to create a dominant company in the industry. 
2006 saw the last CEO letter to shareholders signed by long-time BP 
Chief Executive, The Lord Browne of Madingley (previously known as 
Sir John Browne) before his abrupt departure from BP in 2007.
BP was not the focus of a financial reporting scandal during these 
years.  Nonetheless it is worthwhile to examine the company’s tone at the 
top over this time period because BP is an important global corporation 
in a sensitive industry.  Such an examination, especially if conducted 
by key internal and external corporate stakeholders concerned with the 
company’s integrity, has the potential to identify dysfunctional aspects 
of leadership and encourage improvements in the tone at the top before 
a crisis in financial reporting or similar matter occurs.  Interest in the 
tone at the top should be a continuing pursuit for key stakeholders – and 
not just an after-the-fact remedial exercise – although the retrospective 
examination of how leadership language contributes to a reporting 
crisis is also important in understanding the tone at the top and what 
contributes to its impairment.  Such an examination in connection with 
the CEO letters of the American company, New Century Financial 
Corporation is conducted in chapter six.
The analysis of BP’s CEO letters is based on two close readings, 
each conducted from a different perspective (Amernic & Craig, 
2001, 2006).  It is acknowledge that CEO letters are only part of the 
communication and language spectrum of a corporate CEO.  Other 
aspects of CEO discourse, ranging from informal corridor conversations 
to formal speeches, are important as well.  Some examples of the other 
CEO discourse mediums are provided by Amernic and Craig’s (2001) 
examination of the joint merger announcement by the heads of three 
major aluminium companies; and by Hayes (1922), who examined 
corporate publications targeted to employees.  CEO discourse is not 
limited to text and talk; for example, Chatterjee and Hambrick (2007) 
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examined the prominence of the CEO’s photograph in a company’s 
annual report as an indicator of narcissistic tendencies.
The first close reading perspective of BP’s CEO letters identifies 
the themes in the letters.  This perspective recognises the insight CEO 
letters provide to what is apparently important to the CEO.  However, 
the term ‘theme’ itself requires definition.  Ryan and Bernard (2003, p. 
87) observe that determining ‘what is a theme?’ is a ‘problem [which has] 
a long history’.  They contend that ‘You know you have found a theme 
when you can answer the question, what is this expression an example 
of?’  The present research draws upon several techniques they suggest in 
the thematic analysis of BP’s CEO letters using close readings.  The most 
important of these ‘typically involves pawing through texts’ (Ryan and 
Bernard, 2003, p. 88) – in other words, reading and re-reading texts, 
and re-reading them again and again, picking out textual instances of 
seemingly-relevant concepts, then refining these concepts until they 
apparently can be refined no more.
The second close reading perspective involves analysing the 
metaphorical features of the CEO’s letter.  For many people, metaphors 
might seem innocuous when first encountered in a CEO’s speech, a 
letter in a company’s annual report signed by a CEO, or elsewhere 
(including non-textual, visual metaphors such as in a photograph of 
a CEO).  Some might be tempted even to regard a metaphor as just a 
rhetorical flourish for entertainment or emphasis.  However, the modern 
theory of metaphor draws attention to the capacity for metaphors to 
reveal a corporate leader’s mindset, and to affect the behaviour of others. 
Metaphors influence behaviour by the images they trigger, the emotions 
they stir, and what they emphasise and obscure (Bergmann, 1982).  
However, this chapter does not provide a psychological assessment of 
corporate CEOs – nor is this provided elsewhere in this book.  Although 
there is a well-established literature (mainly in political psychology) 
that garners indications of political leaders’ psychological characteristics 
at-a-distance (see Schafer, 2000), the main interest is in the leadership 
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provided through the key discourse medium of the CEO letter.  The 
actual psychological state of the CEO is not discussed, although this is 
probably related.  
Indications of the tone at the top in the CEO’s letter can be 
explicit or implicit.  Explicit indications can be sought, for example, by 
determining the topics and themes that are included in the letter.  What 
is the relative importance of these topics and themes? How, if at all, are 
these topics and themes pursued outside of the CEO letter? Does the 
letter contain empty words and platitudes?
Alternatively, indications of tone at the top can be implicit.  For 
example, what metaphors are used? How are these metaphors linked to 
the topics and themes in the letter? How well-developed and extensive 
are the metaphors? Are they used to support reasoning in the letter – that 
is, to develop specific arguments and positions? Are enthymemes (or 
unstated assumptions) evident, and if so, what are the implications for 
positions taken in the CEO’s letter? How, if at all, is hedging language 
(that is, language employing equivocation) used? How are rhetorical 
techniques used (Lanham, 1991)? What are the silences in the letter? For 
example, is there an indication of a turnaround strategy if the results of 
the current year are poor? Is there mention – in a meaningful and non-
platitudinous way – of publicly-known events affecting the company? 
What accounting performance measures are mentioned? Are the 
measures justified?  How are their weaknesses acknowledged? Are failures 
or lack of success attributed to events beyond the leadership’s control? 
Is success attributed to the leadership? How is the CEO’s leadership 
portrayed – as even-handed, heroic, transformational (Amernic et 
al., 2007) or perhaps, unintentionally, as destructively-narcissistic 
(Chatterjee & Hambrick, 2007)? 
All of these explicit and implicit aspects of the CEO’s letter provide 
insight to the tone at the top of an organisation.  Perhaps just as 
importantly, they provide insight to the tone at the top that the leadership 
of an organisation intends to exist.  Consequently, the concept of tone at 
the top is largely about leadership and how it is perceived and enacted. 
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The CEO letter is a convenient, important, publicly-accessible medium 
for ascertaining the tone that top corporate leadership sets, wishes to 
set, and wishes to be seen by others.
The company of interest here, BP plc, is described first to emphasise 
the context within which BP’s CEO discourse took place.  An analysis 
of CEO discourse is enriched in helping to understand the tone at the 
top if it is embedded contextually.  Examples of other research on CEO 
communication and metaphor that places CEO discourse in context 
include studies by Amernic and Craig (2000) (of Walt Disney’s 1940 
CEO letter) and David and Graham (1997) (of a speech by a relatively 
new CEO).  Following the contextualisation of BP, the results of a 
reading and re-reading of the nine CEO letters to identify themes are 
reported.  This step is important since it captures information regarding 
what the CEO focused upon, and consciously neglected to focus upon. 
Thereafter, the metaphors underlying the leadership theme in the 1998 
CEO letter are examined.  The final section links the discussion to the 
forensic purpose of using textual analysis of CEO letters as a means of 
understanding tone at the top.  
British Petroleum
BP plc was previously known as British Petroleum, or simply BP.  It 
is one of the world’s largest global energy companies, with headquarters 
in London.  In 2006, BP reported revenues of $US 266 billion and 
profits of $US 22 billion.  Jaffe and Soligo (2007, p. 2) indicate the 
importance of the Big Five group of international, non-governmental, 
integrated petroleum companies, of which BP is a member:
The so-called Big Five (BP, Chevron, ConocoPhillips Company, 
Exxon Mobil, and Royal Dutch Shell) had $120.6 billion in profits 
in 2006 against 9.7 million barrels a day (b/d) of oil production.  
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By contrast, the next 20 largest American oil firms had $31.2 
billion in profits against 2.1 million b/d in oil production.
The analysis of the company’s CEO letters begins in 1998, when BP 
acquired the American oil multinational, Amoco, to form BP Amoco. 
This transforming event enabled BP to join the top-tier of integrated 
petroleum companies worldwide.  
The corpus of BP Chief Executive letters studied
Some characteristics of the Chief Executive’s letters for BP are shown 
in Table 5.1.  The nine CEO letters total 12,794 words, an average of 
1,421 words.  The letters from 1999 to 2005 were just at, or below, 
this average word count.  However, the first and last letters (1998 and 
2006 respectively) are well above the average (2,088 and 2,224 words 
respectively).  Perhaps the CEO had much to say in 1998 as the BP 
and Amoco merger was being effected – and also as he contemplated 
his legacy in his final CEO letter in 2006.
Table 5.1 Length of BP’s Chief Executive’s letters, 1998-2006
Year Word count
1998 2,088
1999 906
2000 1,360
2001 769
2002 1,338
2003 1,444
2004 1,447
2005 1,218
2006 2,224
TOTAL 12,794 
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Identified themes and their possible implications
Drawing on Ryan and Bernard (2003), the close readings initially 
identify themes, paragraph by paragraph, in BP’s 1998 CEO letter. 
These themes and the analysis notes for the 1998 letter are reported 
in Appendix 2.  One feature of Appendix 2 is that reading for themes 
necessarily forces the analyst to slow down and consider each word in 
its relation to other words and other discourses.
The analysis is then extended to encompass all of Browne’s nine 
CEO letters (1998-2006) using the process illustrated by the example 
in Appendix 2.  Thereafter, the letters are scrutinised again, this time 
applying short, tentative, theme labels to the text in each paragraph.  This 
process was conducted for all nine letters.  Because of space constraints, 
the results are not appended, but are available on request from the first 
author.  The results of the analysis of all nine letters are summarised 
in Table 5.2, beginning with themes identified in the 1998 letter, and 
adding extra themes as they appeared in subsequent years.  
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Table 5.2  Summary of themes in the CEO of BP’s letters 1998-2006
Themes 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 Total
Identified in the letter for 1998
Heroic x x x x x x x x x 9
Size x x x 3
Leadership is realistic x x x x 4
Making size acceptable x x 2
Leadership is adaptive x x x x 4
Standard of care x x x x x x x x x 9
Trust x x x x x x x 7
Business environment is 
difficult x x x x x x x x x 9
Business achievement x x x x x x x x x 9
We have great strength x x x 3
Real value is in potential x x x x x 5
Speed is good x x x 3
Management’s enduring 
financial framework x x x x x 5
The future is risky x x x x x x x x x 9
Leadership is prudent x x x x x x x x x 9
Key performance measures x x x x 4
Identified in the letters for 1999 to 2006
Great strength is an 
enabler x x x x x x 6
Strategy evolves long-term x x x x x x x x 8
Business philosopher x x x x x x x 7
New is good x x x x x 5
Growth is good x x x x 4
People are human capital x x x x 4
Success depends on 
adaptation and evolving 
strategy
x x 2
Size and diversity create 
strength x x 2
Maximise productivity x x x 3
Leadership learns x x x 3
Clarity in management 
control x x x 3
CEO as pedagogue x x 2
CEO as guiding eminence x 1
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The ‘heroic’ theme appears in every CEO letter from 1998 to 2006. 
David and Graham (1997), who analysed the rhetoric in a speech given 
by Tenneco’s CEO, elaborate on the heroic theme, as follows:
...the goal is saving the company [Tenneco] by reducing 
overhead and raising cash.  However, with echoes of superhuman 
accomplishments, the events take on epic proportions.  (p. 32)
Textual material in the 1998 letter which has an heroic theme 
includes the following: 
Despite the fact that oil prices ended the year 34% below their 
December 1997 level, we improved our underlying performance 
and delivered on our promises.  We also took a crucial first step in 
the restructuring of the oil and gas sector.  (para 1998.1)
The merger of BP and Amoco was announced on 11 August, 
and completed on 31 December.  To have secured full regulatory 
approval in just 99 working days is a tremendous credit to all those 
involved and gives us an excellent opportunity to proceed rapidly 
with the process of integration.  (para 1998.2)
BP’s return on capital was 11% – an industry top-tier performance.  
(para 1998.12)
As we announced in February, we now aim to deliver the $2 billion 
pre-tax benefits of the merger in around a year’s time, some nine 
months earlier than originally planned.  We also expect to bear 
a substantial part of the costs associated with this restructuring 
during 1999.  These costs are likely to be around $1.5 billion 
pre-tax.  (para 1998.19)
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The theme tying these and other textual instances labelled heroic 
in the 1998 CEO letter (and also all the other BP CEO letters 1999 to 
2006) is based upon the epic, or heroic, characteristics ascribed to BP, 
its management and leadership.  For instance, Table 5.3 contains an 
excerpt from the analysis notes for paragraph 1998.1, from Appendix 
2, demonstrating the heroic theme as follows:
Table 5.3  Theme identification in 1998 Chief Executive’s letter
Text of 1998 CEO letter Preliminary theme identification
Para 1 
1998 was a momentous 
year for the oil industry, 
and for BP Amoco in 
particular.  Despite the 
fact that oil prices ended 
the year 34% below their 
December 1997 level, we 
improved our underlying 
performance and delivered 
on our promises.  We also 
took a crucial first step in 
the restructuring of the oil 
and gas sector.  
– A time interval [the year 1998] is able to be momentous [important/
significant/historic/earth-shattering/…], and in turn affect an industry 
[the oil industry] and ‘in particular’ a corporation [BP Amoco].
– ‘We’ [BP Amoco? The employees of BP Amoco? The leadership of BP 
Amoco? Other?] ‘improved our underlying performance and delivered 
on our promises’ ‘[d]espite’ the [uncontrollable behaviour?] of ‘oil 
prices’.  It is a ‘fact’ that ‘oil prices’ were ‘34% below their December 
1997 level’.  In this sentence, ‘oil prices’ are objectified; their price level 
is an objective ‘fact’, presumably beyond the control of BP.  However, 
‘[d]espite’ this ‘fact’, ‘we’ exhibited dynamic agency since ‘we’:
	‘improved…’
	‘delivered…’
	‘took a crucial first step…’
The ‘we’ in all of this suggest the metaphorical entailments that 
leadership is active, an agent of change, able to overcome external 
objective crucial facts and to keep promises.  It is a brief heroic 
narrative.
Thus, in answer to Ryan and Bernard’s (2003, p. 87) question 
on theme identification, ‘what is this expression an example of?’, the 
textual instances in Appendix 2 labelled heroic are examples of heroic, 
epic business leadership: they are instances of a theme which creates 
and elevates a business story to almost ‘mythic proportions’ (David & 
Graham, 1997, p. 32), and which will be important in the metaphor 
analysis in the next section.  From Table 5.2, it is apparent that this 
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heroic theme is a central and enduring one across the corpus of CEO 
Browne’s letters from 1998 to 2006.
Based upon the summary information regarding themes in Table 
5.2, the 1998 CEO letter seems broadly consistent with the following 
thematic structure, with the previously-identified themes underlined 
(see also Appendix 2):
Since the Business environment is difficult and The future is risky, 
Size is important to succeed in the future (Real value is in potential).  
But, because stakeholders, including the consumer and society in 
general, regard big companies with suspicion and as striving 
for the accumulation of power, Size must be made acceptable 
(Making size acceptable).  This is accomplished by BP leadership 
since it is realistic (Leadership is realistic), adaptive, (Leadership 
is adaptive), prudent (Leadership is prudent), and moves quickly 
(Speed is good), whilst recognising that safety regarding employees 
and the environment is important (Standard of care; Trust) as 
well as ensuring that employees fulfil their potential (Trust).  
In addition, and importantly, BP leadership has constructed 
Management’s enduring financial framework, including Key 
performance measures whose achievement is imperative (see para 
1998.26), resulting in great strength and consequently Business 
achievement which is, given all the above, heroic.
But this thematic structure seems questionable for several reasons. 
First, there are inconsistencies: for example, defining targets in financial 
accounting terms and setting these accounting targets as ‘the basis for 
the remuneration of all BP Amoco’s senior managers’ (para 1998.25) 
seems inconsistent with well-known deficiencies in using accounting 
targets for compensation incentive purposes.  Second, the thematic 
structure ignores negative outcomes of speed, including never letting up 
the pace.  Third, the themes are leader-centric and ignore followership. 
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While what connotes followership is open to debate, one view is that 
it is a partnership of reciprocal following in which leadership does not 
exist without willing followers who also exercise an influence on leaders 
(Maroosis, 2008).  Further, the emphasis is on size and growth, with 
a dramatisation of the heroic nature of leadership.  The themes in this 
CEO letter are based rhetorically, to a considerable extent, on hyperbole. 
Absent or under-represented themes and their 
possible implications
What are the themes that one might have expected to appear, 
but which did not? That is, what are the silences? To consider this 
issue, evidence is used from outside the CEO letters and the financial 
statements and financial reporting generally for BP.  Important aspects 
of the context within which BP operated between the years 1998 and 
2006 are documented, and seem likely to warrant inclusion among the 
themes of the company’s CEO letters.  
CEO discourse does not exist in a vacuum – the context within 
which discourse is constructed is important in the interpretation and 
understanding of communication media such as a company’s CEO letters 
to shareholders.  For a company the size of BP, thousands of items can 
be relevant in structuring the context for CEO discourse.  For purposes 
of analysis, the focus is on two major contextual issues, discussed below:
(i) New pipeline project initiatives
The focal project to represent this contextual issue is the controversial 
AGT (Azerbaijan Georgia Turkey) project.  The principal background 
material examined for this contextual issue was Some Common Concerns: 
Imagining BP’s Azerbaijan-Georgia-Turkey Pipelines System, PLATFORM, 
London, 2002.  Henceforth, this is referred to as Some Common Concerns. 
This massive project was described in September 2002 as:
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…a vast social and industrial structure, a gathering of men, 
women and machines stretching 1,750 kilometres (1,087 miles) 
across hills and valleys, mountains and plains, fields and deserts, 
gardens and rivers that would remain in place for more than 40 
years.  The pipelines would be part of a complete system running 
from the offshore oil and gas fields in the Caspian Sea to a tanker 
terminal on the Mediterranean coast.  Through the pipelines would 
flow US$ 21 million worth of fuel every day.  (Summary report 
of Some Common Concerns, published by PLATFORM et al., 
London, 2002, pp. 1-3)
This major, multi-pipeline, multi-country project received significant 
worldwide publicity due to its huge scale, numerous components, and 
the resulting social, environmental, political, and economic impacts. 
BP was the major leader of this project.  Despite this, the text of the 
company’s CEO letters between 1998 and 2006 are strangely silent 
regarding AGT.  There are some very brief references to AGT, but no 
substantive comment from the CEO on the social and environmental 
issues involved.  From the perspective of understanding a corporation’s 
leadership and that leadership’s establishment of the company’s tone at 
the top, it is curious that this issue has been ignored in the CEO letters.
Projects such as AGT involve many companies, international 
agencies, technologies, and stakeholders, including many unrepresented 
stakeholders.  BP was the leader in the consortiums involved, and also 
acquired one of its major competitors for AGT influence, Amoco, 
thereby enhancing its power over the project.  Environmental, political, 
human rights, social, and many other AGT issues – all on a massive 
scale – ought to have warranted substantive attention in the BP CEO’s 
letter to shareholders.  
The summary report of Some Common Concerns (2002) included 
the following comment on BP and Amoco in the AGT negotiations: 
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Throughout the 1990s, the Caspian states such as Azerbaijan 
struggled to gain favourable terms from foreign oil companies for 
the development of their resources.  To do so, they tried to play one 
corporation off against another.  When the two largest players, BP 
and Amoco, merged, however, this advantage was largely lost.  Since 
1998, BP has been the primary player in the western Caspian 
region.  It has a 34.1% holding in the Azerbaijan International 
Operating Company (the company developing the majority of 
Azerbaijan’s oil and gas fields), a 25.5% holding in the SCP (gas) 
pipeline and a 34.76 % holding in the BTC oil pipeline.  It is 
also the operator of the complete AGT pipelines system, which is 
in effect a BP pipelines system.  (p. 5)
(ii) Operational safety
This contextual issue involves the operational processes and systems 
at BP facilities (such as its refineries and pipelines).  Two events within 
this issue are included:
•	 The Texas City refinery disaster of March 23, 2005.  This resulted 
in the death of 15 people and serious injury to about 170 people. 
(Report of the BP US Refineries Independent Safety Review Panel, 
January, 2007; Investigation Report: Refinery Explosion and Fire, US 
Chemical Safety and Hazard Investigation Board, Report 2005-04-
I-TX, 2007).
•	 The Prudhoe Bay pipeline rupture.  (Hearings of the US House of 
Representatives Committee on Energy and Commerce, Subcommittee 
on Investigations and Oversight, May 16, 2007 (accessible at www.
house.gov)).
Operational safety has always been an important issue in the oil 
extraction, transportation, and refinery business.  It is an issue related 
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closely to corporate governance, cost control, and management control, 
including compensation incentives.  The following three quotations 
from recent reviews of operational safety at BP indicate the importance 
of this issue at BP and the role of tone at the top in promoting concern 
for safety issues:
Process safety leadership.  The Panel believes that leadership from 
the top of the company, starting with the Board and going down, 
is essential.  In the Panel’s opinion, it is imperative that BP’s 
leadership set the process safety ‘tone at the top’ of the organization 
and establish appropriate expectations regarding process safety 
performance.  Based on its review, the Panel believes that BP 
has not provided effective process safety leadership and has not 
adequately established process safety as a core value across all its 
five US refineries.  (Report of the BP US Refineries Independent 
Safety Review Panel, 2007, p. xii)
Process safety leadership in an organization must start at the top.  
The Board of Directors of BP plc, its Group Chief Executive, 
and corporate management as a group must set the process safety 
‘tone at the top’ and establish appropriate expectations regarding 
process safety performance.  Those expectations must reflect an 
unwavering commitment to process safety and infuse into BP’s 
workforce the mindset that process accidents are not acceptable.  
Those expectations must also be translated into measurable goals 
designed to move BP toward the achievement of excellence in 
process safety performance. (Report of the BP US Refineries 
Independent Safety Review Panel, 2007, p. 244)
There are striking similarities in the reported causes of the 2006 
events involving BP’s Prudhoe Bay pipelines and the 2005 
explosion at the BP Texas City Refinery.  Most if not all of the 
seven root causes…that BP consultants identified for the Prudhoe 
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Bay incidents have strong echoes in Texas City.  (Testimony of 
Carolyn W. Merritt, Chairman and CEO, US Chemical Safety 
Board, Before the US House of Representatives Committee 
on Energy and Commerce, Sub-committee on Investigations 
and Oversight, May 16, 2007, p. 1) 
But, this issue was sorely under-represented in the CEO letters. 
The Texas City disaster only appears briefly in the 2005 and 2006 CEO 
letters, and the Prudhoe Bay failure only in 2006.  This is significant since, 
as the three quotations above indicate, management control issues that 
facilitated the Prudhoe Bay pipeline rupture were similar to those with 
the Texas City refinery disaster.  And, indeed, as the Report of the BP US 
Refineries Independent Safety Review Panel concluded (2007, p. 173): 
Even more than five years after BP acquired four of its US refineries 
from Amoco and ARCO, those refineries continue to rely heavily 
on legacy systems, standards, and procedures, some of which need 
substantial updating to bring them into conformity with current 
good practices… 
The report asserted that BP’s corporate management had not 
provided such safety guidance (p. 173), and that (as the quotation above 
indicates) ‘process safety leadership in an organisation must start at the 
top.  The Board of Directors of BP plc, its Group Chief Executive, and 
corporate management as a group must set the process safety “tone at 
the top” and establish appropriate expectations regarding process safety 
performance’.
Operational safety is a strategic issue at any major oil company.  BP’s 
leadership could have discussed how it managed the Amoco acquisition 
and the attendant cost control, incentive compensation, and cultural 
challenges.  According to the investigation reports cited above, this 
crucial aspect of the tone at the top was missing at BP for many years. 
79‘Close reading’ oF leadership language
The omission of such operational safety issues from the company’s CEO 
letters before the public crises of 2005 and 2006 could be considered as 
a lapse of corporate leadership with respect to communication.  Why, 
in the 1998 CEO letter (written just after the BP-Amoco business 
combination), were serious issues of operational safety at the Amoco 
facilities not addressed? And, in the 1999 CEO letter (written more 
than a year after the business combination) serious mention of the issue 
is still conspicuously absent.
Perhaps, with the benefit of hindsight, it would be unfair to 
claim that CEO letters from 1998 onward should have included text 
mentioning operational safety issues arising from the Amoco acquisition 
that subsequently appeared to lead to the 2005 Texas City disaster and 
the 2006 Prudhoe Bay failure.  But this is not the point.  In 1998, 
because of the failures of tone at the top, Texas City and Prudhoe Bay 
seemed to be set on a course for crisis several years hence.  The absence of 
these important operational safety themes in the CEO letters and other 
financial reporting disclosures might have alerted auditors knowledgeable 
in this industry, ex ante.  
In this connection, it might be suggested that during the BP-Amoco 
merger process and thereafter, BP’s external auditors might have been 
aware of (or should have been aware of ) major operational safety issues 
discussed in 2007 in the Report of the BP US Refineries Independent Safety 
Review Panel, although without the clarifying benefit of hindsight.  Safety 
is an overarching issue in the petroleum industry.  The coming together in 
1998 of two complex companies with their individual operational safety 
systems and processes, and the attendant organisational and leadership 
challenges that this merger created, was plausibly a vivid part of the 
context within which CEO discourse in general, and the CEO letter in 
particular, was crafted.  Because of its silence with regard to significant 
operational safety issues, BP’s CEO letters from 1998, and for several 
years thereafter, might be regarded as deficient.  The Amoco transaction 
was lauded profusely by CEO Browne in the 1998 letter (see Appendix 
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2), but a crucial material aspect of the future success of the merger was 
left unspoken, or as Peshkin (2001) might put it, ‘silenced’.
The ninth of Peshkin’s (2001) angles of vision (see chapter three), 
‘silences’, offers a stimulus for external auditors to learn as much as 
possible about the key business and contextual factors impinging upon 
an organisation that one would expect to be included in responsible 
CEO leadership language.  Thus, external auditors might then be in 
a position to question why such silences regarding key factors exist in 
CEO discourse.    
Importance of themes: CEO attention and tone at the 
top
There is much more to explore regarding the themes in the 1998 to 
2006 BP CEO letters.  But the methodology and importance of thematic 
analysis, including its relationship to leadership and the tone set by top 
management, has been introduced.  Before analysing the metaphors in 
the CEO letters, two other aspects of a thematic analysis of the letters 
that might be explored usefully, are presented.
First, which themes appear to be most important for the CEO? 
This can be determined initially by identifying the themes that occupy 
the most space (in word count, for example), and which appear first 
(or at least early) in the letters each year.  In the BP letters, what is 
the significance of the ‘business philosopher’ theme which appears 
prominently in various letters, including at the beginning of the letters 
for 2001, 2002, 2003, 2005 and 2006? What is the specific content of 
the business philosophy thus espoused? Is it consistent over time? Does 
it occur when other, contextual events occur?
Second, since trust is as an important theme throughout the corpus 
of letters (see Table 5.2), and since this theme is also central to current 
concerns regarding business generally, what are the specific features of 
trust in the BP CEO letters? For example, Bogle (2007, p. 26) writes 
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that ‘the central ethic of the system of modern capitalism when it began 
in Great Britain around the start of the eighteenth century – trusting 
and being trusted – was gradually eroded’.  Are these features consistent 
with the concepts of leadership and management control that also appear 
in the letters?
If, as Edersheim (2007, p. 43) contends, ‘The CEO sets the tone – 
good or bad’ what the CEO publicly pays attention to is an important 
aspect of the tone set.  The silences in BP CEO’s letters were described 
earlier  –  things that might have been expected to be discussed but were 
not.  Also, various themes that were found in the corpus of the BP CEO 
letters were noted; these were themes that appeared in the CEO letters 
and thus were accorded public attention by the CEO.  This thematic 
analysis is refined now in two ways.  First, a justification is made in more 
depth, of the importance of themes in the CEO letter, using the concept 
of ‘attention-structures’ (Lanham, 1993, p. 227).  Second, what appear 
to be the most important themes in the letters is ascertained, revealing 
what the CEO seemed publicly to be giving most attention to.
(a) The CEO and attention structures
Yadav et al. (2007, p. 86) contend that ‘the important role of the 
CEO in focusing the attention of the firm suggests that greater CEO 
attention to certain issues and events can lead to greater awareness, 
anticipation, and action in firms with respect to these types of issues and 
events’.  This contention is based upon the idea that human cognitive 
ability is limited, and therefore, especially in a world characterised by 
information overload, attention is the scarce resource.  Lanham (1993, 
p. 227) develops this notion, more formally, as follows:
We have in the West a venerable tradition of studying how human 
attention is created and allocated: the ‘art of persuasion’ which the 
Greeks called rhetoric.  A better definition of rhetoric, in fact, might 
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be ‘the economics of human attention-structures’, for whenever 
we persuade someone, we do so by getting that person to ‘look at 
things from our point of view’, share our attention-structure.  It 
is in the nature of human life that attention should be in short 
supply, but in an information economy it becomes the crucial 
scarce commodity.  Just as economics has been the study of how 
we allocate scarce resources in a goods economy, we now will use a 
variety of rhetoric as the ‘economics’ of human attention-structures.
Three observations can be made of this: 
•	 the CEO letter is an important and privileged public corporate 
communication medium; 
•	 the CEO, in general, is the most important and powerful corporate 
leader; and
•	 CEO attention is in short supply due to the nature of limited human 
cognitive ability and CEO information overload.
It is thus plausible that the most prominent themes in the CEO 
letter are those to which the CEO is publicly devoting his or her scarce 
attention.  Conversely, themes that are absent from the CEO letter are 
being shown publicly as not being attended to.  This does not mean that 
the CEO is ignoring these absent CEO letter themes, since, privately 
they may be of utmost importance to the CEO.  But the absence or 
minimisation of what should be key themes in the CEO letter (such as 
major politically and socially potent pipeline initiatives and core issues 
regarding operational safety) raises serious concerns since such key issues 
should be at the centre of the CEO’s publicly-displayed attention.
Thus, CEO attention is an important indicator of tone at the top, 
since the more attention devoted by the CEO to a topic, the more 
important the topic is, or is intended to be, in the culture of the firm. 
In addition, the themes that are the most prominent in the CEO letter 
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are signals to internal and external stakeholders about the themes to 
which they should be devoting their scarce human attention-structures. 
Consequently, given the importance of the CEO letter as a 
communication medium, the most prominent themes in the letter 
are twofold.  First, an important (public) enactment for the CEO as 
corporate leader; and second, the provision of a frame for all other 
corporate stakeholders of what should be attended to, given limited 
human abilities and information overload.  This raises an audit question 
in relation to the tone at the top: which important topics does the 
CEO attend to, publicly, in an important disclosure medium such as 
the CEO letter?
In research focusing on how a CEO’s attention affects subsequent 
technological innovation in a company, Yadav et al. (2007) used CEO 
letters ‘to measure three independent variables related to the attentional 
foci of CEOs: future focus, external focus, and internal focus’.  In this 
chapter, the attention of BP’s CEO is measured by assuming that topics 
appearing first in the CEO letter have captured the CEO’s attention, 
since they are the topics the CEO intends readers to notice first.  
(b) Important themes in the BP CEO letters
The first theme that appears in each BP CEO’s letter, year-by-year 
(based upon Appendix 2), is shown in Table 5.4.  
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Table 5.4  First theme of each CEO letter
Year First theme First paragraph of each CEO letter
1998 Heroic 
leadership
1998 was a momentous year for the oil industry, and for BP Amoco in particular.  
Despite the fact that oil prices ended the year 34% below their December 1997 level, 
we improved our underlying performance and delivered on our promises.  We also took 
a crucial first step in the restructuring of the oil and gas sector.  
1999 Heroic 
leadership
1999 was an exciting, dynamic and very successful year for BP Amoco.  We combined 
two great companies into one, unifying our operations and processes, and our team of 
people.  As a result we were able to deliver the financial benefits of the merger in full 
and well ahead of schedule.  
2000 Heroic 
leadership
2000 was a year of great success for BP.  Record results were delivered, targets were 
met and a new group was established, bringing together the people and assets of a 
number of different businesses – including ARCO, Vastar and Burmah Castrol, as well 
as BP itself.  Each element strengthens our portfolio and helps us to fulfil the strategic 
objectives we have been pursuing for the last five years.  
2001 Business 
philosopher
2001 was a year that reminded us, in the most dramatic and tragic way, that events 
shape the lives of individuals and of companies.  No one could have predicted the 
events of 11 September and very few expected the economic recession that ended a 
long period of growth in the USA.  
2002 Business 
philosopher
Our strategy is to create value from a distinctive set of opportunities, biased towards the 
upstream, which through a disciplined approach to long-term investment growth can 
produce returns that are secure and highly competitive.
2003 Business 
philosopher
When I wrote to you last time, my team and I had as many questions as answers about 
the forthcoming year.  Would our strategy endure a weak global economy, impending 
war in Iraq, continuing uncertainty over terrorism, increasingly complex regulation and 
a groundswell of anti-corporate sentiment? How would our competitors respond to the 
challenging position we had worked so hard to achieve? 
2004 Heroic 
leadership
2004 was a great year for BP.  In terms of overall performance, it was the best since the 
recent series of mergers and acquisitions.  
2005 Business 
philosopher
We start from the view that the purpose of business is to satisfy human needs and, 
in doing so, to generate profits for investors.  For BP, that means providing energy to 
fuel human progress and economic growth.  It also means satisfying the need for a 
sustainable environment.  
2006 Business 
philosopher
BP’s purpose is a progressive one.  That means we aim to generate returns for our 
investors by providing the energy for basic human needs such as light, heat and 
mobility and to do so in a safe, sustainable and environmentally responsible way.  Our 
financial results were very strong in 2006.  However, we fell short of our expectations 
in certain areas, notably with two oil spills in Alaska and the inability to start up the 
Thunder Horse platform as soon as we had hoped.  
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CEO Browne introduces four of his CEO letters with words that 
resonate with a heroic leadership theme.  The other five letters begin 
with a business philosopher theme.  In the three years 1998 to 2000, 
the heroic theme serves to explain the apparently epic achievement of 
melding two companies, BP and Amoco, along with other acquisitions, 
into the ‘great success’ of 2000.  But the business philosopher theme is 
deployed first in a letter when it is needed.  It is prominent in the CEO 
letter for 2001, written following the attacks of September 11, 2001. 
CEO Browne also begins the remaining letters of his tenure, except for 
2004, with a business philosopher theme.  The business philosopher 
seems to appear first in CEO letters in years in which a crisis occurred 
(for example, in 2005, the year of the Texas City disaster).  
Why is the first theme in Browne’s letter either the heroic theme or 
the business philosopher theme? In the nine letters examined, it seems 
that BP’s Chief Executive willingly claimed credit for achievements 
heroically, but shifted initial attention to broader, philosophical issues 
in crisis years.  This underscores the need to question the construction 
of tone at the top by CEOs when they engage in forms of self-eulogy 
regarding their (and their leadership cohort’s) achievements, while 
deflecting attention from crises and failures to achieve.  The Texas City 
disaster occurred in 2005.  The Baker Report appeared in early 2007 and 
is mentioned in CEO Browne’s 2006 CEO letter.  Did the disaster and 
the subsequent report affect Browne’s rhetorical leadership as evidenced 
by the first themes in his CEO letters of those two years?  The moving 
in and out of positional pre-eminence of the heroic theme, even though 
as indicated in Table 5.2 it appeared somewhere in every letter, invites 
questions regarding the linguistic character of this heroic leadership, as 
suggested by metaphor.  This is a matter to which we now turn.
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Metaphors in the BP Chief Executive’s letters
Contemporary theory of metaphor: a brief overview
Lakoff (1993, p. 203) defines metaphor in the ‘classical theory of 
metaphor’ as ‘a novel or poetic linguistic expression where one or more 
words for a concept are used outside of their normal conventional 
meaning to express a “similar” concept’.  But he goes on to dismiss 
this ‘classical theory’ by claiming that ‘the locus of metaphor is not in 
language at all, but in the way we conceptualise one mental domain in 
terms of another’ (Lakoff, 1993, p. 203).
According to contemporary metaphor theory (Lakoff & Johnson, 
1980, 1999; Lakoff, 1993),  a metaphor is a word, phrase, or sentence 
that is the manifestation of a ‘cross-domain mapping’ of ‘… everyday 
abstract concepts like time, states, change, causation, and purpose’ 
(Lakoff, 1993, p. 203).  Metaphoric language ‘provides a means for ideas 
nourished in one domain to lend their authority to another domain and 
simultaneously be enriched by the alliance’.  For example, through the 
use of metaphor ‘spaces may get created … in which moral and political 
actions appear to be sanctified by nature...’ (Harrington, 1995, p. 378).
As Slingerland observes, ‘a single complex, metaphorical structure 
can inform a whole series of specific linguistic expressions.  These 
“families” of specific metaphorical expressions are not random or 
unrelated but, rather, are all motivated by a common conceptual schema’ 
(2004, p. 13).
So, for example, the words ‘Enron is laser-focused on earnings per 
share’ (which appeared in Enron’s 2000 CEO letter) may be interpreted 
as a linguistic instance of a conceptual metaphor such as business is 
war.  Keeping in mind Eubanks’ caution (1999) that metaphor’s work 
depends on the context (including the understanding one has of war), 
this conceptual metaphor might be expected to have entailments such as:
•	 all members of the company must centre their attention on a single 
(accounting-based) performance measure;
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•	 their attention, being ‘laser-focused’, ignores all else;
•	 winning is achieving increased earnings per share; 
•	 losing is not an option, since the losing side in a war typically is 
subjugated or destroyed;
•	 competitors are enemies;
•	 any means of winning is acceptable (recall the old saying ‘all’s fair 
in love and war’);
•	 business leadership must be top-down, since an army at war must 
have a unitary hierarchical command structure; and
•	 dissent is not allowable, and therefore followers must obey the leader.
According to Eubanks (1999, p. 195), metaphors are not isolated 
linguistic phenomena but are ‘...rhetorically constituted.  No metaphor 
is spoken or written except in the context of a socio-historically bound 
communicative situation.  Therefore, all metaphors are inflected 
by politics, economics, philosophy, social interests, professional 
commitments, and personal attitudes – in short by the whole of our 
cultural and conceptual repertoire.  Because metaphors are inflected, 
we cannot explain how they work unless we consider concrete instances 
of metaphor, taking into account how inflections constrain the way 
metaphors are uttered and understood’.
Accordingly, the metaphors in CEO text are not atomised, but 
are considered in relation to ‘metaphoric and literal concepts that are 
already in motion within a culture’s (or subculture’s) discourse’ (Eubanks, 
1999, p. 195).
In addition, as Craig and Amernic (2004, p. 823) note, the 
metaphorical structure implied by the words ‘Enron is laser-focused on 
earnings per share’ is especially troubling and might raise other issues:
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It suggests that ‘earnings per share’ is a target, to be conquered or 
destroyed, rather than to be regarded as a ‘measure’ by which ‘success’ 
is partially assessed.  Even if it is not a target set for destruction, 
then it might be the object of perverse fixation.  It might bias 
managers’ behaviour.  After all, earnings per share is a measure 
with fundamental flaws that are well-known in the accounting 
and management literature.  And, further, fixation on any 
single quantitative measure is well-known to induce ‘undesirable 
consequences for over-all organizational performance’ (Ridgway, 
1956, p. 247) – and, we would add, the numerous stakeholders 
in the organization as well!
Language in general, and metaphors in particular, are well suited 
to influence thought and behaviour (Lakoff, 1993; Cohn, 1987).  The 
contemporary theory of metaphor is central to understanding how this is 
so.  In industrial relations, for example, there has been debate about the 
appropriateness of the ‘trench warfare’ or ‘pioneering journey’ metaphors 
as controlling ‘root metaphors’ or ‘conceptual archetypes’ influencing 
industrial relations practice (Dunn 1990, 1991; Keenoy 1991).  In 
religious studies, Slingerland (2004) has argued that contemporary 
metaphor theory is important in understanding issues in comparative 
religion and in ‘enabling cross-cultural dialogue on contentious religious 
issues’ (p. 1).  In business and accounting, metaphors help provide 
the vocabulary and conceptual tools to identify what are considered 
legitimate problems and acceptable solutions.  Metaphors used by CEOs 
become a sort of public language or ‘an external reality that [people] have 
to adopt if they are to communicate with others’ (Carrier 1997, p. 49). 
And the more powerful and influential the CEO, the more this language 
affects how people (both inside and outside the company) think and act. 
The more that particular metaphors are used in specific discourses, 
the more apparently natural and uncontroversial the entailments of 
such metaphors become (Gramm, 1996).  For example, in examining 
89‘Close reading’ oF leadership language
the discourse of public policy, Hart et al. (2005, p. 47) contend that: 
‘To use a metaphor repeatedly is to open up certain policy options and 
to close off others’.  They illustrate their point by asking ‘Did it make a 
difference that China came to be viewed as a market for US goods rather 
than a rapacious and backward nation?’ (p. 47, italics in the original). 
Hobbs’ (2008) analysis of the ‘surge’ metaphor in the US government’s 
increase in troop strength in Iraq makes a similar point.
The importance of metaphors to corporate leaders in 
establishing tone at the top
CEOs deploy metaphor to fashion, implicitly, perceptions about 
how a corporation has fulfilled its accountability to stakeholders. 
Consequently, there is much to be gained by being sensitised to the 
existence of metaphors and to the metaphor-related entailments, 
implications, contexts and cognitive models that are used to construct 
a corporation’s accountability.  
Hart et al. (2005, p. 47) list several reasons for ‘paying attention to 
metaphors’.  These reasons justify an examination of metaphor in BP’s 
CEO letters: metaphors ‘signal authorial assumptions’; ‘signal ideological 
commitments’; and ‘signal latent values’ (pp. 47-48; italics in original). 
Thus, metaphors in the language of corporate leaders might suggest 
how ‘a particular language affect[s] the adoption and abandonment of 
management practices…’ (Ferraro et al., 2005, p. 16)
Consequently, the language that structures comprehension of 
phenomena by CEOs affects the thoughts and actions of CEOs regarding 
those phenomena, just like for other, less-powerful, humans (for 
example, see Cohn, 1987).  And since much CEO-speak draws upon 
accounting language, the often implicit consequences of metaphor(s) 
about accounting are important because they structure the way CEOs 
comprehend accounting and, in turn, affect CEOs’ thoughts and 
actions about real things.  There are many empirical implications of the 
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importance of metaphors in CEO discourse.  For example, are metaphors 
about accounting coherent within instances of CEO discourse (Shen & 
Balaban, 1999)?  Or do they differ according to context? Are they shared 
or idiosyncratic?  Are they anchored in broader, society-wide discourse? 
What are their entailments and other implicit secondary consequences? 
Do CEOs form attitudes and make judgments about real phenomena 
consistent with the entailments of the metaphors that they employ? 
Two important considerations justify focusing on the metaphors 
CEOs use in accounting and business generally.  First, more broadly, 
accounting language and business language is implicated intimately in 
a wide variety of social and economic discourses with profound effects 
on human welfare.  These range from the use of accounting in debates 
about whether or not (and if so, how) to privatise a public utility; to 
arguments regarding the necessity of downsizing to support global 
competition; to debates about the design of corporate performance 
management approaches such as Economic Value Added and the 
Balanced Scorecard.  Second, language relies fundamentally upon 
accounting metaphors to structure the way people, including CEOs, 
think about rights and obligations (Johnson, 1993; Lakoff, 1996). 
Thus, a sense of accountability and reciprocation becomes a pervasive 
and fundamental feature of thought.  Rights and duties are defined 
metaphorically within the framework of social accounting and moral 
accounting metaphors (Johnson 1993, pp. 41-50).  If accounting helps 
structure a person’s non-accounting language (and thus thought), it seems 
crucial to examine how (non-accounting) language helps structure the 
way CEOs conceive accounting and business.  
Organisations function partly as narrative spaces in which stories 
and accounts are employed by all participants to facilitate the process of 
sense-making (Gabriel, 2004).  The narratives of companies and CEOs 
are regarded as constructed with the aid of interpretative devices or 
poetic tropes, such as metaphor, to attribute responsibility, blame and 
credit, and to establish causal connections and agency (Gabriel, 2000). 
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In this context, leaders engage ‘in a process of rhetorical negotiation 
with their audience, trying out words, phrases, and literary constructions 
to better and more convincingly communicate their vision of their 
organisation’ (Cuno, 2005, p. 205).  Metaphors are integral to this 
process of communicative leadership.
Discourse, such as written CEO text, consists of ‘the surface level 
of communicative actions, and the deeper level of discursive structures’ 
(Heracleous, 2006, p. 1,060).  Although various interpretative prisms are 
used by different readers to enhance understanding of CEO text, there 
is a strong need to explore the ‘deeper level’ of that text.  One concern is 
to identify fundamental root metaphors implicated in the activation of 
leadership – that is, metaphors that provide rich summaries of the world 
and reveal dominant and powerful ways of seeing (Smith & Eisenberg, 
1987).  In pursuing this task, it is important to acknowledge that 
interpretations of texts, stories and narratives are informed also by our 
‘own frame of reference’ (Heracleous, 2004, p. 176); and that all data, 
including CEO text in a CEO letter, are affected by the constructions 
placed on them by the reader (Alvesson & Deetz, 2000).  Metaphors 
evoke multiple meanings in everyday language and in the minds of 
those who deploy them and perceive them (Oswick et al., 2004). 
Organisational rhetoric is thus affected inherently by ‘contingencies, 
uncertainties and ambiguities’ (Cheney et al., 2004, p. 82).
The challenge is to go beyond the apparent explicit meanings in a 
text to tease out the implicit, probable or possible meanings likely to be 
attached to it by different audiences.  The exploration of metaphor usage 
(conducted in this chapter on BP’s CEO letters) is an integral part of 
this process; and it is potentially insightful in view of the argument that 
‘a metaphor is not an ornament.  It is an organ of perception’ (Postman, 
1996, p. 174); an organ of a CEO’s perception.
Consistent with the approach to metaphor analysis outlined by 
Cornelissen (2006) and applied by Amernic et al. (2007), an initial 
reading and re-reading was conducted of the nine CEO letters to 
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stockholders of BP from 1998 to 2006, with the intent of identifying 
metaphors-in-use, since ‘…metaphor is rhetorically constituted.  No 
metaphor is spoken or written except in the context of a socio-historically 
bound communicative situation’ (Eubanks, 1999, p. 195).  The 
importance of context in metaphor analysis is illustrated in Amernic’s 
(1998) exploration of the metaphors in Walt Disney Company CEO 
Michael Eisner’s 1996 CEO letter.  This requires an understanding of 
the importance of Walt Disney, the company’s founder, to the successful 
communicative leadership of its then-CEO, Eisner.
Exploring the metaphoric structure of the ‘heroic’ 
theme 
The 1998 CEO letter for BP is important because it is the first 
CEO letter following the company-altering Amoco acquisition.  It 
has themes which were important in subsequent letters, omits crucial 
themes, and is the second-longest letter in the corpus by word count 
(suggesting that the CEO had a lot to say that year).  This letter is 
examined for metaphors.  The heroic theme,  identified earlier as being 
prominent throughout the corpus of BP’s CEO letters, is the stimulus 
for the metaphoric analysis.  This theme involves ascribing to BP, and 
its leadership, dramatic and heroic qualities.  The interest centres on the 
company’s most senior leadership, to develop aspects of the heroic theme 
that relate most closely to such leadership.  We employed a probe to 
isolate linguistic instances of textual top management leadership in the 
corpus of letters.  In previous work on GE’s leadership, it was argued 
that ‘the metaphors used in conjunction with a personal pronoun by the 
leader… signal …strong attribution or ownership of the metaphorical 
characteristics’ (Amernic et al., 2007, p. 1858).  The probe used here is 
the word ‘we’ (both lower and upper case), using ANTCONC (Anthony, 
2005) KWIC (keyword-in-context) software was used to search for, 
and capture, each instance of this word and its surrounding context. 
The word ‘we/We’ occurs 300 times in the 1998 to 2006 letters, and 
45 times in the 1998 letter.  To illustrate the analysis, the metaphoric 
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features of the first six instances of the 45 occurrences in the 1998 letter 
are noted, as follows.  The text of each paragraph of the CEO letter that 
was examined is followed by the analysis.  The word ‘we’ is in bold with 
each instance numbered sequentially; for example, we[1] refers to the 
first instance of ‘we’.
Paragraph 1998.1 
1998 was a momentous year for the oil industry, and for BP Amoco 
in particular.  Despite the fact that oil prices ended the year 34% 
below their December 1997 level, we[1] improved our underlying 
performance and delivered on our promises.  We[2] also took a 
crucial first step in the restructuring of the oil and gas sector.
Although both We[1] and We[2] may be regarded as primarily 
referring literally to BP, in so doing they invoke metaphor because of the 
human-like agency that they ascribe to the inanimate corporation, BP. 
This agency is reinforced three times in this paragraph (‘we improved…
[we] delivered…[we] took…’).  Such agency, in the life of the modern 
corporation, can be exercised only by the corporate leadership.  Thus, 
both instances of the pronoun in this paragraph must stand for the top 
leadership.  
There were other ways to phrase the language contextualising these 
uses of ‘we’; for example, the passive voice could have been used, but was 
not.  Thus, the choices made, including the structure ‘Despite X, we Y’, 
makes agency both salient and potent, and reinforces the metaphoricity 
embedded in this first paragraph regarding top management.  Thus, top 
management have:
•	 overcome natural phenomena such as oil prices steeply declining 
(notice that ‘oil prices’ have their own agency in this paragraph);
•	 ‘improved our underlying performance’ despite the oil price decline;
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•	 ‘delivered on our promises’; and
•	 ‘[taken] a crucial first step in the restructuring of the oil and gas 
sector’.
Thus, top management, an overcomer of natural impediments, an 
improver of underlying performance, a promise-keeper, and a taker of 
the ‘crucial first step in the structuring’ of a whole economic sector, is 
nothing short of heroic.  Consequently, the metaphor ‘top management 
is a hero’ seems apt.
One might argue that BP’s CEO has merely engaged in flowery 
language, in hyperbole.  However, such hyperbole is by design, and 
is thus textual evidence of purposive language that is suggestive of an 
underlying conceptual metaphor of a heroic self-image.
Paragraph 1998.2 
The merger of BP and Amoco was announced on 11 August, 
and completed on 31 December.  To have secured full regulatory 
approval in just 99 working days is a tremendous credit to all those 
involved and gives us an excellent opportunity to proceed rapidly 
with the process of integration.
Since no instance of ‘we’ appears in this paragraph, it is not subject 
to analysis by itself.  Rather, it is analysed below along with paragraph 
1998.3, in which the third ‘we’ appears.  This is appropriate since 
paragraph 1998.3 depends materially on paragraph 1998.2’s introduction 
of ‘The merger’, and thus provides important context for we[3].
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Paragraph 1998.3
Although the merger creates one of the world’s largest industrial 
organisations, we[3] are very aware that size alone is no guarantee 
of success.
The ‘we’ in paragraph 1998.3 is wisely ‘aware that size alone is no 
guarantee of success’.  The newly-merged company is, though, ‘one of the 
world’s largest industrial organisations’, and the merger (from  paragraph 
1998.2) ‘secured’ ‘full regulatory approval’ in an extraordinarily short 
time.  Notice in paragraph 1998.2 that the passive tense is employed 
when describing the announcement and subsequent completion of the 
merger; this absence of agency permits top management to share praise 
with ‘all those involved’, but abstractly, while then quickly reasserting 
agency by use of the phrase ‘and gives us an excellent opportunity to 
proceed rapidly with the process of integration’.  Thus, top management 
leads in securing merger approval, shares praise, now leads ‘one of the 
world’s largest industrial organisations’, but is also wise.  Again, ‘top 
management is a hero’, seems an apt characterisation of the metaphor 
regarding leadership embedded in these two paragraphs.  
Paragraph 1998.4 
All the available evidence suggests that big companies are commonly 
regarded with suspicion, and that mergers are often considered to 
be simply about the accumulation of market power.
Since no instance of ‘we’ appears in this paragraph, it is not subject 
to analysis by itself.  Rather, it is analysed below along with paragraph 
1998.5, in which the fourth ‘we’ appears.  This is appropriate since 
paragraph 1998.5 depends materially on paragraph 1998.4’s introduction 
of ‘All the available evidence’ that provides important context for we[4]. 
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It should be noted too that we[4] is linked back to we[3], at which point 
the wiseness of the leadership was introduced.
Paragraph 1998.5
To be acceptable to the consumer and to society in general, mergers 
must be progressive – enhancing rather than reducing the range 
of choices available to the customer, by combining the skills and 
know-how to achieve things which neither company could have 
delivered on its own.  That means we[4] have to listen with great 
care and be continuously responsive to the changing pattern of 
customer needs and desires.
The metaphoric nature of the surface text in which we[4] is 
embedded operates at two levels.  First, and most obviously, we[4] 
metaphorically suggests someone who, because of the conditions declared 
by the CEO in paragraph 1998.5 that must be fulfilled in order for 
mergers ‘[t]o be acceptable to society’, must both ‘listen with great care’ 
and ‘be continuously responsive’ ‘to the changing pattern of customer 
needs and desires’.  Since no one person could neither literally ‘listen’ nor 
‘be continuously responsive’ to so many customers and their ‘changing 
pattern of…needs and desires’ (and indeed would be hard-put to identify 
these ‘needs and desires’), it seems that we[4] is operating symbolically, or 
rather metonymically, in standing for the whole company.  Second, the 
ability to listen to so many customers, and be continuously responsive to 
their identified needs and desires, links back to we[3], and importantly 
also to we[1] and we[2], since we[4] might also be interpreted as 
continuing the ‘top management is a hero’ theme, especially if there is 
even a vestige of literal intent in paragraph 1998.5.   
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Paragraph 1998.6
In our sector in particular the challenge is to ensure that 
hydrocarbons can be found, produced, refined, distributed and 
used without damaging the natural environment.  BP Amoco 
will aim to provide consumers with the choices that make that 
aspiration achievable.
Since no instance of ‘we’ appears in this paragraph, it is not subject 
to analysis by itself.  
Paragraph 1998.7
Secondly, we[5] have to organise and manage a huge worldwide 
company in a way which excites and empowers the people who 
work for us.  We[6] have to avoid rigidity and bureaucracy and 
ensure that, within clear boundaries and standards, individuals 
have the freedom to fulfil their potential and to make a difference.
Both we[5] and we[6] suggest an approach to leadership that is 
strongly top-down.  It is top management who must ‘organise and 
manage’, set ‘clear boundaries and standards’, while also ensuring 
employees are excited, empowered, have freedom, and make a difference. 
But this excitement, empowerment, freedom, and making a difference 
seem to be defined by top management, the leadership that has the 
burden ‘to organise and manage’ the new BP Amoco, a ‘huge worldwide 
company’.  This again evokes a heroic mantle (who but a hero could do 
such heroic things, could know what excites ‘the people who work for us’ 
(not with us), could know what ‘clear boundaries and standards’ to set?), 
and is consistent with the underlying root metaphor ‘top management 
is a hero’.
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In the first seven paragraphs of the 1998 CEO letter (using as the 
probe the identification of the leadership metaphor, ‘we’) it is argued 
plausibly by the textual analysis that a fundamental, or root metaphor 
coursing through at least the first part of the CEO letter reporting on 
1998, is ‘top management is a hero’.  Of course, the analysis is based 
upon the authors’ close reading, and is subject to dispute.  But ‘top 
management is a hero’ fits rather nicely when considered in the context 
of the themes in the corpus of BP CEO letters from 1998 to 2006 
(see Table 5.2), and also given the importance of 1998 to the newly 
merged BP-Amoco corporation and the attendant symbolic work that 
top management would have to do to fashion a common worldwide 
organisational culture.  
The key implication in terms of tone at the top is that this root 
metaphor signals a perverse leadership approach, as described below. 
And since this metaphor appears strongly in BP’s CEO letters, one might 
ask whether it is intended to be so portrayed by top management to all 
other stakeholders (especially employees), and whether top management 
itself – in the person of the CEO – operated cognitively within such a 
mental model.
The leadership approach signalled by this metaphor includes the 
following:
•	 top management exercises leadership in a top-down fashion;
•	 top management knows best;
•	 top management knows all there is to know;
•	 top management has little regard for followership;
•	 top management is imbued with extraordinary insight, wisdom, and 
other abilities; and
•	 top management might not appreciate criticism, even if constructive.
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The text of the CEO letter is insightful, especially in view of what is 
now known regarding the conclusions of the Report of the BP US Refineries 
Independent Safety Review Panel (2007) that was cited above regarding 
the tone at the top.  Top management cannot, indeed should not, be 
regarded by others or themselves as heroes, metaphorically or literally.  
Summary
International Standard on Auditing 315: Identifying and Assessing 
the Risks of Material Misstatements through Understanding the Entity and 
its Environment reinforces the importance of comprehending audit risk 
in a comprehensive fashion.  Based upon the discussion in the first five 
chapters of this book, one significant aspect of audit risk is entity (or 
business) leadership risk, especially the risk associated with the setting 
of an inappropriate tone at the top by the CEO.  The leadership of the 
CEO is constructed to a significant degree by means of communication 
and language – formal and informal, verbal and written.  Thus, it seems 
prudent to assess how this leadership is made manifest through analysis 
of key CEO communication media, such as the CEO letter.  
The chapter has illustrated some qualitative approaches to 
analysing the CEO letter, first through thematic analysis (including the 
identification of themes that are under-represented in the CEO letter), 
and second through metaphor analysis.  While the analyses are illustrative 
and therefore selective, they focus on the key link between the rhetoric 
of leadership and the setting of tone at the top.  
Close readings of CEO letters, by company directors (including 
of drafts of these letters as they evolve), external auditors, analysts, 
employees, and numerous other corporate stakeholders, should lead to 
many benefits.  These would include a higher awareness of the importance 
of depth in leadership, eschewing platitudinous and empty words, and 
of the importance of encouraging the humble CEO (as summarised 
earlier from Morris et al. (2005)).  Of course, monitoring CEO discourse 
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should not be limited to the CEO letter, however important it is, but 
also include samples of all textual discourse that has been made public, 
and – on a confidential basis – internal memos and speeches to the extent 
available to internal stakeholders.  Such actions should not be taken to 
‘police’ CEO discourse, but with a view to monitoring such discourse 
and encouraging the construction of a more functional tone at the top. 
The next chapter analyses the case of New Century Financial 
Corporation, using quantitative and qualitative approaches. 
6 new century financial corporation’s ceo letters prior to Bankruptcy
Introduction
Assessment of tone at the top is multimedia since corporate leadership 
language, including the language of CEOs, is expressed in numerous 
formal and informal ways both inside and outside the company.  It is also 
multi-method, and so this chapter uses a combination of quantitative 
and qualitative methods to examine the CEO letters of the bankrupt 
company New Century Financial Corporation.  This was one of 
America’s ‘premier full-service mortgage finance companies’ (www.ncen.
com; last visited June 30, 2008), involved intimately in the sub-prime 
mortgage crisis that facilitated the global economic crisis of 2008.  The 
analysis reveals a perverse tone at the top well before the company’s 
2007 bankruptcy.
Company description 
On Wednesday, March 26, 2008, the 581 page final report of 
the bankruptcy court examiner concerning New Century Financial 
Corporation [New Century] was unsealed.  The examiner, Michael 
Missal, concluded:
New Century’s Senior Management did not set an appropriate 
‘tone at the top’. (Final Report of Michael J. Missal, Bankruptcy 
Court Examiner, February 29, 2008, p. 5) 
The report documented numerous detailed allegations regarding 
material accounting misstatements and other significant deficiencies in 
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the operation and governance of the company over several years.  Missal 
(2008, p. 1) summarised the New Century situation as follows:
On February 7, 2007, New Century Financial Corporation 
(‘New Century’ or the ‘Company’) announced the need to restate 
its financial statements for the first three quarters of 2006.  At the 
time, New Century was the second largest originator of subprime 
residential mortgage loans, which are loans made to borrowers who 
represent a high level of credit risk.  The Company had growth 
at an incredible pace since inception, from originating $357 
million in mortgage loans in its first year of operation in 1996, 
to approximately $60 billion in 2006.  New Century’s equity 
securities were traded on the New York Stock Exchange (‘NYSE’), 
the Company had a market capitalization of over £1 billion in 
February 2007, and it had credit facilities of $17.4 billion to 
finance its activities.  New Century reported net earnings of $411 
million for 2005 and $276 million for the nine months ended 
September 30, 2006.
The February 7, 2007 news that New Century needed to 
restate its 2006 interim financial statements caused a dramatic 
and swift descent of the Company.  Immediately following the 
announcement, New Century’s stock price dropped precipitously, 
and the Company disclosed on March 2, 2007 that it would not 
file its 2006 Annual Report on time.  This revelation and other 
developments prompted increased margin calls by the Company’s 
lenders, accompanied by their refusal to provide further financing.  
As a result of these financial pressures, New Century stopped 
accepting loan applications on March 8, 2007, and the NYSE 
delisted the Company’s securities on March 13, 2007.  On April 
2, 2007, New Century and many of its affiliates (collectively the 
‘Debtors’) filed for bankruptcy protection.  KPMG LLP (‘KPMG’) 
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resigned as the independent auditor for New Century on April 27, 
2007, and the Company announced on May 24, 2007 that its 
financial statements for the year ended December 31, 2005 also 
should no longer be relied upon.
The allegations regarding New Century Financial Corporation are 
highlighted below (source: Missal, 2008):
•	 Aggressively increased loan originations without due consideration 
of risk.  ‘The increasingly risky nature of New Century’s loan 
originations created a ticking time bomb that detonated in 2007’ 
(p. 3);
•	 Made ‘frequent exceptions to its underwriting guidelines for 
borrowers who might not otherwise qualify for a loan’ (p. 3);
•	 ‘Senior Management turned a blind eye to the increasing risks of 
New Century’s loan originations and did not take appropriate steps 
to manage these risks’ (p. 4);
•	 ‘Senior Management was aware of an alarming and steady increase 
in early payment defaults…on loans originated by New Century, 
beginning no later then mid-2004’ (p. 4);
•	 The company ‘did not invest in the necessary technologies, systems 
or personnel to meet its growing business and expanding challenges’ 
(p. 5);
•	 ‘New Century’s Senior Management did not set an appropriate ‘tone 
at the top’.  Many former New Century employees rationalised the 
company’s actions with the belief that  the company was conducting 
business in the same manner or even better than its competitors’ 
(p. 5);
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•	 ‘New Century engaged in…wide-ranging improper accounting 
practices in 2005 and 2006, most of which were not in conformity 
with generally accepted accounting principles…’ (p. 5).  These 
‘improper practices’ included: (i) improper accounting ‘for the reserve 
for losses associated with the repurchase of loans previously sold to 
investors’ (p. 5); (ii) ‘failed to value properly residual interests that 
the company held in off-balance sheet securitisations’ (p. 6); (iii) 
allowance for investment loan losses (p. 7); (iv) mortgage servicing 
rights accounting (p. 7); (v) ‘deferral and amortisation of loan 
origination fees and costs’ (p. 7); (vi) ‘hedge accounting’ (p. 7); and 
(vii) goodwill (p. 7);
•	 Many other allegations in the Missal report, including: (i) allegations 
regarding the conduct of KPMG, New Century’s external auditor; 
(ii) allegations regarding an ‘unhealthy friction between the Board 
of Directors and Senior Management…’ (Missal, 2008, p. 9); (iii) 
‘New Century failed to have an effective system of internal controls’ 
(Missal, 2008, p. 9); (iv) Audit Committee lapses; and (v) Internal 
Audit Department lapses.
New Century’s self-description on its website is as follows (www.
ncen.com; last visited June 30, 2008):
Company Information  
Founded in 1995 and headquartered in Irvine, California, New 
Century Financial Corporation is a real estate investment trust 
(REIT) and one of the nation’s premier full-service mortgage 
finance companies, providing first and second mortgage products 
to borrowers nationwide through its operating subsidiaries, New 
Century Mortgage Corporation and Home123 Corporation.  The 
company offers a broad range of mortgage products designed to meet 
the needs of all borrowers.  New Century is committed to serving 
the communities in which it operates with fair and responsible 
lending practices.  
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We originate and purchase loans on the basis of the borrower’s 
ability to repay the mortgage loan, the borrower’s historical pattern 
of debt repayment and the amount of equity in the borrower’s 
property (as measured by the borrower’s loan-to-value ratio, or 
LTV).  We have been originating and purchasing loans since 1996 
and believe we have developed a comprehensive and sophisticated 
process of credit evaluation and risk-based pricing that allows us 
to effectively manage risk.
We originate and purchase loans through our wholesale network of 
approximately 35,000 independent mortgage brokers and through 
our retail network of 216 sales offices operating in 35 states, and 
34 regional processing centres operating in 17 states.  Although a 
significant percentage of our loans are originated in California, 
we are authorized to do business in all 50 states and regularly 
originate and purchase loans throughout the country.  Additionally, 
we employ approximately 7,500 Associates.
We originate approximately 90 percent of our loans through our 
wholesale channel and 10 percent through our retail channel.  
Of the loans that we originate, approximately 60 percent are 
refinances of existing mortgages and 40 percent are for the purchase 
of residential property.  Of the refinance transactions, 85 percent 
were cash-out refinances in which the borrower receives additional 
proceeds to pay off other debt or meet other financial needs.  
We have a secondary marketing strategy where we sell approximately 
80 percent of our loans for cash in the whole loan market and 
hold the remaining 20 percent of our production for investment 
through on-balance sheet securitizations.  This secondary marketing 
strategy provides greater stabilization of earnings going forward.  
On October 1, 2004, we converted into a REIT, which we believe 
we will put us in a better position to achieve our long-term growth 
objectives, diversify our revenues in a more tax-efficient manner 
and increase stockholder value.  
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Nielsen (‘The Rise and Demise of New Century Financial’, 
Investopedia.com) describes the industry in which the company operated 
as follows:
The Wild West of Mortgage Lending
New Century Financial was a star in the booming mortgage business 
of the late 1990s and 2000s.  It made its money by concentrating 
on a then underserved section of the mortgage market: sub-prime 
borrowers.  
New Century’s approach to the mortgage market was made clear in 
its March 2006 10-K filing, in which it stated that ‘[New Century 
Financial lends] to individuals whose borrowing needs are generally 
not fulfilled by traditional financial institutions because they do not 
satisfy the credit, documentation or other underwriting standards 
prescribed by conventional mortgage lenders and loan buyers’.
During this time, interest rates reached all-time lows.  New types 
of mortgages were introduced to borrowers, which allowed for 
interest-only payments and deferred interest.  Mortgage companies 
were rolling out proprietary automated-underwriting systems that 
allowed for quick, analytical underwriting decisions.
Borrowers were constantly willing to take on the risk of higher 
mortgage payments and a flat or rising mortgage balance because 
the ability to refinance down the road seemed certain.  Housing 
prices continued to climb.
Wall Street and big investors were willing to take on risk that 
seemed quantifiable and diversified in exotic mortgage-backed 
security (MBS), asset-backed security (ABS) and collateralized debt 
obligation (CDO) structures.
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Everybody was making money and virtually everyone was happy.  
As in most bubbles, the belief by most was that the good times were 
sure to go on forever.  And New Century was on the leading edge.
A timeline of major events in the company’s history is set out in 
Table 6.1.  
Table 6.1  Timeline of major events
Date Major event
1995 - 1998 New Century Financial was founded in 1995 by three mortgage veterans Bob Cole, Brad 
Morrice and Ed Gotschall.  The company made its first loan in 1996 and went public in 
1997.  By 1998, it had grown to 1,151 employees, had 111 offices, originated $2 billion in 
mortgages and made $17.7 million in net profit.
2000 New Century originated $4.2 billion in mortgages.
2002 Added to the Nasdaq Financial 100 Index.
2003 Ranked twelfth on Fortune Magazine’s ‘100 Fastest Growing Companies’.
2004 Converts to a real estate investment trust; lists on the NYSE; originates $42.2 billion in 
mortgages.
2005 Ranks third on the Wall Street Journal’s ‘Top Guns’ of best performing companies; originates a 
record $56.1 billion in mortgages.  
2006 Ranks second nationally in subprime mortgage origination volume.
First quarter 
2006
The rapid pace of home price appreciation ends.  However, New Century and the mortgage 
industry continues to originate subprime loans under the previously valid assumption that 
subprime borrowers will be able to refinance out of adjustable-rate mortgages.
Fourth 
quarter 2006
Things begin to fall apart.  The assumptions used in automated credit underwriting engines 
prove to be invalid as the percentage of subprime loans in default begins to rise.  Investor 
appetite for subprime securities wanes.  Loan repurchase requirements for New Century 
and other subprime originators increases as early payment defaults rise.  This is because 
mortgages sold into the secondary market frequently have clauses stating the mortgage must 
be repurchased if it goes into default within a certain period of time.
March 8, 
2007
New Century announced it had stopped accepting loan applications because some of its 
financial backers are refusing to provide access to financing; and that it had received $150 
million of margin calls from its warehouse lenders.  ‘As a result of the current constrained 
funding capacity, the company has elected to cease accepting loan applications from 
prospective borrowers effective immediately, while the company seeks to obtain additional 
funding capacity’; and that one of its financial backers has demanded the company repurchase 
some loans pursuant to repurchase provisions contained in loan purchase agreements.
[Sources: company website; Wikipedia.com; Investopedia.com; Barry 
Nielsen, “The Rise and Fall of New Century Financial”]
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Table 6.1  Timeline of major events (Cont.)
Date Major event
March 9, 
2007
New Century reported that it had failed to meet certain minimum financial targets 
required by its warehouse lenders and disclosed that it was the subject of a federal criminal 
investigation.  The company also indicated that it did not have the cash to pay creditors.
March 12, 
2007
The NYSE halted trading of New Century while it decided whether to continue listing 
the company’s securities in light of liquidity problems.  The stock of New Century lost 
approximately 90 percent of its value since the start of March 2007 on news of growing 
defaults and problems obtaining new financing.
March 13, 
2007
In a regulatory filing, New Century reported that it had received a grand jury subpoena from 
the US Attorney’s Office for the Central District of California as well as a letter from the SEC 
notifying it of a preliminary investigation.  The filing stated that the US Attorney’s office 
had indicated in a letter dated February 28, 2007 that it was conducting a criminal inquiry 
in connection with trading in the company’s securities, as well as into accounting errors 
regarding the company’s allowance for repurchase losses.  The filing also stated that the SEC 
has requested a meeting with the company to discuss the company’s previous announcement 
that it would restate certain financial statements.
March 20, 
2007
New Century said it can no longer sell mortgage loans to Fannie Mae or act as the primary 
servicer of mortgage loans for the government sponsored enterprise.  In a filing with the SEC, 
New Century said that Fannie Mae terminated ‘for cause’ a mortgage selling and servicing 
contract with it, citing alleged breaches of that contract and others.  New Century said it 
received a notice of breach and termination on March 14, 2007; that it had received ‘cease-
and-desist’ orders from California, that it has entered into consent agreements with Florida 
and Washington state regulators, and that New York’s banking department has suspended the 
banking license of its Home123 Corporation subsidiary for up to 30 days.
April 2, 2007 New Century and its related entities filed voluntary petitions for relief under chapter 11 of the 
United States Bankruptcy Code in the United States Bankruptcy Court, District of Delaware.  
New Century listed liabilities of more than $100 million, and also announced that about 
3,200 of its employees would be terminated.  New Century said that it had obtained $150 
million from CIT Group and Royal Bank of Scotland Group Plc’s Greenwich Capital unit to 
use as its bankruptcy case moves through the court process.  The company said it planned to 
sell most of its assets within 45 days of the bankruptcy filing.
April 16, 
2007
A petition by the US Department of Justice, filed with the bankruptcy court, requested the 
handover of company management to a court-appointed trustee.  The petition claimed that 
there were signs of ongoing self-dealing by company executives and directors.  The creditors’ 
committee opposed this request, and it was denied.
May 25, 
2007
The company filed its form 8-K, a day after stating that they ‘...probably overstated 2005 
earnings’.
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Table 6.1  Timeline of major events (Cont.)
Date Major event
June 8, 2007 New Century warned that its effort to liquidate assets could be stymied if GE Capital was 
allowed to seize computers and other equipment it leased to the bankrupt housing lender.  GE 
Capital, argued that New Century owed it $8.7 million on leased equipment and was behind 
on current on payments.  It asked a judge to lift the protection normally granted to companies 
in chapter 11.  That would enable GE Capital to repossess the equipment, which included 
computer servers, and chairs.  New Century said that would disrupt its effort to wind down 
operations and repay creditors.  New Century said ‘much of the data and information’ 
involving its assets and business operations, including accounting information, is stored on 
the computers, or generated by them.  New Century also said ‘it is critical for the debtors to 
use the equipment’ so that the loan-servicing business it recently sold to Carrington Capital 
Management can be kept ‘operating as a going concern’.  Carrington paid $188 million for 
the business.  The committee of unsecured creditors in the bankruptcy case also opposed GE 
Capital’s bid to seize the computers, saying it was the third time the company had tried to 
force New Century to pay ‘substantially more’ in cash than the value of the equipment.
March 26, 
2008
An unsealed report by bankruptcy court examiner Michael Missal outlined a number of 
‘significant improper and imprudent practices related to its loan originations, operations, 
accounting and financial reporting processes,’ and accused auditor KPMG of helping the 
company conceal the problems during 2005 and 2006.  
Quantitative analysis using DICTION
The New Century CEO letters from the years 2000 to 2005 were 
extracted from the corresponding annual reports after these reports, 
as pdf files, were downloaded from the company’s website (ncen.com) 
and converted to text files.  The CEO letters were then analysed using 
DICTION.  The results are shown in Table 6.2.  The first 500-word 
option was chosen, and it was decided to initially consider only results 
that were two or more standard deviations from DICTION’s norms 
for business annual reports, for the reasons mentioned in chapter four.
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From the DICTION results in Table 6.2, a major point of disjuncture 
and a major change of tone at the top in the company commenced in the 
CEO’s letter for 2004.  The following three-step procedure was adopted.
First, we identified whether any of the 35 DICTION variables were 
more than + or - 2 standard deviations from the expected mean.  This 
focused particularly on any changes in the pattern of those deviations. 
Second, if a change was found in the pattern in the first step, the other 
DICTION variables which became out-of-range (even by +1 or - 1 
standard deviation) simultaneously (and thereby indicated a similar 
pattern) were analysed too.  Third, the pattern of above or below range 
results were explored for the five DICTION master variables to assess 
whether they helped substantiate the conclusions emerging from the 
two prior steps.
For the years 2000-2005, there are 18 instances of variables being 
more than + or - 2 standard deviations from the expected norm (these 
are underlined in bold typeface in Table 6.2).  Seven of the variables 
appear once.  They are not a part of any run of consecutive instances 
and are not focused on.  These are:
•	 Levelling terms (2001) 
•	 Collectives (2004) 
•	 Inspiration (2005)
•	 Rapport (2006)
•	 Passivity (2002)
•	 Familiarity (2004)
•	 Temporal terms (2005)  
The human interest variable is present every year from 2000 to 2005. 
They indicate an extremely and consistently high level of focus on people 
and activities.  Their chief preoccupation is a stress on the humanity of 
the organisation, the care which is felt towards all its employees, and 
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a tone of ‘motherhood and apple pie’.  But they are not of immediate 
interest.  More striking are changes in the pattern of out-of-range results. 
One such change occurred with the extremely out-of-range result for 
hardship (+7.90).  This began to be out of range in 2004, and continued 
to be out of range strongly in 2005.
Hardship suggests a growing recognition that the organisation’s 
operating environment has become more competitive and difficult.  But 
what other  DICTION variables can help us to understand the change 
of the tone at the top which is evident with the suddenly strong out of 
range result for hardship?
So, in the second stage of analysis, any other DICTION variables 
are examined which became out of range (even by +1 or -1 standard 
deviation) simultaneously in 2004, and indicate a pattern similar to 
that exhibited by hardship and re-occurred in 2005.  As with hardship, 
in 2004, three variables were out of range by at least +1 or -1 standard 
deviation after a lapse of three years of not being out of range.  These 
variables, which continued to be out of range in 2005, were temporal 
awareness (+1.14, +2.54), insistence (-1.16, -1.39) and variety (1.89, 
1.84) and were assessed to see whether they can illuminate the very 
strong change in the hardship variable.
It is understandable that temporal awareness, insistence and variety 
should exhibit a pattern similar to that for hardship.  The CEO, aware 
of hardship facing the company, invokes a tone of precise and measured 
concern for practicalities and need for change – a kind of sober but 
precise ‘business like’ way ahead to resolve the company’s difficulties.
 In the third stage, changes in the ‘master’ variables were studied to 
assess whether there is any reinforcement of a finding of a major change 
in tone, of the type described above, in 2004.  Table 6.2 reveals that a 
disjuncture seems to have occurred in 2004, as outlined above.  This is 
apparent, in particular, from the results for optimism, which indicate a 
tone of endorsement and stress on positive entailments.  These results 
appear as a counterpoint to the other acknowledgements of hardship. 
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In other words, things may be difficult, but the tone is one in which it is 
asserted that the organisation will prevail.  This is complemented by the 
tone of certainty, which seeks to reinforce the view that, ultimately, the 
organisation will revert to a platform of success.  Scores for both of these 
variables exceeded the normal range from 2000 to 2002.  But a change 
in this pattern occurred in 2003.  In that year only optimism exceeded 
normal range and realism was within range.  In 2005, optimism was 
below range.  After three years of these variables being almost in tandem, 
in 2004 this pattern was upset.  The stress on endorsement and positive 
entailment had been diminished greatly without effect on the stress on 
more tangible matters in 2004.  So, this was a tone of measured concern 
for the harsher realities facing the company and the changes it needed to 
undergo.  This tone appears to have been linked to the strategic decision 
of the company to become a Real Estate Investment Trust – and the 
stresses, demands and exigencies that would impose.
In sum, the pattern of results in terms of DICTION’s semantic tone 
measures reveals that the 2004 CEO letter represented a rather dramatic 
change from the letters of previous years.  Thus, the 2004 letter is our 
candidate for a closer, qualitative, analysis.  
Qualitative analysis of the 2004 CEO letter
The text of the 2004 CEO letter of New Century Financial is shown 
in Exhibit 6.1 (with line numbers added).  
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Exhibit 6.1  New century financial corporation 2004 CEO letter
1 New Century Financial Corporation 2004 CEO Letter 
2 To Our Stockholders,  
3 2004 was the best year in the history of New Century Financial Corporation from a financial, operational and 
4 strategic perspective, achieved while weaving our ‘New Shade of Blue Chip’ thread through our  
5 accomplishments.   
6 Financially, we set a goal of growing our 2004 diluted EPS from $6.32 in 2003 to over $8.25 in 2004, and we did  
7 it, earning $8.29 for the year.   
8 Operationally, we grew our 2004 loan production 54 percent over 2003’s results to a record $42.2 billion.  In our  
9 Wholesale Division, we added six new regional processing centers and 283 new account executives, which  
10 translated into a 51 percent year-over-year increase in wholesale production.  We delivered even stronger growth  
11 in our retail franchise as we increased production 86 percent by hiring 213 additional loan officers and increasing  
12 our productivity.   
13 Strategically, we believe we positioned the company to deliver even greater returns to our stockholders, most  
14 notably by converting into a REIT.  Management and our board of directors analysed the REIT structure for many  
15 months before deciding to become a REIT, and we appreciate our stockholders’ strong vote of support for the  
16 REIT conversion.  We believe that as a REIT we are in a better position to achieve our long-term objectives by  
17 diversifying and stabilizing our revenues in a more tax-efficient manner, which we expect will increase  
18 stockholder value.  We are now one of the largest mortgage REITs by origination volume and have the largest  
19 taxable REIT subsidiary (TRS).   
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Exhibit 6.1  New century financial corporation 2004 CEO letter (Cont)
20 Total Return REIT  
21 Our Total Return REIT business model consists of a REIT that we believe will deliver a stable and growing  
22 dividend, and a sizeable TRS that generates earnings that can be used for franchise growth, expansion of our  
23 portfolio of mortgage loans, or to supplement our dividend.  This model provides significant competitive  
24 advantages compared with other mortgage REITs as we have greater financial flexibility and less reliance on the  
25 capital markets.  As a REIT, we expect to distribute to our stockholders 100 percent of our annual REIT taxable  
26 income - the income we earn on our mortgage loan portfolio held at the REIT.  We also have the option of  
27 supplementing our dividend with a portion of the earnings from our TRS.  We paid our first quarterly dividend as  
28 a REIT in the amount of $1.50 per share on January 31, 2005 and we intend to deliver an annual dividend of  
29 $6.50 per share or more this year.  Looking beyond 2005, our goal is to grow our dividend 10 percent annually.   
30 Strategic Acquisition  
31 Another 2004 strategic milestone was our acquisition of the Home123 Corporation brand assets.  The Home123®  
32 brand promise is to help borrowers ‘cut through the loan clutter’ and make the loan process as easy as 1-2-3.   
33 Early results show that this value proposition and distinct identity will allow us to more significantly grow retail  
34 production volume and increase market share.  The Home123® brand rollout began in January 2005 and features  
35 Bob Vila, one of America's best-known home improvement experts, as its spokesperson.  We expect to convert all  
36 74 of our retail branches to the new brand in the first half of 2005.   
37 2005 Outlook  
38 As we look forward to 2005, we will face more challenges than the past few years due to rising interest rates,  
38 moderating home-price appreciation and greater competition.  However, we believe our management team has the  
39 experience to navigate through this environment and we have a clear and compelling strategy to deliver another  
40 year of strong results.   
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Exhibit 6.1  New century financial corporation 2004 CEO letter (Cont.)
37 2005 Outlook  
38 As we look forward to 2005, we will face more challenges than the past few years due to rising interest rates,  
38 moderating home-price appreciation and greater competition.  However, we believe our management team has the  
39 experience to navigate through this environment and we have a clear and compelling strategy to deliver another  
40 year of strong results.   
42 Within the REIT, we plan to accelerate our mortgage loan portfolio’s growth during 2005 to deliver greater value  
42 to our stockholders. .  By deploying our existing capital, we project our average portfolio balance to be  
43 approximately $16 billion this year. .  We expect this portfolio to pay out most or all of our projected 2005  
44 dividend. .   
45 Within the TRS, we will focus our efforts on expanding our product menu to grow our purchase business,  
46 develop additional Alt-A (higher FICO score) products and provide home equity lines of credit. .  Additionally, we  
47 plan to add 10 new retail offices and increase our sales forces to drive greater penetration in regions where we do  
48 not currently have a strong presence. .  Overall, we expect to grow loan production to $45 billion or more in 2005,  
49 with a significant portion of this growth coming through our retail franchise’s Home123 rollout. .   
50 Additionally, we are implementing a number of cost saving initiatives that we believe will enhance our  
51 competitive position and profitability. .  We have the size and scale to operate as a low cost originator, an important  
52 factor in delivering strong results in this part of the business cycle. .   
53 With the continued strength of our mortgage banking operations and our growing mortgage loan portfolio, we  
54 believe our Total Return REIT will increase stockholder value by delivering a dividend of at least $6.50 per share  
55 by paying out our REIT taxable earnings, and delivering EPS of $9.00 or more this year. .   
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Exhibit 6.1  New century financial corporation 2004 CEO letter (Cont.)
56 Community Involvement  
57 We are also focused on giving back to the communities in which we do business, which we believe is  
58 fundamental to our success and is our responsibility as a corporate leader.  Our corporate philanthropy programs  
59 focus on the areas of affordable housing, education and healthcare.  We also offer company-sponsored volunteer  
60 programs, paid time off for volunteer work and a gift-matching program.   
61 Everything that we do at New Century is guided by our ‘New Shade of Blue Chip SM’ beliefs.  We aspire to  
62 become a world-class mortgage company by transforming ourselves from a subprime mortgage company into  
63 one of the top 10 mortgage banking companies in the United States.  We expect to reach our goals by meeting or  
64 exceeding our commitments and delivering the right results, done well.   
65 We look forward to sharing another year of success in 2005 and know we could not do it without our board of  
66 directors, financial partners, brokers, customers, stockholders and especially our Associates.  We thank you all for  
67 your continued support of New Century Financial Corporation.   
70 Sincerely,  
71 Robert K.  Cole Edward F.  Gotschall  
72 Chairman of the Board and Chief Executive Officer Vice Chairman-Finance  
73 Brad A.  Morrice  
74 Vice Chairman, President and Chief Operating Officer  
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Lines 3 to 5 of the letter proclaim that ‘2004 was the best year in 
the history of [the company]...  achieved while weaving our “New Shade 
of Blue Chip” thread through our accomplishments’.  Although the 
examination of CEO letters in this report are restricted  to just the text of 
CEO letters, clearly text is only one aspect (albeit a potentially revealing 
aspect) of any document.  The non-text visual and graphic aspects of 
a communication medium such as a CEO letter or annual report are 
significant as well, and can enhance interpretation of straight text.  For 
example, portraits of top executives and CEOs, sometimes contained 
in annual reports ‘represent significant sites for the visual construction 
of corporate identity and image’, while simultaneously raising issues of 
authenticity (Guthey & Jackson, 2005, p. 1057).  Such are the issues 
raised with these first few lines of New Century’s 2004 CEO letter.
Writing about corporate annual reports, David, a professor of 
rhetoric and professional communication, has reinforced the importance 
of narrative context themes and pictorial images.  She argues that ‘by 
presenting themes in annual reports and offering vivid pictorial images, 
the producers of reports obscure the differences between reporting the 
company’s yearly progress and promoting business values that leaders 
find important’ (David, 2001, p. 196).  Importantly, she argues that: 
The narrative sections of annual reports are not just portrayals of 
a company’s history.  They are purveyors of cultural values about 
the company, the broader industry, and business and its activities.  
For readers wishing to scan the report without granting it the time 
needed to analyze figures, the photographs and summaries in the 
narrative section allow at a glance an impression of the company’s 
image and its central theme.  Furthermore, the documentary style 
of photography imports the ethos of truth that documentary has 
enjoyed from its onset…the stories presented in the narratives of 
some annual reports convey myths through pictures and graphics 
and accompanying text.  The myths tap into the large cultural belief 
systems represented in the broader media. (David, 2001, p. 206)
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In New Century’s letter, the words ‘achieved while weaving our 
“New Shade of Blue Chip” thread through our accomplishments’ 
are evocatively metaphorical.  This metaphor is consistent with, and 
reinforced by, the graphic image of a line, or ‘thread’.  The metaphor 
‘weaves’ from the front cover of the 2004 annual report, through the next 
three pages of the annual report, skipping a page, then re-appearing again 
(as a thread outlining what seems to be a woman and a man) on the first 
published page of the CEO letter in the annual report.  It  continues over 
the next three pages of the published version of the CEO letter, ending 
on the second-to-last page of the letter as a hard-to-interpret squiggle 
that might represent a person with a backpack on the top of a mountain. 
This thread metaphor, as text and as a visual metaphor, serves to frame 
the CEO letter and the 2004 annual report as a whole.  
While a more complete analysis of this combined textual and 
graphic metaphor would require considerable depth and run for several 
pages, only three aspects  are emphasised here.  First, that this complex 
text/visual metaphor is an important framing device.  Second, that it 
employs socially-appealing images (a curvy line or thread that variously 
becomes a dove, a woman and man, a climber at a mountain peak). 
Third, that it is itself reinforced with attractive text: ‘there is a belief 
that runs through our company’; and ‘a belief that performance means 
little without integrity’.
On one hand, New Century’s use of a sustained, framing metaphor 
might be regarded as simply corporate hyperbole.  But since this 
metaphoric structure is associated intimately with the CEO letter and 
the context within which the letter is embedded, its use should be taken 
seriously in analysing the letter.  For example, notice how the metaphor 
first appears in the CEO letter as the verbal subject of the word ‘while’. 
The authors of the CEO letter are proclaiming that: 
2004 was the best year in the history of New Century Financial 
Corporation from a financial, operational and strategic perspective, 
achieved while weaving our ‘New Shade of Blue Chip’ thread 
through our accomplishments.  
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So, becoming ‘A New Shade of Blue Chip’ (a presumably socially-
meritorious goal) was accomplished even as the company had its ‘best 
year in [its] history’.  And, further, the criterion for ‘best year’ is based 
upon ‘financial, operational and strategic’ perspectives, which were 
criticised persistently in court examiner Missal’s (2008) report.  
From the perspective of an analyst interested in ‘tone at the top’, 
such a complex framing metaphor combined with the hyperbolic ‘best 
year in history’ assertion thus suggests that extreme language and rhetoric 
are in play.  Lines 6 and 7 of the letter (see Exhibit 6.1) are as follows:
Financially, we set a goal of growing our 2004 diluted EPS from 
$6.32 in 2003 to over $8.25 in 2004, and we did it, earning 
$8.29 for the year.
Setting a singular financial goal of increasing EPS seems inapt, since 
the shortcomings of this financial accounting metric are well-known. 
And the growth target of almost 31% (8.25/6.32) seems to require an 
explanation of how the company would manage such a significant and 
rapid increase in the implied level of operations.  
The phrase ‘New Shade of Blue Chip’ provides bookends to the 
letter.  The phrase appears on line 4 and line 61.  The metaphor that 
begins as a thread that the corporate leadership ‘weave[s]…through 
our accomplishments’ and ends as ‘our…beliefs’, has interesting  visual 
overtones.  What begins at the start of the letter (line 4) as a ‘thread’ that 
the leadership has been ‘weaving’, ends the letter (line 61) as ‘beliefs’ 
that ‘guide[…]’ ‘Everything we do at New Century’.
So, a ‘thread’ (that is passive since the leadership does the ‘weaving’ of 
the ‘thread’) becomes at the end of the letter active (as agent) since it now 
does the ‘guid[ing]’.  But what does ‘New Shade of Blue Chip’ signify? 
The text of the letter uses the phrase twice (as bookends: see above). 
The visual line (‘thread’) which courses from the cover and through 
the first few pages of the 2004 annual report, is coloured blue (against 
the black background of the cover and the next two black background 
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pages of the annual report results).  Visually, this is a very vivid image. 
The New Century leadership contrast a ‘New Style of Blue Chip’ with 
a ‘traditional blue chip’ company (2004 annual report, p. 4):
Like traditional blue chip companies, we have outperformed our 
competitors with consistent and strong financial performance.  
Over the past three years, annual revenue more than tripled, 
earnings per share (EPS) grew significantly and annual loan 
production set our record levels.
New Century Financial Corporation has delivered strong results 
like traditional blue chips, while putting significant emphasis on 
the way these results are achieved.  We are committed to forging 
relationships with partners based on trust and living up to our 
promises.
At New Century Financial Corporation, integrity and performance 
are part of the same equation.
The phrase ‘A New Shade of Blue Chip’ is first introduced in the 
2004 annual report on the fourth page after the above contrast with 
‘traditional blue chips’ in the heading:
New Century Financial Corporation
‘A New Shade of Blue Chip’
This appears in blue font, just like the ‘thread’ line graphic.  Then 
there are two uses of the phrase ‘New Shade of Blue Chip’, as mentioned 
above.  This phrase did not appear in the 2003 annual report, but 
appeared in the 10-K portion of the 2005 annual report as part of a factual 
explanation for an increase in advertising and promotion expense due 
to the company’s ‘New Shade of Blue Chip corporate brand campaign’ 
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(2005 annual report, p. 61).  The Missal report (2008) provides evidence 
that the more egregious transgressions at New Century became apparent 
in 2004 and after – and the 2004 CEO letter presumably was written at 
least at the cusp of the company’s inapt behaviour.  This suggests that the 
‘New Shade of Blue Chip’ ‘brand campaign’ may have coincided with an 
attempt to shade such behaviour inappropriately.  The rhetoric embedded 
in the 2004 letter, as well as the hints from DICTION, seem to suggest 
this; from the perspective of the language of corporate leadership and 
the tone at the top, at the very least, there was something rather curious 
about New Century’s 2004 CEO letter.
Thus, there are important major themes in the 2004 CEO letter and 
the annual report context.  First, the leadership’s proclamation, via both 
textual and visual metaphors, of a new type of company – ’A New Shade 
of Blue Chip’ –  plausibly entails that is a blue chip company, and such 
self-branding has the rhetorical intent of benefiting from the positive 
social carriage of the phrase ‘blue chip’.  The website investorwords.com 
(visited September 12, 2008) defines the phrase ‘blue chip’ as: 
Stock of a large, national company with a solid record of stable 
earnings and/or dividend growth and a reputation for high quality 
management and/or products.  More generally, anything of very 
high quality.
The website investopedia.com (visited September 12, 2008) offers 
a similar definition: 
A nationally recognized, well-established and financially sound 
company.  Blue chips generally sell high-quality, widely accepted 
products and services.  Blue chip companies are known to weather 
downturns and operate profitably in the face of adverse economic 
conditions, which help to contribute to their long record of stable 
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and reliable growth.  The name ‘blue chip’ came about because in 
the game of poker the blue chips have the highest value.  
Blue chip stocks are seen as a less volatile investment than owning 
shares in companies without blue chip status because blue chips 
have an institutional status in the economy.  Investors may buy 
blue chip companies in order to have a portion of their portfolio 
in stocks that will provide steady growth.  The stock price of a blue 
chip usually closely follows the S&P 500.
But New Century attempted to differentiate itself even further by 
being a ‘new’ rather than a ‘traditional’ blue chip company.  There is 
rhetorical value in newness in our society.  In addition, the implication 
is that since the only difference that the company espouses between a 
‘new’ and ‘traditional’ blue chip is values and ethics, the old blue chips 
were somehow deficient when it came to ‘forging relationships…based 
on trust and living up to…promises’ (annual report, p. 4).
Second, a major theme can be seen from the way the letter proclaims 
and idealises a singular financial goal, achieving EPS.  But what is ‘new’ 
about this? It is ‘new’ in the same dysfunctional sense that Enron was 
(in the words of its corporate leadership in that company’s 2000 CEO 
letter) ‘laser-focused on earnings per share’.
Thus, these two themes are inconsistent.  By its intensive focus on 
earnings per share, New Century is not ‘new’ at all, and the use of EPS 
in such a prominent and highly focused manner is a strong symbol of 
what appears to be a cognitively-restricted corporate leadership mindset.
Summary
The discourse in the 2004 CEO letter, and the textual and visual 
context of the annual report of which it is a part, is far from innocent, 
and far from being merely decorative.  Assertions are made of ‘newness’, 
when in fact little that is ‘new’ appears to be on offer.  Rather, a rhetorical 
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appeal is invoked which its authors clearly imagine will have a potent 
appeal to the letter’s target audience.  This gulf between rhetoric and 
reality is troubling.  Thus, the analysis provides insight to the company’s 
leadership-through-language-and-symbol, a leadership that indicates 
an indication, at the very least, of a perverse tone at the top.  The 
next chapter considers how to further gauge the tone at the top using 
DICTION.
7 using DICTION software to help assess tone at the top
Introduction
This chapter demonstrates how a quantitatively based analysis of the text 
of CEO letters to shareholders, using DICTION 5.0 software, can help 
to gauge tone at the top of a company.  Techniques are introduced that 
help to identify companies whose CEO letters to shareholders reflect 
a potentially undesirable tone at the top.  Other elements of CEO 
discourse, such as speeches, can be analysed similarly.
The techniques demonstrated can be employed by auditors to 
identify companies whose culture might warrant closer scrutiny.  The 
conclusions that stem from the applications of such techniques are 
strengthened when they are also based on longitudinal (rather than cross-
sectional) data and are supplemented by qualitative close reading analysis.
DICTION-based assessment of tone at the top for major companies 
is conducted in respect of the text of two sets of CEO letters to 
shareholders for 2006: one for large UK-based companies; and the other 
for large US-based companies.  The UK companies are in the Financial 
Times Stock Exchange (FTSE) 100 index of the top 100 companies, 
according to market capitalisation, listed on the London Stock Exchange. 
The US companies are the top 100 companies in the annual FORTUNE 
500 listing of America’s largest corporations according to annual revenues 
(FORTUNE 100).
The CEO letters to shareholders of the FTSE 100 and FORTUNE 
100 companies are analysed to show how DICTION can help to ascertain 
the current ambient tone at the top in major corporations.  An important 
motive for doing so is to provide a benchmark against which assessments 
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of the tone at the top in individual companies can be compared.  The 
analysis also shows how quantitative techniques can help to reveal 
extremes of tone at the top: that is, traces of any unsavoury or egregious 
aspects that are conducive to heightened leadership risk.  Finally, the 
differences in DICTION results for FTSE 100 and FORTUNE 100 
companies are examined to assess whether the nature and character of the 
tone at the top is due to variations in the cultural, social, and regulatory 
environments in which FTSE 100 (essentially UK-based) companies and 
FORTUNE 100 (essentially US-based) companies operate.
In very broad outline, the analysis reveals prima facie evidence of 
some semantic tone differences between FTSE 100 and FORTUNE 100 
companies.  It also reveals a wide variety of tone at the top, including 
tones of triumph in achievement, smugness, narcissism, hubris, 
confidence, strength, blame, frustration and resignation.
Data
FTSE 100
The identities of companies comprising the FTSE 100 were sourced 
from Eckett (2005).  The database constructed contained the CEO (or 
similarly titled) letters for 91 of these companies.  CEO (or similarly 
designated) letters for 2006 were not accessible for nine FTSE 100 
companies: Scottish Power; BAA; BOC; Gallaher; Smith and Nephew; 
Boots; BPB; Sage; and AllianceUniChem.  The first three companies 
were taken over during 2006 by companies based in either Spain or 
Germany.  It is much less common for Continental European companies 
to issue CEO letters to shareholders and no such letters were published 
for these three companies in 2006.  BPB was delisted during the year 
and Gallaher, Smith and Nephew, and Sage did not appear to issue a 
CEO (or similar) letter in 2006.  The distractions of a merger between 
Boots and Alliance Unichem seems to have accounted for the absence 
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of a CEO (or similar) letter for either of those companies or for the 
merged company (Alliance Boots).
Unlike FORTUNE 100 companies, FTSE 100 companies do not 
have a strong tradition of publishing a CEO letter to shareholders in 
their annual reports.  Some of the FTSE 100 companies published letters 
which serve the same purpose and which have the same characteristics, 
but have other titles.  Accordingly, the 91 letters examined included 76 
CEO letters to shareholders, 11 combined Chair’s Statement and CEO’s 
letter, and four which were a Chairman’s Statement only.  The resultant 
FTSE 100 letter file comprised 156,702 words, with an average length 
of 1,722 words (s.d. = 1,148 words).  The companies represented had 
market capitalisations ranging from £133,858 million (BP plc) to £1,928 
million (Schroders plc); and their reported earnings ranged from a profit 
of £17,772 million (Royal Dutch Shell plc) to a loss of £4,702 million 
(Vodafone Group plc).
FORTUNE 100
The companies comprising the FORTUNE 100 for 2006 were 
sourced from www.money.cnn.com/magazines/fortune/fortune500/
full_list/.  The database constructed contained the CEO (or similarly 
titled) letters for 94 of these companies.  CEO (or similarly designated) 
letters for 2006 were not accessible for: Albertsons; Caremark; Johnson 
Control; Delphi; International Paper; and HCA.  The first three of these 
companies were affected by major ownership re-structuring (de-merger, 
merger, leverage buyout) during the year.  The other three companies with 
missing letters do not appear to have issued a traditional company annual 
report in 2006 but seemed to have confined their annual public reporting 
to 10-K disclosures.  The companies represented in the FORTUNE 
100 database had revenues ranging from $US 339,938 million (Exxon 
Mobil) to $US 21,290 million (General Dynamics); and their reported 
earnings ranged from a profit of $US 36,130 million (Exxon Mobil) to 
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a loss of $US 10,600 million (General Motors).  The FORTUNE 100 
letter file comprised 203,040 words, with an average length of 2,160 
words (s.d. = 1,737 words).  
The FORTUNE 100 letters were significantly longer than the FTSE 
100 letters (p ≤ 0.05, two-tailed).  This could be explained as reflecting a 
longer tradition for FORTUNE 100 companies to publish such letters. 
Greater importance may be accorded to them in the US as a device 
for discharging CEO accountability to shareholders and stakeholders. 
One of many other explanations is that perhaps FTSE 100 CEOs were 
more efficient and disciplined in their use of the English language than 
FORTUNE 100 CEOs.
Method
The text of each CEO letter was downloaded from each company’s 
website, converted into a text file, and formatted to facilitate processing 
using DICTION 5.0 software.  The formatting involved excising all non-
text items such as tables, diagrams, logos, and photographs, as well as 
all irrelevant text (for example, headers and footers, and notations such 
as ‘continued on the next page’), together with foreign symbols and 
accents.  The formatted files were imported into a FTSE 100 database 
and a FORTUNE 100 database.  
The analysis began by assessing the 40 DICTION variables for the 
first 500 words of each letter in each database.  This was prompted by 
the view, presented earlier, that the initial paragraphs of written text have 
stronger rhetorical impact and are more influential in reflecting tone 
at the top.  The mean and median scores for each DICTION variable 
in each database were calculated.  The word usage norm against which 
the analysed text was compared was the company annual report ‘special 
dictionary’.  Some caveats and cautions applicable to the use of this 
normative dictionary, especially in relation to FTSE companies, were 
noted in chapter four.  Two-tailed tests were conducted to determine 
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whether there were significant differences between the respective 
means of each of the 40 variables for the FTSE 100 companies and 
the FORTUNE 100 companies.  Mann-Whitney two-tailed tests for 
significant differences between median scores for each DICTION variable 
in the FTSE 100 companies and the FORTUNE 100 companies were 
also conducted.  
Thereafter, for each company in both the FTSE 100 and FORTUNE 
100 databases, the DICTION variable scores that were more than +2 or 
-2 standard deviations from expected values were noted and designated 
as being out-of-range.  The incidence, nature and pattern of these out-
of-range variables for FTSE 100 companies were compared against those 
for FORTUNE 100 companies.  The procedures outlined above were 
repeated for each 500 word segment of text in each letter.  
Results
The initial focus was on the variables with the highest level of 
significant difference between the two data sets; that is, those variables 
for which the test of difference in means, and the test of difference in 
medians, both revealed a two-tailed probability of no difference of 1% 
or less.  
The four variables where the scores for the FTSE 100 companies 
were significantly higher (p ≤ 0.01) than the FORTUNE 100 companies 
were tenacity, accomplishment, familiarity, and exclusion.  These results 
show that, in some FTSE 100 companies at least, a distinctive point 
of difference occurs with common language [familiarity] being used to 
express a tone of ‘cocky’ confidence that the company’s performance 
had been outstanding [tenacity, accomplishment] in a competitive, 
globalised business environment [exclusion, spatial awareness].  Such 
a tone goes beyond matter-of-fact reporting of success, or expressing 
simple pride in achievement, to one of smug, blinded, self-glorification 
in which the efforts of competitors are regarded disdainfully.  There is no 
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trace of humility but a narcissistic air of ‘look at me.  Look how great I 
am’.  The Chief Executive of Reckitt Bensicker, Bart Becht, writes that 
the company:
…launched even better products and invested at record levels in our 
Power Brands to excite customers and stimulate growth.  Examples 
of successful new products include Vanish Oxi Action Crystal White 
[a multi-purpose stain remover], Cillit Bang Stain & Drain [a 
versatile liquid cleaner for use in toilet, kitchens, drains and 
bathroom], Finish 5 in 1 [dishwasher tablets], Quantum [an 
automatic dishwasher powder and gel] and Air wick Freshmatic 
[a time-release home fragrance].  
He tells us that it is the company’s ‘vision’ ‘to keep delivering better 
products to consumers that improve their lives at crucial moments’ [italics 
applied].  One marvels at what crucial moment one’s life could be 
improved by Cillit Bang Stain & Drain – or does Becht have his tongue 
firmly planted in his cheek?  Becht basks in the following text:
At the heart of any successful company is a set of strong, commonly-
held beliefs and ways of working.  At Reckitt Benckiser, we work 
together with passion and commitment to excite consumers.  We 
truly live our business, it is fun and therefore rewarding and it 
is an obsession that goes beyond just being a job.  Our culture 
breeds pride in achievement, a truly personal commitment to 
delivery, pleasure in cooperating in teams and the excitement of 
taking business risks in the search for better solutions.  Not for us 
a culture of consensus, rather we enjoy constructive conflict if it 
leads to better decision making.  It is a culture that works for us.
It is notable that Becht assumes he has some sense of impeccable 
perception in ‘knowing’ the emotions and values of his employees. 
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Apparently, a large and diffuse organisation shares a uniform ‘personal 
commitment’ to producing home fragrances and dishwasher powder, and 
finds it exciting.  However, many studies have emphasised that CEOs 
often have a poor grasp of the real attitudes of people much further 
down the organisational hierarchy, since any news which suggests the 
contrary is heavily filtered on its way to the boardroom (Tourish and 
Robson, 2006).  It could well be that the reality in Becht’s organisation is 
somewhat different from that depicted in his letter.  Consistent with this 
interpretation, there is considerable evidence to suggest declining levels 
of engagement, loyalty and enthusiasm in the majority of workplaces 
throughout the world.  For example, an engagement index devised by 
the polling organisation, Gallup, found that only 16% of UK employees 
were engaged positively with their work – that is, they were loyal and 
committed to the organisation (Caulkin, 2007).  The rest were unengaged 
or actively disengaged – that is, physically present but psychologically 
absent.  While it is possible that Reckitt Bensicker has escaped these 
trends, it seems more likely that Becht’s letter shows an unawareness 
of a harsher reality – or an unwillingness to acknowledge it.  Rather, 
Becht’s letter frames a more culturally uniform and engaged context and 
communicates this as if such a desired-for state of affairs already exists.
Matthew Emmens, CEO of Shire Pharmaceuticals, shows no 
evident traces of humility either – his company is a beacon, a shaper and 
a unique and exemplary model.  Emmens tells readers that his company 
‘set its sights high, and then delivered on its promises’.  In doing so, the 
company reinforced its ‘reputation as a beacon’ among its competitors. 
This was presumably because of its innate ability to ‘know what it takes 
to both shape and realise a vision’ and its ‘unique business model that 
sets [the company] apart from the competition, a disciplined and focused 
growth strategy, an achievement oriented culture, and a high quality team 
of employees willing to meet extraordinary goals and get the job done’.
The two variables for which the FORTUNE 100 companies were 
significantly higher (p ≤ 0.01) than the FTSE 100 companies were 
levelling and present concern.  Two other variables, satisfaction and 
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human interest, were also significant (p ≤ 0.05) for the average 500 words 
of each letter.  An assessment of these results is that FORTUNE 100 letters 
could be characterised, perhaps uncharitably, as having a distinctively 
avuncular, evangelical tone of homage to the ‘protestant work ethic’ or 
‘American dream’.  That is, there was assurance [levelling], expressed in 
a ‘folksy’ way [human interest], that activity [accomplishment] had led 
to the joy of achieving a positive outcome [satisfaction].
With the benefit of hindsight, the letter of Stan O’Neal, Chairman 
and CEO of Merrill Lynch, dated February 22, 2007 makes interesting 
reading,  in view of the company’s precipitate sale at a grossly discounted 
price in September 2008 to the Bank of America to thwart impending 
bankruptcy.  O’Neal’s message is one of success through work – and, 
in particular, work that is hard, disciplined and strategically smart. 
Maximisation of shareholder wealth is seen as the outcome of work that 
has a strong basis in Protestant values of ‘integrity, dedication, discipline’ 
and a focus on others [clients].  O’Neal is evangelical in extolling the 
virtues of capitalism and the benefits of embracing it.  In words that 
subsequent events have proven highly ironic and incongruous, O’Neal 
lauds ‘global capitalism’.  He seems delighted about his company’s 
‘remarkable position at the center of global capitalism – the most 
powerful force for improving lives and creating wealth that the world has 
ever known.  All of us are proud of what we do and excited by a future 
that is literally brimming with opportunity … Together, we can and will 
continue to grow our business, [and] lead this incredible force of global 
capitalism…’  It is noteworthy that O’Neal’s ideological endorsement of 
capitalism was highly challengeable subsequently.  The ‘incredible force’ 
of global capitalism seems likely to have imploded without the strong 
financial and regulatory intervention of the US Treasury and Federal 
Reserve during 2008 to sustain the operational viability of many of 
global capitalism’s key players, such as Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac. 
Indeed, the financial ‘bail-out’ of the American Insurance Group by the 
US government (and US taxpayers) was tantamount to nationalisation. 
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Several UK commentators such as Roubini (2008) have referred 
disparagingly to this development as ‘socialism for the rich’.
Finally, each data set was examined in terms of the hubris master 
variable that we have developed in chapter four for the variables praise, 
accomplishment and tenacity.  There was no significant difference (p ≤ 
0.01) between the praise variable for the two data sets.  However, FTSE 
100 companies were significantly higher (p ≤ 0.01) than FORTUNE 
100 companies in terms of accomplishment and tenacity.  This result 
was observed in analyses of the first 500 words and the average 500 
words of each letter.  This suggests that an air of overconfidence in one’s 
achievement and ability, and possibly diffidence to others, is probably 
more a feature in CEO letters to shareholders of FTSE 100 companies. 
This is consistent with the earlier suggestion (and examples) that there 
was a tone of smugness in some FTSE 100 letters; and with the results 
of the qualitative case analysis of BP’s letters for 1998-2006 (conducted 
in chapter five).  The results draw attention to the probability of an 
inadvisable tone of complacency and exultation at the top in some FTSE 
100 companies.  
Company-by-company out-of-range analysis
FTSE 100
For each company in the FTSE 100 database, the out-of-range scores 
for each of the 40 DICTION variables (35 variables and the 5 master 
variables) were highlighted.  The mean number of variables for which 
the FTSE 100 companies were out-of-range in analysing the first 500 
words was 1.88, with a range of 0 to 10.  In analysis of the average 500 
words, the mean was 1.64 and the range 0 to 10.  
The company with the most out of range variables in the first 
500 words of each letter was William Hill plc (n = 10).  Such a high 
number of out of range variables points to the desirability of giving 
closer scrutiny to the company and its ‘tone at the top’ – by, for example, 
a close reading analysis of its letters to shareholders.  This company’s 
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letter was more than two standard deviations above the norm in terms 
of five variables (in order of strength): blame (+7.33); insistence (+3.45); 
embellishment (+2.80); collectives (+2.36); and numerical terms (+2.30). 
This suggests a tone of resigned [insistence], but overstated [numerical 
terms] and vague [collectives] blame-laying [blame] for some non-human 
action [embellishment].  It was more than two standard deviations 
below the norm in terms of five variables (in order of strength): variety 
(-3.40); optimism (-2.91); human interest (-2.20); complexity (-2.16); 
and activity (-2.11).  This seems indicative of the presentation of an 
overstated [variety], unfavourable and detrimental situation [optimism], 
caused by non-human action [human interest], with clear implications 
[complexity], but for which the response has been inertia and futility 
[activity].  
In sum, the letter’s tone seems to be one of resigned frustration. 
This tone is set very much by the CEO’s statements regarding the 
introduction of the Amusement Machine Licensing Duty.  This is described 
as an ‘imposition’ and it is blamed for ‘adversely’ affecting profitability. 
No counter-proposals are made by the CEO to redress these effects – the 
company seems resigned to the ‘imposition’.  In the space of six sentences 
are such words as: ‘imposition’; ‘adversely’; ‘fell’ (four times); cost(s) 
(two times); ‘reduced/reduction’ (two times); and ‘minimal’.  None of 
the variables identified above for William Hill were out of range in the 
analysis of the average 500 words in the letter.  This suggests that the 
letter was very powerful, rhetorically, in its extreme use of language in 
the opening paragraphs to draw attention to the unfavourable impact 
of the Amusement Machine Licensing Duty.
Variables out of range in each database
The variables for which the FTSE 100 companies were most 
frequently out of range (and more than +2 standard deviations above 
the mean) in the analysis of the first 500 words were: numerical terms 
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(n=7); hardship (n =7); aggression (n=7); and liberation (n=7).  No 
company had all four (or any three) of these variables out of range, but 
two companies had two of these variables simultaneously out of range. 
Centrica plc was out of range in terms of hardship (+2.70) and aggression 
(+2.01): and British Airways plc was out of range in terms of hardship 
(+2.13) and liberation (+2.75).  These out of range variables seem to be 
those expected to be found typically for companies that were reporting 
on a difficult operating year.  Although both companies report that 
they were confronted with difficult operating circumstances, the tone 
of the letters exudes each company’s (alleged) strength and wisdom in 
overcoming such adversity.  
Hubris
In the out-of-range results in terms of the hubris master variable 
(praise + accomplishment + tenacity), Reed Elsevier plc was out of 
range simultaneously in terms of two of these variables: praise (+2.56) 
and accomplishment (+2.13).  A reading of the company’s letter reveals 
frequent adjectival affirmations, consistent with the praise variable. 
The company’s progress is described as ‘important’ and ‘accelerating’; 
its performance, cash generation and brands were each described as 
‘strong’; revenue growth was ‘good’; returns were ‘higher’; its brands 
were ‘leading’; the data it provided were ‘essential’; its information 
was ‘authoritative’; its portfolio was ‘synergistic’; and its allocation of 
resources was ‘disciplined’.  The opening paragraph conveys a strong 
sense of satisfaction with activity accomplishment.  In the space of 47 
words, readers are informed that the company ‘made important progress’, 
‘continued to expand’, ‘delivered’, ‘invested’, ‘achieved further significant 
efficiency gains’ and had accelerated progress.
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FORTUNE 100
For the FORTUNE 100 database, the mean number of variables 
that companies were out-of-range in analysing the first 500 words was 
1.73, with a range of 0 to 10; and for the average 500 words, the mean 
was 1.82, and the range 0 to 11.
The company with the most out of range variables in the analysis 
of the first 500 words, was State Farm (n=10).  But State Farm’s letter 
comprised only 138 words.  The extrapolation of this text to 500 words 
by DICTION seems to have been distortive.  So, the second highest 
number of out-of-range variables, United Health (n=9), is analysed.  A 
high number of out-of-range variables for any company should signal 
that closer scrutiny of its tone at the top might be warranted – including 
a close reading of letters to shareholders.  
The CEO letter for United Health was more than two standard 
deviations above the norm in terms of eight variables (in order of 
strength): present concern (+3.83); satisfaction (+2.89); liberation 
(+2.73); tenacity (+2.66); inspiration (+2.51); certainty (+2.40); 
complexity (+2.33); and optimism (+2.20).  It was more than two 
standard deviations below the norm in terms of familiarity (-2.75).  This 
suggests a company (and a CEO) which is confident [tenacity], strong 
[certainty], affirming triumphantly [satisfaction, optimism] its strategic 
path [inspiration, complexity] and achievements [present concern] in 
a difficult social and business environment [liberation].  Such a general 
tone of success, despite ‘dramatic change taking place in health care 
today’ seems to be sustained from the first 500 words of the CEO’s 
letter.  For example, present concern is evident in the company’s claim to 
‘embrace’, ‘shape’, ‘rationalise’, ‘define’, ‘see opportunities’, ‘reform’ and 
‘cultivate’.  Inspiration is evident in reference to such abstract virtues as 
‘rationalising’, ‘integration’, ‘interaction’, ‘technology-enabled’, ‘ethical 
behaviour’ and ‘integrity’; and optimism and satisfaction in exultation 
in self-proclaimed success in ‘reforming and cultivating our long-
standing competencies to serve expanding market needs… embracing 
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a corporate culture that thrives on change, social responsibility and 
ethical behaviour.’  Indeed, consistent with Mokoteli et al. (2006), the 
combination of positive out-of-range variables optimism and certainty 
is a strong measure of overconfidence.
In the analysis of the average 500 words of each letter, J. P. Morgan 
Chase (n = 8) was out of range in respect of eight DICTION variables. 
The company was more than two deviations above the norm in terms 
of: praise (+4.42); ambivalence (+3.01); cognitive terms (+2.78); self 
reference (+2.47); embellishment (+2.40).  The company was more 
than two standard deviations below the norm in terms of: familiarity 
(-2.65); activity (-2.42); and certainty (-2.19).  This suggests a semantic 
tone of abstract and detached [self-reference, embellishment], highbrow 
[cognitive terms, familiarity] affirmation [praise] of company behaviour. 
The following text from the eighth paragraph of the letter seems 
indicative of this:
…we were not managing our relationships with many of our largest 
clients in an integrated and coordinated way.  Too many people 
were selling their own products without feeling accountable for 
JP Morgan Chase’s overall relationship with the client.  Now, we 
have addressed this issue with dedicated corporate bankers who 
cover the treasurer’s offices of our largest, longest-standing and 
most important clients.  These corporate bankers, in partnership 
with our investment bankers, are focused on developing our entire 
relationship with our clients – orchestrating the coverage effort with 
regular account planning, client reviews and coordinated calling.  
This effort ultimately should add hundreds of millions of dollars 
to revenue and create happier clients.
The stress in the language is on growth and opportunity, even as 
indications were mounting of a more difficult future.  By stressing the 
opportunities for growth rather than a more constrained operating 
environment, this letter may have encouraged further risk taking 
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behaviours.  In a soaring market, the main imperative is to chase the 
growth opportunities that are said to exist, rather than miss out by a 
cautious attitude to risk assessment.
The variables for which the FORTUNE 100 companies were most 
frequently out of range in terms of the first 500 words of each letter (and 
all more than two standard deviations above the mean) were: rapport 
(n = 6); insistence (n = 6); and embellishment (n = 6).  No company 
had all three of these variables simultaneously out of range.  These three 
variables appear to reflect a greater degree of uncertainty and hedging 
than was the case with the FTSE 100 companies.
In the out of range results in terms of the hubris master variable 
(praise + accomplishment + tenacity) no FORTUNE 100 company was 
out of range in more than one of the three components, either for the 
first 500 words or an average 500 words of each letter.
Summary
Overall, the analysis suggests several key themes with wider 
importance.  There is a lack of humility, and a stress on growth and 
opportunity, which seems to have militated against a more cautious 
approach to risk assessment.  Tendencies towards hubris and narcissism 
have been noted also.  Thus, it appears that CEO letters faithfully 
reflect the dominant model of business management at the time they 
are written, even as these models career towards a precipice.  But they 
also clearly do more than act as a neutral mirror.  In validating particular 
world views and methods of doing business, they also encourage and 
reinforce precisely those approaches.  While the analysis is necessarily 
retrospective, it suggests that much can be gained in the future by 
studying CEO letters, to yield insight into models of positive and 
negative leadership styles as they unfold.  In turn, such an analysis could 
disclose valuable information about such issues as attitudes towards risk, 
before the organisations concerned stumble into avoidable crises.  The 
next chapter considers the change in tone at the top over time.
8 DICTION and tone at the top over time
Introduction
A DICTION-based analysis can help in developing a longitudinal view of 
changes in ‘tone at the top’ over time.  Aspects of tone at the top in the 
2006 letters can be compared with CEO letters for 1998 to determine 
how the tone at the top has changed between 1998 and 2006 in UK 
and US companies.  A plausible conjecture is that the passage of the 
Sarbanes-Oxley Act in 2002, with its international influences, prompted 
companies to be more guarded, more precise and more conservative and 
that this would be reflected in the tone at the top revealed by DICTION. 
An important motive for the analyses reported in this chapter is to 
reveal how comparative benchmarks of tone at the top for companies 
change over time, and to reveal unsavoury or egregious aspects which 
are conducive to heightened business leadership risk.  In very broad 
outline, the analyses reveal prima facie evidence of similarities and 
dissimilarities in the tone at the top for the FTSE 100 and FORTUNE 
100 letters for 1998 and 2006.  The FTSE l00 letters retained a 
stronger aura of conservatism and ‘matter-of-factness’ over the analysis 
period.  Nonetheless, the CEO letters in 2006 for the FTSE 100, and 
especially for the FORTUNE 100, were inclined to be more editorial, 
conversational and hyperbolic, and less cautious or equivocal.
Data
FTSE 100
The previous chapter analysed the CEO (or similarly designated) 
letters of 91 of the FTSE 100 companies for 2006.  This chapter accesses 
the CEO letters for 1998 for 71 of the companies that were listed in the 
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FTSE 100 in 2006.  Sixty-four companies were ‘matched’ in terms of 
their CEO letter for 1998 and their CEO letter for 2006.  The companies 
excluded for 1998 were those which were founded, or re-vamped 
considerably, after major merger activity post-1998.  For example, no 
letter was found for AstraZeneca plc in 1998.  This was because the 
company was not formed until 1999 – it resulted from a merger between 
the Zeneca Group plc and Astra AB of Sweden.  Similarly, no letter 
was found for 1998 for BHP Billiton or for GlaxoSmithKline.  Both 
companies were formed through merger activity in 2001.
The resultant FTSE 100 letter file of matched companies for 1998 
comprised 100,893 words, with an average length of 1,578 words and 
a standard deviation of 974 words.  For the same companies in 2006, 
there were 109,631 words, with an average length of 1,713 words and a 
standard deviation of 1,089 words.  There was no significant difference 
in the average length of the FTSE 100 letters in 1998 when compared 
with 2006.
FORTUNE 100
The previous chapter analysed 94 FORTUNE 100 company CEO 
(or similarly titled) letters for 2006.  For 1998, CEO letters for 84 of 
the companies listed in the FORTUNE 100 in 2006 were accessed. 
Eighty-one companies were ‘matched’ in terms of their CEO letter for 
1998 and their CEO letter for 2006.  Those not matched included, for 
example, Delphi, UPS, AmerisouceBergen or Medco Health Solutions 
in 1998 – these companies did not become public listed companies until 
1999, 1999, 2001, and 2003 respectively.
The resultant FORTUNE 100 letter file of matched companies for 
1998 comprised 138,366 words, with an average length of 1,708 words 
and a standard deviation of 1,310 words.  For the same companies in 
2006, there were 180,708 words, with an average length of 2,231 words 
and a standard deviation of 1,805 words.  A test of differences in means 
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indicated that the FORTUNE 100 letters were, on average, significantly 
longer in 2006 than they were in 1998 (p = 0.0001).  Why this is so, is 
a matter for conjecture.  It could have been a consequence of the greater 
corporate accountability pressures in American society prompted directly 
and indirectly by the Sarbanes-Oxley Act, 2002.
The FORTUNE 100 letters for 1998 were also significantly longer 
than the FTSE 100 letters for 1998 (p < 0.01).  The reasons for this 
could be that there was a more disciplined, succinct capacity for written 
expression by FTSE CEOs; or that the FTSE CEOs were naturally ‘less 
expansive’ individuals than FORTUNE CEOs; or that it reflected the 
more precise disclosures required in UK directors’ reports – from which 
many FTSE 100 CEO letters seemed to have developed.
Method
About half of the CEO letters for 1998 were downloaded from 
company websites, converted into a text file, and formatted to facilitate 
processing using DICTION 5.0 software.  For the remainder, letters were 
accessed from physical copies, and were then scanned and converted 
to text files using optical character recognition software, OmniPage 
16, and then formatted to facilitate processing by DICTION 5.0.  The 
formatting, described more fully in the previous chapter, involved 
excising all non-text items such as tables, diagrams, logos, photographs 
and footers from the letters.
Data were analysed in six major stages.  Stage 1 calculated each 
of the 40 DICTION variables for the first 500 words in the 64 letters 
in the FTSE 100 database for 1998.  These were compared with the 
DICTION scores in the paired 64 letters in the FTSE database for 2006 
with focus applied to highly significant differences (p ≤ 0.01) in the 
variables between 1998 and 2006.  This involved conducting two-tailed 
tests for significant differences in means in the FTSE 100 companies 
between 1998 and 2006 together with Mann-Whitney two-tailed tests 
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for significant differences in median scores between 1998 and 2006.  The 
word usage norm against which we compared the text was the company 
annual report ‘special dictionary’.
Stage two repeated the process in stage one by using 81 pairs 
of letters in the FORTUNE 100 databases for 1998 and 2006 and 
compared the DICTION results for CEO letters for 1998 against results 
for the letters for the same companies in 2006.
In stage three, for each company in the 1998 database for the FTSE 
100 companies, the DICTION variable scores which were more than + 2 
or more than – 2 standard deviations from expected values were identified 
and designated as out-of-range.  The incidence, nature and pattern of 
these out-of-range variables for 1998 companies was compared with 
those for 2006 companies.  Stage four repeated the process described 
in stage 3 for FORTUNE 100 companies.  
Stage five determined a broad measure of the movement in out-of-
range variables that occurred for each company between 1998 and 2006 
with the intent of helping to reveal companies whose CEO discourse 
and tone at the top had been unsettled and volatile.  The broad measure 
used was calculated as follows:
(Sum of the |z-scores| for all standard DICTION variables in 2006)
less 
(Sum of the |z-scores| for all standard DICTION variables in 1998)
Stage six calculated a global measure of ‘tone’ in each set of letters, 
using the method described by Henry (2008, p. 386):
Tone is calculated as the count of positive words minus the count 
of negative words, divided by the sum of positive and negative 
word counts.  The maximum and minimum values of Tone are 1 
and -1, respectively.
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Consistent with Henry (2008), the positive words searched for were:
positive; positives; success; successes; successful; succeed; succeeds; 
succeeding; succeeded; accomplish; accomplishes; accomplishing; 
accomplished; accomplishment; accomplishments; strong; strength; 
strengths; certain; certainty; definite; solid; excellent; good; leading; 
achieve; achieves; achieved; achieving; achievement; achievements; 
progress; progressing; deliver; delivers; delivered; delivering; leader; 
pleased; reward; rewards; rewarding; rewarded; opportunity; 
opportunities; enjoy; enjoying; enjoyed; encouraged; encouraging; 
up; increase; increases; increasing; increased; rise; rises; rising; rose; 
risen; improve; improves; improving; improved; improvement; 
improvements; strengthen; strengthens; strengthening; strengthened; 
stronger; strongest; better; best; more; most; above; record; high; 
higher; highest; greater; greatest; larger; largest; grow; grows; 
growing; grew; grown; growth; expand; expands; expanding; 
expanded; expansion; exceed; exceeds; exceeded; exceeding; beat; 
beats; beating.
 
and the negative words searched for were:
negative; negatives; fail; fails; failing; failure; weak; weakness; 
weaknesses; difficult; difficulty; hurdle; hurdles; obstacle; obstacles; 
slump; slumps; slumping; slumped; uncertain; uncertainty; 
unsettled; unfavourable; downturn; depressed; disappoint; 
disappoints; disappointing; disappointed; disappointment; risk; 
risks; risky; threat; threats; penalty; penalties; down; decrease; 
decreases; decreasing; decreased; decline; declines; declining; 
declined; fall; falls; falling; fell; fallen; drop; drops; dropping; 
dropped; deteriorate; deteriorates; deteriorating; deteriorated; 
worsen; worsens; worsening; weaken; weakens; weakening; 
weakened; worse; worst; low; lower; lowest; less; least; smaller; 
smallest; shrink; shrinks; shrinking; shrunk; below; under; 
challenge; challenges; challenging; challenged.
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Results
Stage 1
The initial focus was on the variables with high levels of significant 
difference between the aggregate FTSE 100 data sets for 1998 and 
2006.  That is, the focus was on those variables for which both the test of 
difference in means and the test of difference in medians were significant, 
with at least one of these tests revealing a two-tailed probability of no 
difference of 1% or less.  This led to attention being directed to the seven 
DICTION variables listed in Table 8.1.
Table 8.1   Differences in DICTION variables for FTSE 100 companies 
between 1998 and 2006
Variable
P value: test 
of means
Significance 
level
P value: test 
of medians
Significance 
level
1998 > 2006
Familiarity 0.0003 1% 0.0006 1%
Past concern 0.0040 1% 0.0032 1%
2006  > 1998
Human interest 0.0000 1% 0.0000 1%
Satisfaction 0.0057 1% 0.0091 1%
Inspiration 0.0004 1% 0.0151 5%
Optimism 0.0002 1% 0.0328 5%
Accomplishment 0.0019 1% 0.0599 10%
There were two variables in which the FTSE 100 companies, in 
aggregate, were significantly higher (p ≤ 0.01) in 1998 than in 2006 in 
terms of differences in means and medians: familiarity and past concern. 
These results suggest that CEO letters in 1998 were more in the nature 
of a matter-of-fact, objective reporting of what had happened in the past 
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year, and did not indulge in editorialising.  This style of reporting seems 
consistent with (and likely strongly influenced by) the UK’s tradition 
of a company law-required ‘Directors’ Report’, with its strong legal 
compulsion for objectivity and transparency in performance reporting.
There were five variables in which the FTSE 100 companies, in 
aggregate, were significantly higher in 2006 than 1998 in terms of 
differences in means (all p ≤ 0.01) and medians (all p ≤ 0.10).  These 
variables were human interest, satisfaction, inspiration, optimism, and 
accomplishment.  Together, these results suggest that by 2006, the CEO 
letter had become more ‘conversational’ and ‘folksy’; that it had more of 
the character of a public relations, opinion-influencing document focused 
on emphasising achievements, performance successes and ensuing positive 
outcomes; and that it was much more inclined to indulge in editorialising 
and highlighting a company’s attractive virtues.
Stage 2
The focus was on the variables with the highest level of significant 
difference between the aggregate FORTUNE 100 data sets for 1998 and 
2006.  Table 8.2 lists the variables for which both the test of difference 
in means and the test of difference in medians were significant, with at 
least one of these tests revealing a two-tailed probability of no difference 
of 1% or less.  
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Table 8.2   Differences in DICTION variables for FORTUNE 100 
companies between 1998 and 2006
Variable
P value: test 
of means
Significance 
level
P value: test 
of medians
Significance 
level
1998 > 2006
Ambivalence 0.0007 1% 0.0015 1%
Hardship 0.0040 1% 0.0599 10%
Aggression 0.0032 1% 0.0154 5%
Concreteness 0.0039 1% 0.0017 1%
Denial 0.0053 1% 0.0559 5%
Variety 0.0020 1% 0.0805 10%
2006  > 1998
Inspiration 0.0062 1% 0.0286 5%
Present concern 0.0045 1% 0.0140 5%
Optimism 0.0000 1% 0.0036 1%
There are six variables in which the FORTUNE 100 letters, in 
aggregate, are significantly stronger (p ≤ 0.01) in 1998 than 2006 in terms 
of differences in means, and also significant in terms of differences in 
medians (at levels variously of 1%, 5% and 10%): ambivalence, hardship, 
aggression, concreteness, denial and variety.  These results suggest that 
CEO letters in 1998 were more hesitant and equivocal; and more prone 
to express fears, doubts and negativity; to err on the side of caution by 
avoiding subjectivity and overstatement; and to focus more on tangible 
and material matters.
There were three variables in which the 81 FORTUNE 100 
companies, in aggregate, were significantly stronger in 2006 than 1998 
in terms of differences in means (all p ≤ 0.01) and medians (all p ≤ 
0.05).  These variables were inspiration, present concern and optimism. 
Together, these results suggest that by 2006, the CEO letter was 
invoked more as a conduit to promote the ideals and morals guiding 
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the company; and to highlight and endorse the positive achievements 
of the company (and its managers).  They also suggest that a style of 
leadership more normally associated with transformational models of 
the leadership process, which stress the importance of leaders creating 
an energetic vision that can engage the enthusiasm of their followers, 
had gained ground.
Finally, analysis of the hubris master variable focused on results 
for the variables praise, accomplishment and tenacity.  There was no 
significant difference (p ≤ 0.01) between praise and accomplishment 
variables for the two data sets.  However, FTSE 100 companies were 
significantly stronger (p ≤ 0.01) than FORTUNE 100 companies in 
terms of tenacity.  
Stage 3
FTSE 100
For each of the 71 companies in the FTSE 100 database, the mean 
number of out-of-range scores was 1.80 (1.88 in 2006), with a range of 
0 to 9 (0 to 10 in 2006).  
The two variables for which the FTSE 100 companies were most 
frequently out-of-range (and more than +2 or - 2 standard deviations 
from the mean) were variety (n = 7; all but one more that -2 standard 
deviations below the mean) and liberation (n = 6; all more than +2 
standard deviations from the mean).  In 2006 liberation was the most 
frequent variable out-of-range, and variety figured prominently with 
five out-of-range observations.  No company had both liberation 
and variety out-of-range simultaneously.  These results suggest that 
an enduring feature (from 1998 to 2006 at least) of FTSE 100 CEO 
letters is a tone of conservatism and compliance with convention; and 
that this is allied with avoidance of overstatement and hyperbole.  The 
letters are more matter-of-fact than confected.  In part, this may reflect 
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more deeply ingrained cultural differences between Britain and the 
US.  If so, it also suggests that particular styles of communication have 
greater resonance in particular countries, and that they run the risk of 
alienating audiences elsewhere.  For global corporations that produce 
reports with an international audience in mind, this is likely to present 
major challenges.
The company with the most out-of-range variables (n = 9) was Tesco 
plc.  This company was more than two standard deviations above the 
norm in terms of seven variables (in order of degree): communication 
(+3.63); collectives (+3.60); familiarity (+2.99); rapport (+2.69); 
commonality (+2.66); insistence (+2.41); and co-operation (+2.27).  This 
suggests that the company was exhortative – making a strong, but simply 
expressed appeal for stakeholders to pull together to achieve a desirable 
common goal.  But close reading of the first 500 words on the CEO’s 
letter reveals how DICTION indicators can be misleading, and how they 
need to be evaluated closely and read in context.  The first 500 words 
of the Tesco plc CEO’s letter do not have the characteristics one would 
expect to find on the basis of the out-of-range variables indicated above. 
The first 500 words are unremarkable.  What prompts the high out-of-
range scores for DICTION variables, and points to social interaction, 
common interest, and behavioural interactions, is that key words in 
the DICTION search dictionaries have not been used in their everyday 
sense, but as financial reporting jargon.  Such jargon applies meanings 
to words (here, such as ‘group’, ‘integration’, ‘share’ and ‘joint’) which 
are technical and context-specific.  Thus, care is needed in reading and 
interpreting them in their everyday sense, as DICTION seems to do.  
In the case of the Tesco letter, the CEO refers nine times in the 
opening 500 words to the consolidated company as the ‘Group’. 
‘Integration’ is used twice, but in the context of ‘integration costs’. 
The noun ‘share’ is used twice also, but in the context of ‘share capital’. 
‘Joint’ is used twice, but in the context of ‘joint venture’.  However, such 
words still carry an emotive impact as well as their ‘technical’ definition. 
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For example, even though the word ‘share’ has a technical meaning in 
accounting and finance, its epistemology draws upon the idea of ‘sharing’ 
in a common business enterprise.  Although Tesco’s CEO has frequently 
used words such as ‘share’ and ‘group’ in their ‘technical’ sense to produce 
what seems like a unremarkable 500-word introductory portion of the 
CEO letter, perhaps his letter is thus more powerful rhetorically, since 
these now-technical words still carry some emotive freight.  This points 
to the need for DICTION analysis to be supported by close reading.
The out-of-range results in terms of the hubris master variable 
(praise + accomplishment + tenacity) showed that no company was 
simultaneously out-of-range on any two or more of these variables.  
Stage 4
FORTUNE 100 
The mean number of variables for which the FORTUNE 100 
companies were out-of-range was 1.96 (1.73 in 2006), with a range of 
0 to 7 (0 to 10 in 2006).  The five variables for which the FORTUNE 
100 companies were most frequently out-of-range (and more than +2 
or - 2 standard deviations from the mean) were: human interest (n = 
7; 3 high, 4 low); cognitive terms (n = 6; all high); passivity (n = 6; 4 
high, 2 low); diversity (n = 6; all high); and variety (n = 6; 4 high, 2 
low).  (In 2006, the variables most frequently out-of-range were rapport; 
insistence; and embellishment, all n = 6).  These results suggest that there 
were no enduring out-of-range characteristics between 1998 and 2006. 
The 1998 out-of-range variables suggest there is a wide diversity in the 
extent of focus on people, and in the degree of overstatement or ‘spin’ 
in letters.  There are consistent out-of-range indications of the text being 
intellectually challenging and directed to a heterogeneous audience.
Plains All American Pipeline (PAA) had the most out-of-range 
variables (n = 7).  This company was more than two standard deviations 
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above the norm in four variables (in order of strength): cooperation 
(+4.18); blame (+3.94); centrality (+2.26); and diversity (+2.02).  It 
was also more than two standard deviations below the norm in terms of 
three variables: human interest (-2.75); passivity (-2.03); and optimism 
(-2.69).  These results suggest mildly benign language that reflects an 
implied commitment to group action to regularise an irregularity, to a 
lack of focus on people or their activities, and to a tone of concern about 
something affecting the fortunes of the company.  Such suggestions are 
reflected in the letter and the company’s circumstances.  The 1998 letter 
was the first for PAA after its listing on the NYSE as a master limited 
partnership on November 17, 1998.  Thus, the text of the letter reflects 
PAA’s commitment to regularise post-listing partnership distributions; 
and the tone of concern relates to the challenges claimed to be posed to 
PAA because of the uncertainties in the price of oil.  
The out-of-range results in terms of the hubris master variable (praise 
+ accomplishment + tenacity) found no company was simultaneously 
out-of-range on any two of these variables.  
Stage 5 
For the FTSE 100 companies, Alliance and Leicester had the greatest 
increase between 1998 and 2006 in the sum of the absolute value of the 
z scores for all DICTION variables, with a score of 14.62.  
In 1998, Alliance and Leicester was out-of-range on one variable 
only, passivity (+ 2.76).  However, in 2006, it was out-of-range on five 
variables: centrality (+2.56); cooperation (+2.23); insistence (+ 2.15); 
numerical terms (+2.08); and variety (-2.13).  Together, these variables 
suggest a picture of a formerly settled company making an overstated 
appeal to stakeholders to bond together to adopt a common (but 
narrowly defined) set of values or aims.  A reading of the CEO’s letter 
for 2006 yields little to suggest such a scenario.  However, when one 
explores further, there are ample indicators that such a situation existed. 
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For example, Sir Derek Higgs, in his Chairman’s Report for 2006, urges 
that the company (implicitly at least) will not be unduly concerned by 
takeover speculation and will stay focused on delivering good service.
All this was achieved despite the distractions of press speculation 
in the summer about a possible bid for Alliance & Leicester.  A 
perennial chestnut maybe, but this time accompanied by an 
announcement from Credit Agricole that we were – along with 
others – a potential target.  Whilst that quickly went away without 
any proposal ever being made to us, we would have preferred to 
focus wholly and solely on growing the business in shareholders’ 
interests.
It is a tribute to Richard Pym, his management team and all 
our staff that during this period they not only dealt calmly with 
the pressures created by the press but got on, to great effect, with 
delivering results today and building for the future.
So, what we learn from this is that DICTION has the capacity to 
reveal much more of the ambient tone and circumstances of a company 
than might be readily apparent from a casual reading; and that it is 
potentially useful in directing attention to aspects of ‘tone at the top’ 
that are otherwise not immediately apparent.
For the FORTUNE 100 companies, the greatest increase between 
1998 and 2006 in sum of the absolute value of the z scores for all 
DICTION variables (of 18.24) was United Technologies, a company 
largely involved in the production of jet engines, helicopters and other 
products for military use.  In 1998, United Technologies was not out-of-
range on any variable.  In 2006, it was out-of-range on only one variable 
human interest (-2.74).  The fact that across all variables the company 
is out-of-range by an absolute sum of 38.10 suggests it has had to resort 
to atypical language in addressing the strong criticisms to which it has 
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been subject from environmentalists, labour unions, pacifist groups and 
local communities.
Stage 6
FTSE 100
There were fewer negative words in 2006 than in 1998 (p = 0.057). 
There were more positive words in 2006 than in 1998 (p = 0.013). 
The measure of ‘tone’ was high in both 1998 and 2006, and increased 
from +0.705 to + 0.819.  Thus, there seemed to be an increased desire 
to create a positive spin around the accompanying annual reports.  In 
retrospect, this sense of increased optimism may be an indicator that the 
top of the economic boom and the accompanying mood of ‘irrational 
exuberance’ had been reached.  As one might expect, the peak of an 
economic cycle is also likely to be a time of heightened expectations, 
and the misguided thought that continuous growth and prosperity is 
assured.  Close reading of the documents in question would be useful 
to help substantiate this view.
FORTUNE 100
The pattern of results for the FORTUNE 100 companies was very 
similar.  There were significantly fewer negative words in 2006 than in 
1998 (p = 0.09); and there were significantly more positive words in 
2006 than in 1998 (p = 0.001).  The measure of ‘tone’ was high in both 
1998 and 2006.  It increased from +0.752 in 1998 to + 0.837 in 2006.
For the FTSE companies in 1998, the range of ‘tone’ scores was 
-0.14 to 1.00 (8 companies had the maximum score; one company 
had a score less than zero); and in 2006 the range was 0.25 to 1.00 
(10 companies had the maximum score).  For the NYSE companies in 
1998, the range of ‘tone’ scores was -0.21 to 1.00 (12 companies had the 
maximum score; two companies were less than zero); and in 2006 the 
155DICTION and tone at the top over time
range was 0.24 to 1.00 (19 companies had the maximum score).  The 
lowest score for ‘tone’ observed for any company in the databases was 
for Chevron in 1998.  This is not surprising.  The opening 500 words 
of the CEO’s letter uses such terms as ‘tough year’, ‘depressed economic 
conditions’, ‘hammered prices’, ‘falling earnings’, ‘overcapacity’, 
‘slowdown’, and ‘a negative effect’.
In broad terms, the ‘tone’ of CEO letters to shareholders was 
highly positive in 1998 and was even more highly positive in 2006. 
The ‘tone’ of CEO letters to shareholders is much higher than the + 
0.568 observed by Henry (2008) for earnings press releases.  This lends 
some credence to criticism that annual report letters are public relations 
documents deliberately intent on putting a ‘positive spin’ on companies 
and their activities, and that they are reluctant to signal problems.  The 
danger, of course, is that a culture of spin may help to disguise emergent 
problems from key decision makers, and therefore further limit efforts 
to engage with them.  Research suggests that when people relentlessly 
sell the positive benefits of something to others, whether these are real or 
imagined, they end up re-convincing themselves of their own hype, in 
a process known as ‘self persuasion’ (Boudon, 1994).  CEO letters may 
be evidence of precisely this phenomenon in the context of corporate 
communications and decision making.  It is a perilous proposition.
The measure of ‘tone’ is one that  needs closer analysis on a company 
by company basis – but it provides a benchmark measure of the ambient 
mood and confidence of a CEO and the likely tone at the top.  
Summary
Overall, the analysis is not conclusive.  DICTION opens a variety 
of ways of analysis and interpretation, but does not furnish definitive 
answers by itself.  Close reading is absolutely essential to complete the 
task.
With that proviso, the analysis nevertheless suggests several trends 
that bear further examination.  The growth we have detected of linguistic 
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terms is consistent with transformational models of leadership that stress 
the role of powerful leaders in determining the belief systems of others. 
It is incontestable that CEOs acquired much greater power over the 
period in question.  Therefore, it would be unsurprising for leadership 
models that stress the central importance of their role to have a ready 
appeal, and influence significantly the linguistic tools and markers they 
deploy.  Consistent also with the economic cycle over this period of time 
are some tentative suggestions of a growing mood of optimism, and 
reluctance to acknowledge potential difficulties.  This may well chime 
with what, in retrospect, was often a corporate and individual mood 
of ‘irrational exuberance’.  Further analysis seems likely to be useful in 
offering significant pointers to a culture of excessive optimism which, 
it is now evident, may have prevented organisations from facing up to 
substantive problems before they matured into catastrophic crises which 
damaged the wider economy.
9 conclusions
CEOs have enormous power to frame organisational reality for their 
internal and external stakeholders.  Typically, CEOs place a strong 
premium on crafting coherent organisational cultures that reflect shared 
values, expectations and behaviours.  While it is obvious that this is 
necessary to some degree, it is also clear that such cultures have the 
potential to create stifling organisational norms that facilitate corporate 
malfeasance and chicanery.  This book provides many examples.  The 
financial crisis of 2008 also demonstrates the importance of ensuring 
that the actions of CEOs, company boards and regulatory authorities 
ensure compliance with legal requirements, adherence to ethical codes of 
conduct, and the opening of corporate rhetoric and behaviour to proper 
scrutiny and accountability.  This means that the actions of CEOs, and 
the words that underpin them, are becoming much more studied – and 
criticised – than has usually been the case in the past (for example, by 
Mintzberg, 2008; 2009).
Corporate culture is a vitally important area of study.  In particular, 
the tone at the top set by CEOs is of major importance.  Properly 
examined, it can demonstrate much about how companies are run, how 
they see themselves, and how CEO rhetoric accords with other measures 
of their actual performance.  In the process, indicators of tension can 
be unveiled, particularly in terms of language that indicates hubris, 
intention to deceive, or any emphasis on aspects of strategy which 
other analysis suggests is incompatible with the real needs of a business. 
Culture and communication audits are important and, in particular, 
CEO letters to shareholders in annual reports provide a rich vein of data 
to help understand a CEO’s mindset, view of the leadership process, 
and ideological intent.  Those letters also help develop understanding of 
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the metaphorical constructs CEOs employ as they seek to frame reality 
for a wide range of stakeholders, thereby shaping perceptions of the 
organisations in question.
Several approaches can inform this analysis.  Close reading and 
DICTION analysis provide indicative materials showing how this 
approach works in practice.  Thus, an analysis of Jack Welch’s letters 
during his lengthy tenure at General Electric has traced the shifting 
balance between such variables as optimism, realism and certainty.  This 
kind of analysis sheds valuable light on the theory of leadership held by 
a major CEO, and how it was expressed in practice, in a company of 
global significance.  This can be of considerable value in checking for 
signs of business leadership risk – and much else.  Using qualitative and 
quantitative techniques in unison enables inferences to be made about 
the content that is present in the letters of CEOs, and also to identify 
important missing issues.  Given that CEOs have accumulated immense 
power, in a context where the construct of leadership has been influenced 
heavily by notions of the leader as a charismatic hero, it is evident that 
these issues are of vital importance in illuminating the direction that 
companies are taking, and the strengths and weaknesses they exhibit 
in striving to achieve strategic aims.  In particular, the analysis suggests 
that the metaphor of ‘leader as hero’ has taken deep root in the rhetoric 
(and, hence, presumably in the practice) of top CEOs.
The financial crisis of 2008 further exemplifies the perils in this 
approach to leadership.  Powerful leaders, with an apparently exaggerated 
view of their own prowess and the efficacy of their business models, are 
unlikely to recognise the value of dissent, and perhaps even of input from 
other sources.  Rather, their focus is on asserting, arguing and imposing 
their vision of the way forward.  This is likely to be expressed in a tone 
of heightened certainty, including about issues that are objectively 
uncertain.  This kind of exaggerated certainty has been shown in this 
book.  For example, the analysis of the CEO letters of New Century 
Financial Corporation prior to its bankruptcy shows quite clearly that 
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an inappropriate tone at the top was set – one characterised by wholly 
inaccurate optimism.  This arguably contributed to dire consequences 
for the organisation and its stakeholders.  
The world economy is rebalancing.  The State is exerting much 
more influence over corporate decision-making.  The public is exhibiting 
increased scepticism towards the claims of competence and vision made 
by many CEOs.  In such an environment, approaches that subject 
the rhetoric of CEOs to critical scrutiny seem likely to be useful for 
accounting and auditing professionals, academic analysis, the exercise 
of public oversight, and policy making.
Implications for the accounting profession
Overwhelmingly, accountants have focused their analysis of 
company performance on traditional financial metrics of performance. 
In the aftermath of Enron’s demise, and the more recent $50 billion 
fraud perpetrated in the US by Bernard Madoff, the limitations of this 
approach are evident.  A closer and all-rounded scrutiny of corporate 
activity seems inescapable.  In that context, the accounting profession 
needs to be more amenable to forms of data other than financial 
indicators.  The language of those who captain organisations is an 
invaluable, and hitherto underused, means of achieving this.  
In reflecting on the quantitative and qualitative analysis of CEO 
letters, DICTION is a useful diagnostic tool.  However, it is likely to be 
much more beneficial if assessors of tone at the top ‘get down and dirty’ 
with close reading techniques and qualitative analysis more generally. 
There is much to be gained by reading text closely in context.  
The apparent statistical sophistication and aura of scientific precision 
that accompanies DICTION should be noted with caution.  Despite the 
masses of quantitative data it is capable of producing, ironically, its results 
can sometimes produce a spurious aura of certainty over objectively 
uncertain data, while failing to yield sufficient contextual information to 
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generate worthwhile insights.  DICTION is only of value if accountants 
and auditors place its findings in context, and hence analyse around 
it.  Users of DICTION must recognise that its principal benefit is in 
providing indicators of overall trends in word use by CEOs, rather than 
offering definitive conclusions.  
There is a strong need to complement DICTION with close 
reading analysis to explore context and to provide much more insightful 
understandings.  The advantage of close reading is that it is more 
conducive to generating rich, interesting, story-based, sense-making 
understandings.  Close reading also presents challenges.  It is very labour-
intensive, and requires special aptitudes and training.  In particular, 
accountants and auditors need to become sensitised to the power of 
language and its various tropes, especially the power of metaphor. 
They also need to be attuned to the world around them in order to 
contextualise the environment in which entities operate; and exhibit an 
awareness of the historical, social and psychological forces that impel 
the conduct of CEOs and their companies.  They also need to develop 
ideas about pervading themes and critical silences in a CEO’s letter to 
shareholders, and in CEO discourse more generally.  
This approach is consistent with a growing interest in mixed 
methods research, defined broadly as ‘research in which the investigator 
collects and analyses data, integrates the findings, and draws inferences 
using both quantitative and qualitative approaches or methods in a single 
study or a program of inquiry’ (Tashakkori and Creswell, 2007, p. 4). 
The aim is to produce a synthesis in which a much deeper insight is gained 
into the object being studied (Johnson et al., 2007).  For example, purely 
qualitative methods generate multiple, contested and contradictory 
accounts of what is happening in organisations.  While thus furnishing 
rich accounts of people’s perceptions, qualitative methods also pose major 
interpretive challenges.  On the other hand, purely quantitative methods 
such as DICTION analysis also have weaknesses.  Researchers and 
auditors gain when they utilise a combination of approaches, generating 
161ConClusions
both breadth and depth in analysis.  Given these advantages, it is likely 
that interest in the use of mixed methods analysis will continue to grow 
in the years ahead (Creswell, 2009), including during investigations of 
such issues as organisational culture and tone at the top.  The challenge 
is to integrate the data and insights from both methods to produce a 
more coherent view of organisational reality (Bryman, 2007).  Tone at 
the top is an important issue for auditors to address.  But addressing it 
in a meaningful manner requires the adoption of a more sophisticated 
analytical approach, consistent with the various methods outlined in 
this book.
This kind of approach will also enhance the predictive potential 
of an auditing of CEO letters.  Such auditing can generate tentative 
linguistic markers indicating, for example, the likelihood of increased 
risk taking behaviour by CEOs and the management teams they lead. 
Further work is required to establish more definitively the degree to 
which such markers differentiate between particular forms of behaviour 
by companies.  It is conceivable that some such indicators are found in 
almost all CEO letters – but that a greater incidence of them characterises 
the letters of the most risk-inclined CEOs.  Depth analysis using mixed 
methods, particularly if employed by researchers on a longitudinal and 
cross sectional basis, will help to address this kind of issue.
To engender a greater appreciation of words and discourse in 
assessing and auditing the accountability reports of CEOs and their 
companies, curriculum reform in accounting education is needed – not 
only in higher education institutions, but also in continuing professional 
development programs as well.  This is a challenging task.  A fundamental 
shift of attitude is needed.  The accounting profession should actively 
nurture greater receptivity to the importance of language in constructing 
the world in which accounting and auditing operates.  Being able to 
assess the tone at the top is one critical element of this.  
The reforms needed will not come until the accounting and 
auditing profession makes a more deliberate effort to unburden itself 
of a pervasive and often limiting ‘quantitative’ mindset – one which 
162 measuring and assessing tone at the top using annual report Ceo letters
puts apparent objectivity before relevance.  Alfred North Whitehead’s 
‘fallacy of misplaced concreteness’ (Whitehead, [1925]/1953) is one 
of the great weaknesses underpinning the engagement of accounting 
and auditing with the world, particularly in terms of understanding an 
organisation’s culture.
Yet, a proper appreciation of culture issues, as envisaged and 
determined by the tone at the top, is a vital part of assessing the trajectory 
and prospects of an organisation.  Such understanding will enable 
auditors to identify organisational cultures that are overly partial to 
risk – as well as those which are too risk averse.  It will permit analysts 
and auditors to look carefully at how an organisation’s problems are 
diagnosed (e.g. whether CEOs accept responsibility for the consequences 
of their previous decisions, or seek to deflect it to other stakeholders or 
the external environment), and therefore gain a better appreciation of 
whether the strategies that are proposed are likely to be effective.  For 
example, the CEOs of the three major US car manufacturers (General 
Motors, Ford and Chrysler) were widely criticised for their initial visit 
to Washington in late 2008 seeking financial assistance.  In particular, 
politicians and the media noted their reluctance to acknowledge that past 
strategic decisions concerning car designs and products had played a key 
role in their predicament.  Rather, the CEOs chose to stress the impact of 
the credit crunch.  In this case, the tone emanating from the top helped 
convince policy makers that the CEOs held a faulty diagnosis of their 
problems, and would therefore be unlikely to use financial assistance 
to correct past mistakes.  The CEO’s tone of over-certainty about their 
personal performance and that of their top managers contributed 
significantly to the failure of their intended mission.  The consequences 
may be far reaching.
Close reading in particular, and computer-assisted text analysis 
such as DICTION, are critical tools in conducting such culture and 
communication audits.  While they need to be refined and developed, 
the initial analysis provided here demonstrates that they offer multiple 
opportunities for insight, diagnosis and, ultimately, prescription.  
163ConClusions
Summary
The climate in which business operates has shifted.  Regulation seems 
destined to increase in the years ahead.  Financial services authorities, 
parliamentary bodies, the media and the wider public have cast a much 
more sceptical eye towards corporate practice than they have for many 
years past.  As businesses and CEOs seek to re-legitimise their role in 
society, and engage with a more questioning audience, they too will 
likely place greater importance on their communications with all kinds 
of stakeholders.  The language used by CEOs has always been important, 
even if much of it has been under-examined.  All those concerned with 
business will find it of much more compelling interest in the years ahead. 
The tone at the top is a crucial aspect of how businesses function and 
how they project themselves to critical internal and external publics.  In 
understanding how businesses succeed and fail in the marketplace, and 
rise and fall in public esteem, the techniques highlighted here will be of 
fundamental importance.
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Appendix 1 
Definition of DICTION variables   [Source: Hart, 2000]
CERTAINTY
Definition: Language indicating resoluteness, inflexibility, and completeness 
and a tendency to speak ex cathedra 
Formula: [Tenacity + Levelling + Collectives + Insistence] – [Numerical Terms 
+ Ambivalence + Self Reference + Variety] 
TENACITY: All uses of the verb to be (is, am, will, shall), three definitive verb 
forms (has, must, do) and their variants, as well as all associated contraction’s 
(he’ll, they’ve, ain’t).  These verbs connote confidence and totality.  
LEVELLING: Words used to ignore individual differences and to build a sense 
of completeness and assurance.  Included are totalising terms (everybody, anyone, 
each, fully), adverbs of permanence (always, completely, inevitably, consistently), 
and resolute adjectives (unconditional, consummate, absolute, open-and-shut).  
COLLECTIVES: Singular nouns connoting plurality that function to decrease 
specificity.  These words reflect a dependence on categorical modes of thought. 
Included are social groupings (crowd, choir, team, humanity), task groups (army, 
congress, legislature, staff) and geographical entities (county, world, kingdom, 
republic).  
INSISTENCE: This is a measure of code-restriction and semantic contentedness. 
The assumption is that repetition of key terms indicates a preference for a 
limited, ordered world.  In calculating the measure, all words occurring three 
or more times that function as nouns or noun-derived adjectives are identified 
(either cybernetically or with the user’s assistance) and the following calculation 
performed: [Number of Eligible Words x Sum of their Occurrences] ÷ 10. 
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(For small input files, high frequency terms used two or more times are used 
in the calculation).  
NUMERICAL TERMS: Any sum, date, or product specifying the facts in a 
given case.  This dictionary treats each isolated integer as a single word and 
each separate group of integers as a single word.  In addition, the dictionary 
contains common numbers in lexical format (one, tenfold, hundred, zero) as well 
as terms indicating numerical operations (subtract, divide, multiply, percentage) 
and quantitative topics (digitise, tally, mathematics).  The presumption is that 
Numerical Terms hyper – specify a claim, thus detracting from its universality. 
AMBIVALENCE: Words expressing hesitation or uncertainty, implying a 
speaker’s inability or unwillingness to commit to the verbalisation being made. 
Included are hedges (allegedly, perhaps, might), statements of inexactness (almost, 
approximate, vague, somewhere) and confusion (baffled, puzzling, hesitate).  Also 
included are words of restrained possibility (could, would, he’d) and mystery 
(dilemma, guess, suppose, seems).  
SELF-REFERENCE: All first-person references, including I, I’d, I’ll, I’m, I’ve, 
me, mine, my, myself.  Self-references are treated as acts of indexing whereby the 
locus of action appears to reside in the speaker and not in the world at large 
(thereby implicitly acknowledging the speaker’s limited vision).  
VARIETY: This measure conforms to Wendell Johnson’s (1946) Type-Token 
Ratio which divides the number of different words in a passage by the passage’s 
total words.  A high score indicates a speaker’s avoidance of overstatement and 
a preference for precise, molecular statements.  
OPTIMISM 
Definition: Language endorsing some person, group, concept or event or 
highlighting their positive entailments.  
Formula: [Praise + Satisfaction + Inspiration] – [Blame + Hardship + Denial]
PRAISE: Affirmations of some person, group, or abstract entity.  Included 
are terms isolating important social qualities (dear, delightful, witty), physical 
qualities (mighty, handsome, beautiful), intellectual qualities (shrewd, bright, 
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vigilant, reasonable), entrepreneurial qualities (successful, conscientious, 
renowned), and moral qualities (faithful, good, noble).  All terms in this dictionary 
are adjectives.
SATISFACTION: Term s associated with positive affective states (cheerful, 
passionate, happiness), with moments of undiminished joy (thanks, smile, 
welcome) and pleasurable diversion (excited, fun, lucky) or with moments of 
triumph (celebrating, pride, auspicious).  Also included are words of nurturance: 
healing, encourage, secure, relieved.
INSPIRATION: Abstract virtues deserving of universal respect.  Most of the 
terms in this dictionary are nouns isolating desirable moral qualities (faith, 
honesty, self-sacrifice, virtue) as well as attractive personal qualities (courage, 
dedication, wisdom, mercy).  Social and political ideals are also included: 
patriotism, success, education, justice.
BLAME: Terms designating social inappropriateness (mean, naive, sloppy, stupid) 
as well as downright evil (fascist, blood-thirsty, repugnant, malicious) compose 
this dictionary.  In addition, adjectives describing unfortunate circumstances 
(bankrupt, rash, morbid, embarrassing) or unplanned vicissitudes (weary, nervous, 
painful, detrimental) are included.  The dictionary also contains outright 
denigrations: cruel, illegitimate, offensive, miserly.
HARDSHIP: This dictionary contains natural disasters (earthquake, starvation, 
tornado, pollution), hostile actions (killers, bankruptcy, enemies, vices) and 
censurable human behaviour (infidelity, despots, betrayal).  It also includes 
unsavoury political outcomes (injustice, slavery, exploitation, rebellion) as well as 
normal human fears (grief, unemployment, died, apprehension) and incapacities 
(error, cop-outs, weakness).
DENIAL: A dictionary consisting of standard negative contractions (aren’t, 
shouldn’t, don’t), negative functions words (nor, not, nay), and term s designating 
null sets (nothing, nobody, none).
ACTIVITY
Definition: Language featuring movement, change, the implementation of 
ideas and the avoidance of inertia.  
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Formula: [Aggression + Accomplishment + Communication + Motion] – 
[Cognitive terms + Passivity + Embellishment] 
AGGRESSION: A dictionary embracing human competition and forceful 
action.  Its terms connote physical energy (blast, crash, explode, collide), social 
domination (conquest, attacking, dictatorships, violation), and goal-directedness 
(crusade, commanded, challenging, overcome).  In addition, words associated 
with personal triumph (mastered, rambunctious, pushy), excess human energy 
(prod, poke, pound, shove), disassembly (dismantle, demolish, overturn, veto) and 
resistance (prevent, reduce, defend, curbed) are included.  
ACCOMPLISHMENT: Words expressing task-completion (establish, finish, 
influence, proceed) and organised human behaviour (motivated, influence, leader, 
manage).  Includes capitalistic terms (buy, produce, employees, sell), modes of 
expansion (grow, increase, generate, construction) and general functionality 
(handling, strengthen, succeed, outputs).  Also included is programmatic language: 
agenda, enacted, working, leadership.  
COMMUNICATION: Terms referring to social interaction, both face-to-face 
(listen, interview, read, speak) and mediated (film, videotape, telephone, e-mail). 
The dictionary includes both modes of intercourse (translate, quote, scripts, 
broadcast) and moods of intercourse (chat, declare, flatter, demand).  Other terms 
refer to social actors (reporter, spokesperson, advocates, preacher) and a variety of 
social purposes (hint, rebuke, respond, persuade).  
MOTION: Terms connoting human movement (bustle, job, lurch, leap), physical 
processes (circulate, momentum, revolve, twist), journeys (barnstorm, jaunt, 
wandering, travels), speed (lickety-split, nimble, zip, whistle-stop), and modes of 
transit (ride, fly, glide, swim).  
COGNITIVE TERMS: Words referring to cerebral processes, both functional 
and imaginative.  Included are modes of discovery (learn, deliberate, consider, 
compare) and domains of study (biology, psychology, logic, economics).  The 
dictionary includes mental challenges (question, forget, re-examine, paradoxes), 
institutional learning practices (graduation, teaching, classrooms), as well as 
three forms of intellection: intuitional (invent, perceive, speculate, interpret), 
rationalistic (estimate, examine, reasonable, strategies), and calculative (diagnose, 
analyse, software, fact-finding).  
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PASSIVITY: Words ranging from neutrality to inactivity.  Includes terms of 
compliance (allow, tame, appeasement), docility (submit, contented, sluggish), and 
cessation (arrested, capitulate, refrain, yielding).  Also contains tokens of inertness 
(backward, immobile, silence, inhibit) and disinterest (unconcerned, nonchalant, 
stoic), as well as tranquility (quietly, sleepy, vacation).  
EMBELLISHMENT: A selective ratio of adjectives to verbs based on David 
Boder’s (1940) conception that heavy modification slows down a verbal passage 
by de-emphasising human and material action.  Embellishment is calculated 
according to the following formula: [Praise + Blame +1] ÷ [Present Concern 
+ Past Concern +1].  
REALISM 
Definition: Language describing tangible, immediate, recognisable matters 
that affect people’s everyday lives.  
Formula: [Familiarity + Spatial awareness + Temporal awareness + Present 
concern + Human interest + Concreteness] – [Past concern + Complexity] 
FAMILIARITY: Consists of a selected number of C. K. Ogden’s (1968) 
operation words which he calculates to be the most common words in the 
English language  Included are common prepositions (across, over, through), 
demonstrative pronouns (this, that) and interrogative pronouns (who, what), 
and a variety of particles, conjunctions and connectives (a, for, so).  
SPATIAL AWARENESS: Terms referring to geographical entities, physical 
distances, and modes of measurement.  Included are general geographical terms 
(abroad, elbow-room, locale, outdoors) as well as specific ones (Ceylon, Kuwait, 
Poland).  Also included are politically defined locations (county, fatherland, 
municipality, ward), points on the compass (east, southwest) and the globe 
(latitude, coastal, border, snowbelt), as well as terms of scale (kilometer, map, 
spacious), quality (vacant, out-of-the-way, disoriented) and change (pilgrimage, 
migrated, frontier).
TEMPORAL AWARENESS: Terms that fix a person, idea, or event within a 
specific time-interval, thereby signalling a concern for concrete and practical 
matters.  The dictionary designates literal time (century, instant, mid-morning) 
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as well as metaphorical designations (lingering, seniority, nowadays).  Also 
included are calendrical terms (autumn, year-round, weekend), elliptical terms 
(spontaneously, postpone, transitional), and judgmental terms (premature, obsolete, 
punctual).  
PRESENT CONCERN: A selective list of present-tense verbs extrapolated 
from C. K. Ogden’s list of general and picturable terms, all of which occur 
with great frequency in standard American English  The dictionary is not 
topic-specific but points instead to general physical activity (cough, taste, sing, 
take), social operations (canvass, touch, govern, meet), and task-performance 
(make, cook, print, paint).  
HUMAN INTEREST: An adaptation of Rudolf Flesch’s notion that 
concentrating on people and their activities gives discourse a life-like quality. 
Included are standard personal pronouns (he, his, ourselves, them), family 
members and relations (cousin, wife, grandchild, uncle), and generic terms 
(friend, baby, human, persons).  
CONCRETENESS: A large dictionary possessing no thematic unity other 
than tangibility and materiality.  Included are sociological units (peasants, 
African-Americans, Catholics), occupational groups (carpenter, manufacturer, 
policewoman), and political alignments (Communists, congressman, Europeans). 
Also incorporated are physical structures (courthouse, temple, store), forms of 
diversion (television, football, CD-ROM), terms of accountancy (mortgage, wages, 
finances), and modes of transportation (airplane, ship, bicycle).  In addition, the 
dictionary includes body parts (stomach, eyes, lips), articles of clothing (slacks, 
pants, shirt), household animals (cat, insects, horse) and foodstuffs (wine, grain, 
sugar), and general elements of nature (oil, silk, sand).  
PAST CONCERN: The past-tense forms of the verbs contained in the Present 
Concern dictionary.  
COMPLEXITY: A simple measure of the average number of characters-per-
word in a given input file.  Borrows Rudolph Flesch’s (1951) notion that 
convoluted phrasings make a text’s ideas abstract and its implications unclear 
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COMMONALITY
Definition: Language highlighting the agreed-upon values of a group and 
rejecting idiosyncratic modes of engagement.  
Formula: [Centrality + Cooperation + Rapport] – [Diversity + Exclusion + 
Liberation] 
CENTRALITY: Terms denoting institutional regularities and/or substantive 
agreement on core values.  Included are indigenous terms (native, basic, innate) 
and designations of legitimacy (orthodox, decorum, constitutional, ratified), 
systematicity (paradigm, bureaucratic, ritualistic), and typicality (standardised, 
matter-of-fact, regularity).  Also included are terms of congruence (conformity, 
mandate, unanimous), predictability (expected, continuity, reliable), and 
universality (womankind, perennial, landmarks).  
COOPERATION: Terms designating behavioural interactions among people 
that often result in a group product.  Included are designations of formal work 
relations (unions, schoolmates, caucus) and informal associations (chum, partner, 
cronies) to more intimate interactions (sisterhood, friendship, comrade).  Also 
included are neutral interactions (consolidate, mediate, alignment), job-related 
tasks (network, detente, exchange), personal involvement (teamwork, sharing, 
contribute), and self-denial (public-spirited, care-taking, self-sacrifice).  
RAPPORT: This dictionary describes attitudinal similarities among groups 
of people.  Included are terms of affinity (congenial, camaraderie, companion), 
assent (approve, vouched, warrants), deference (tolerant, willing, permission), and 
identity (equivalent, resemble, consensus).  
DIVERSITY: Words describing individuals or groups of individuals differing 
from the norm.  Such distinctiveness may be comparatively neutral (inconsistent, 
contrasting, non-conformist) but it can also be positive (exceptional, unique, 
individualistic) and negative (illegitimate, rabble-rouser, extremist).  Functionally, 
heterogeneity may be an asset (far-flung, dispersed, diffuse) or a liability 
(factionalism, deviancy, quirky) as can its characterisations: rare vs. queer, variety 
vs. jumble, distinctive vs. disobedient.  
EXCLUSION: A dictionary describing the sources and effects of social 
isolation.  Such seclusion can be phrased passively (displaced, sequestered) as well 
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as positively (self-contained, self-sufficient) and negatively (outlaws, repudiated). 
Moreover, it can result from voluntary forces (secede, privacy) and involuntary 
forces (ostracise, forsake, discriminate) and from both personality factors (small 
mindedness, loneliness) and political factors (right-wingers, nihilism).  Exclusion is 
often a dialectical concept: hermit vs. derelict, refugee vs. pariah, discard vs. spurn. 
LIBERATION: Terms describing the maximising of individual choice 
(autonomous, open-minded, options) and the rejection of social conventions 
(unencumbered, radical, released).  Liberation is motivated by both personality 
factors (eccentric, impetuous, flighty) and political forces (suffrage, liberty, freedom, 
emancipation) and may produce dramatic outcomes (exodus, riotous, deliverance) 
or subdued effects (loosen, disentangle, outpouring).  Liberatory terms also admit 
to rival characterisations: exemption vs. loophole, elope vs. abscond, uninhibited 
vs. outlandish.  
Appendix 2  
Example of analyst’s notes for theme identification in BP’s 1998 Chief 
Executive’s letter
Text of 1998 BP CEO letter 
(1998.3 means para #3 of the 1998 letter) 
Preliminary theme identification
(See Ryan & Bernard, 2003, for theme identification techniques)
1998.1 
1998 was a momentous year for the oil 
industry, and for BP Amoco in particular.
Despite the fact that oil prices ended the 
year 34% below their December 1997 level, 
we improved our underlying performance 
and delivered on our promises.  We also 
took a crucial first step in the restructuring 
of the oil and gas sector.  
– A time interval [the year 1998] is able to be momentous 
[important/significant/historic/earth-shattering/…], and in 
turn affect an industry [the oil industry] and ‘in particular’ a 
corporation [BP Amoco].
– ‘we’ [BP Amoco? The employees of BP Amoco? The 
leadership of BP Amoco? Other?] ‘improved our underlying 
performance and delivered on our promises’ ‘[d]espite’ the 
[uncontrollable behaviour?] of ‘oil prices’.  It is a ‘fact’ that 
‘oil prices’ were ‘34% below their December 1997 level’.  In 
this sentence, ‘oil prices’ are objectified; their price level is an 
objective ‘fact’, presumably beyond the control of BP.  However, 
‘[d]espite’ this ‘fact’, ‘we’ exhibited dynamic agency since ‘we’: 
‘improved…’; ‘delivered…’ ‘took a crucial first step…’
The ‘we’ in all of this suggest metaphorical entailments such 
as: leadership is active, an agent of change, able to overcome 
external objective crucial facts and to keep promises.  It is a brief 
heroic narrative.
1998.2 
The merger of BP and Amoco was 
announced on 11 August, and completed 
on 31 December.  To have secured full 
regulatory approval in just 99 working days 
is a tremendous credit to all those involved 
and gives us an excellent opportunity 
to proceed rapidly with the process of 
integration.  
– ‘The merger’ de-emphasises agency, as does the use of the 
passive ‘was announced’.  
– A ‘merger’ in accounting literature is a coming together of 
equals, and at the time of the BP-Amoco merger, so-called 
merger accounting was still acceptable under accounting 
principles.
– Another heroic achievement is ‘To have secured full regulatory 
approval in just 99 working days’.  
1998.3
Although the merger creates one of the 
world’s largest industrial organisations, we 
are very aware that size alone is no guarantee 
of success.  
– To whom does ‘we’ refer? The newly-merged multinational 
corporate entity BP Amoco? A corporate leadership group? The 
employees of the new BP Amoco? The shareholders of the new 
BP Amoco? Other? 
–’We’ are not only ‘aware’, but importantly ‘very aware’
– Top management = realists.
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Text of 1998 BP CEO letter 
(1998.3 means para #3 of the 1998 letter) 
Preliminary theme identification
(See Ryan & Bernard, 2003, for theme identification techniques)
1998.4
All the available evidence suggests that 
big companies are commonly regarded 
with suspicion, and that mergers are 
often considered to be simply about the 
accumulation of market power.  
– Is this setting-up a ‘straw man’? 
– Why is this issue introduced here? And, further, why 
introduce it all?
1998.5
To be acceptable to the consumer and 
to society in general, mergers must be 
progressive – enhancing rather than 
reducing the range of choices available to 
the customer, by combining the skills and 
know-how to achieve things which neither 
company could have delivered on its own.  
That means we have to listen with great 
care and be continuously responsive to the 
changing pattern of customer needs and 
desires.  
– Why just ‘to the consumer and to society in general’? Since 
‘society in general’ is so broad as to be vacuous, and ‘consumer’ 
is just one of many stakeholders of BP Amoco (others being: 
shareholders, employees, suppliers, neighbours, etc.), why are 
these the only two constituencies to which the CEO directs his 
concern regarding merger acceptability?
– The CEO in this paragraph sets out the criteria by which the 
challenge introduced in paragraph 1998.4 can be met.
– Notice the imposed definition of ‘progressive’: ‘enhancing 
rather than reducing the range of choices available to the 
customer, by combining the skills and know-how to achieve 
things which neither company could have delivered on its own.’ 
And the next sentence indicates what must be done in order to 
ensure that the merger is thus ‘progressive.’
– What must be done is: ‘… we have to listen with great care and 
be continuously responsive to the changing pattern of customer 
needs and desires.’ 
– The newly-merged entity has human-like characteristics: it 
‘must be progressive’, must ‘listen with great care’, and must 
be ‘continuously responsive…’àBP Amoco will be a big, but 
progressive, listener, who will be responsive to what it (he/
she) hears (at least in connection with ‘the changing pattern of 
customer needs and desires.’
1998.6
In our sector in particular the challenge is 
to ensure that hydrocarbons can be found, 
produced, refined, distributed and used 
without damaging the natural environment.  
BP Amoco will aim to provide consumers 
with the choices that make that aspiration 
achievable.  
– Paragraphs 1998.6 to 1998.9 provide more detail on how 
‘listen[ing] with great care and be[ing] continuously responsive 
to the changing pattern of customer needs and desires’ is to be 
done, ‘[i]n our sector in particular.’ 
1998.7
Secondly, we have to organise and manage 
a huge worldwide company in a way which 
excites and empowers the people who 
work for us.  We have to avoid rigidity and 
bureaucracy and ensure that, within clear 
boundaries and standards, individuals have 
the freedom to fulfil their potential and to 
make a difference.  
– These are empty words frightening in their superficiality and 
inconsistency.  What does ‘excite and empower’ mean, exactly? 
And is the phrase ‘who work for us’ revealing, in suggesting a 
top-down approach to leadership and management.  (Is ‘us’ 
related to a royal ‘we’?).
– Notice the tension between ‘avoid rigidity and bureaucracy’ 
and ‘clear boundaries’.  Who sets the ‘clear boundaries’? Top 
management.  Who defines what indicates fulfilment of 
potential, and making a difference? Top management.
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Text of 1998 BP CEO letter 
(1998.3 means para #3 of the 1998 letter) 
Preliminary theme identification
(See Ryan & Bernard, 2003, for theme identification techniques)
1998.8
Empowerment and adopting a progressive 
and constructive approach will help 
ensure that we can deliver the sustained 
improvement in performance which is the 
primary objective of the merger.  Beyond 
the gains in terms of cost savings and 
the elimination of duplication, the real 
challenge of any merger is to use the new 
combination of people and assets to lift 
competitive performance to a new level.  
That is our central focus as we begin to 
plan for the next century, and we will 
be announcing detailed targets as we go 
through 1999.  
– The word ‘progressive’ again…an ideograph? This time it is 
combined with ‘constructive.’
– Who determines what constitutes ‘the sustained improvement 
in performance which is the primary objective of the merger’? 
(The 1998 merger’s ‘cost savings’ were implicated in the 
2005 Texas City disaster.  At US  Congressional Hearings in 
2007 (House of Representatives Committee on Energy and 
Commerce, Subcommittee on Investigations and Oversight, 
May 16, 2007), Carolyn W.  Merritt (Chairman and Chief 
Executive Officer, US  Chemical Safety Board), gave the 
following verbal testimony under oath in connection with the 
BP acquisition of Amoco and Amoco’s Texas City refinery 
operation: ‘1999…we know that the first 25% of operating 
budget cut…was issued by Lord Browne.’)
– Since ‘the real challenge of any merger is to use the new 
combination of people and assets to lift competitive performance 
to a new level’, how is this lifting to occur? How will one know 
when it is successful (that is, when is ‘competitive performance’ 
is at the ‘new level’?)? Does top management do this ‘lift[ing]’? 
– Notice that it is top management that ‘use’ things to ‘lift’.  
Top management is active, in contrast to ‘people’ (employees) 
who are passive in being acted upon (‘use[d]’).  Also, it is top 
management that does the announcing of ‘detailed targets’ (‘we 
will be announcing’).
– All this suggests strongly a top-down approach to leadership 
and management, which makes the use of the phrases ‘which 
excites and empowers the people who work for us’ (1998.7) and 
‘Empowerment and adopting a progressive and constructive 
approach’ (1998.8) empty.
Thus far rhetorically, we have a unitarist, centralised 
management who has set the criteria for acceptability of the 
merger to ‘The consumer and to society in general’.
1998.9
This report, which draws together the 
activities of the two companies for the first 
time, is an important step in the process of 
integration.  As well as setting out the facts, 
it aims to tell the story of an exceptional 
year, and of the people who made that 
year possible – the people who work for 
BP Amoco.  They provided the magic that 
transformed a difficult year into a year when 
we made history.  
– The CEO asserts that this CEO letter ‘is an important step 
in the process of integration’ of the two companies.  This 
is an acknowledgement of the importance of rhetoric and 
communication generally in leadership.  
– The CEO is explicit in asserting that his letter is intended to be 
a narrative (‘setting out the facts [just what are ‘facts’?]’ and ‘aims 
to tell the story.’).  Notice that it is ‘the’ and not ‘a’ story.  Notice 
also that the story to be told is about an ‘exceptional year’, and 
that ‘the people who work for BP Amoco…provided the magic…’
Thus, we have: The CEO is a storyteller (compare to Jack 
Welch); a report (the CEO letter) is ‘an important step in the 
process of integration’; ‘people who work for BP Amoco’ are 
magicians.
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1998.10
Performance in 1998 
The difficulties of the business environment 
we faced in 1998 can be summed up in a few 
key statistics: 
• average realised oil prices fell by 34% from 
around $18 in 1997 to around $12 in 1998 
• refining margins remained low, at under 
$2 a barrel for the third year out of the last 
four 
• petrochemicals margins fell, in line with 
the progression of the economic cycle.  
– The heading ‘Performance in 1998’ frames the contents 
which follow, particularly the measures chosen to indicate 
‘performance’.
– This para frames the letter’s discussion of ‘Performance in 
1998’ further by establishing that it is the (external) ‘business 
environment’ that is replete with ‘difficulties’, and by asserting 
that ‘a few key statistics’ can ‘sum…up’ this environment.  It is 
‘we’ who ‘faced’ these ‘difficulties’ (perhaps like one who must 
face a force of nature beyond one’s control).  
– Why are these three ‘key statistics’ chosen?
– Why is the CEO letter’s discussion of ‘Performance in 1998’ 
framed by using the ‘business environment’ to lead off ?
To sum up: The 1998 story is set up by showing how bad key 
things beyond management’s control were.  Before beginning to 
discuss BP Amoco’s performance, an excuse (that damn ‘business 
environment’) is already set up.  Also, the company (perhaps 
in the persona of top management) ‘faced’ – passively – things 
beyond its control.
1998.11
In the face of such difficulty the results 
delivered represent a tremendous 
achievement.  BP delivered $3.0 billion of 
replacement cost profit before exceptional 
items, compared with $4.6 billion in 1997.  
Around $400 million of the 1998 profit 
resulted from self-help, with another $100 
million contributed by Amoco as part of 
its total profit of $1.0 billion.  The self-help 
includes gains in productivity and in volume 
in all our business streams.  
– But, to jump ahead in the 1998 narrative, the 1998 story 
has a happy and heroic ending: ‘In the face of such difficulty 
the results delivered represent a tremendous achievement.’ 
Management delivered a ‘tremendous achievement’, in spite 
of ‘such difficulty.’ The merged company, and perhaps most 
importantly its leadership, is indeed heroic.
– Although ‘replacement cost profit before exceptional items’ 
declined by $1.6 billion from the previous year, it was still ‘a 
tremendous achievement’ ‘[i]n the face of such difficulties’.  
Perhaps a theme is: Achievement is measured in a favoured 
subset of accounting measures; achievement thus defined 
is justified as ‘tremendous’ when external obstacles (‘The 
difficulties of the business environment we faced in 1998’) 
can be used as an excuse for declines in the favoured subset of 
accounting measures.
Question: Although it is all-too-common in the for-profit 
sector, why choose to define ‘results’ in terms of accounting 
performance measures? And why choose these measures in 
particular (the implication is that it is only a preferred subset 
of accounting measures that signal ‘performance’)? Also, what 
impact did the choice of ‘pooling accounting’ have on the 
reported financial accounting results?
1998.12
BP’s return on capital was 11% – an 
industry top-tier performance.  
– A separate para is devoted to this performance measure.
– Being in the ‘industry top-tier’ on a ‘return on capital’ 
performance measure is thus a very good thing that deserves 
highlighting by separate recognition in the CEO letter.
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1998.13
BP’s oil and natural gas production rose by 
4%, and seven new developments came on 
stream, including Schiehallion, Loyal and 
the Eastern Trough Area Project (ETAP).  
Amoco’s production increased by 3%, with 
output from Latin America and the North 
Sea more than offsetting declines in the 
USA.  
– This para reports a rise in oil and natural gas production: 
increases in this performance measure are noteworthy and thus 
reportable in the CEO letter.  Theme: growth in this measure 
is good.
– The phrase ‘Seven new developments came on stream’ deploys 
a common metaphor in this industry.  This seems to be almost 
a dead metaphor in this industry, but why is it thus? The 
metaphor evokes the naturalness of a watercourse, a ‘stream’, 
with new sources of (desirable fluids?) joining up, or coming ‘on 
stream’ over the year.  Notice also that the word ‘came’ is used, 
suggesting a passivity on the part of management (management 
didn’t ‘bring’ these new sources ‘on stream’, they ‘came’).
1998.14
Amoco’s marketing sales rose by 2%, with a 
particularly strong performance in gasoline 
sales, while the benefits originally foreseen 
from BP’s refining and marketing joint 
venture with Mobil in Europe have now 
been achieved.  
– Again, a theme of growth in (a select subset) of accounting 
performance measures is good.  Part of this was due to a joint 
venture’s ‘benefits’ being ‘achieved’.  
– The phrase ‘while the benefits originally foreseen from BP’s 
refining and marketing joint venture with Mobil in Europe have 
now been achieved’ suggests the sagacity and foresight of top 
management (but the passive sentence structure here (‘while 
the benefits originally foreseen’) do not identify explicitly 
who did the foreseeing, the implication is that it is the author 
of the CEO letter and his management group).  But not only 
did top management foresee these benefits, they managed the 
joint venture so well that the benefits ‘have now been achieved’, 
indicating operating virtuosity on the part of top management.
– Thus, top management has both strategic foresight and the 
operational ability to make such strategies come to fruition.
1998.15
In chemicals BP continued to build 
new business activity in Asia, as well as 
strengthening leading positions in key 
centres such as Grangemouth, Scotland.  
Amoco’s chemicals business brought on 
stream major expansions in the USA, 
further strengthening its global leadership in 
core products.  
– Use of ‘strengthening’ twice in the para evokes a metaphor: the 
company requires strength…???
1998.16
BP’s oil and natural gas production of 
1,606,000 barrels of oil equivalent a day 
(boe/d) was more than fully replaced with 
new discoveries in Angola and the Gulf 
of Mexico and improved recovery in the 
mature areas of the UK and USA.  Further 
significant discoveries in Norway and 
Venezuela are now under appraisal.  Amoco’s 
production of 1,444,000 boe/d was more 
than replaced by new discoveries and other 
additions, principally in Trinidad and Egypt. 
– Theme: New oil and natural gas discoveries, improved 
recoveries, ‘and other additions’ (presumably acquisitions) must 
exceed the current year’s production.  
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1998.17
The newly merged group 
Commitment to performance will be the 
driving force of the newly merged group.  
We start from a position of great strength.  
The merger of BP and Amoco has taken us 
into the top league of the oil industry.  The 
newly merged group: 
• has daily production worldwide of 2.0 
million barrels of crude oil and 5.8billion 
cubic feet of natural gas 
• is the largest producer of oil and gas 
in the USA and in the UK, producing 
respectively 1.25 and 0.74 million barrels of 
oil equivalent a day 
• has reserves of more than 14.9 billion 
barrels of oil and gas equivalent 
• has 15,500 service stations in the USA and 
11,500 in the rest of the world 
• has chemicals revenues of $9billion a year 
• is one of the world’s leading businesses in 
photovoltaics and solar power 
• is founded on a secure base with more than 
70% of its capital invested in the OECD 
world – in particular, in the USA and the 
UK.  
That is a great starting point but, of course, 
being big is not in itself an adequate 
response to the challenges we face.  
– Notice that the phrase ‘the driving force’ suggests an 
irresistible, almost natural phenomenon.  This is ‘Commitment 
to performance’, but with ‘performance’ as defined by the 
measures previously chosen.  
– Again, an extension of the mild apology for ‘being big’ as a 
result of the merger (see paras 1998.3, 1998.4, and 1998.5), but 
with a twist: ‘being big’ has now become ‘a great starting point’ 
for dealing with the ‘challenges we face’.  Thus, the listing in this 
para of the ‘top league’ indicators ‘of the oil industry’ provide 
documentation for the ‘great starting point’.
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1998.18
The real value of the merger lies in the 
potential it creates.  We now have the 
strength to take substantial positions in the 
key resource developments and markets of 
the world and also the ability to combine 
our skills and know-how, learning from each 
other and applying best practice across the 
whole of our combined asset base.  
– The ‘real value’ of what the CEO calls ‘the merger’ (and 
what looks more like BP’s takeover of Amoco, but which 
uses ‘pooling’ accounting so should be, at least in the eyes 
of management, be talked about as a ‘merger’ to justify the 
accounting), ‘lies in the potential it creates’.  That is, this ‘real 
value’ ‘lies’ (an interesting physical metaphor, indicating 
proneness and perhaps passivity…something is lying prone 
waiting only to be taken?) in the future as ‘the potential’.  And 
this ‘potential’ is being created by the ‘merger’.  Notice that 
the verb form is ‘creates’, thus suggesting that this creation of 
‘potential’ is ongoing as the merger is effected.  Thus, the ‘merger’ 
must be managed well for this ‘potential’ to be realised (and 
notice that, from para 1998.14, a previous major transaction, the 
joint venture, was managed well and its benefits ‘achieved’).  But 
how is this management of the merger to be thus managed?   By:
	Using size and thus market power (‘We now have the strength 
to take substantial positions in the key resource developments 
and markets of the world’)àBig is good;
	Designing and implementing management control systems 
to take advantage of the former BP and Amoco and achieve 
economies of scale and scope (‘and also the ability to combine 
our skills and know-how, learning from each other and 
applying best practice across the whole of our combined asset 
base’).  àWho will lead in this capturing of this ‘potential’? 
Top management will lead the way in defining what ‘skills’ 
should be combined, what ‘know-how’ is to be valued, and in 
indicating what are ‘best practice’ (is ‘top management’ the 
‘We’ in this para?).
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1998.19
As we announced in February, we now aim 
to deliver the $2 billion pre-tax benefits of 
the merger in around a year’s time, some 
nine months earlier than originally planned.  
We also expect to bear a substantial part of 
the costs associated with this restructuring 
during 1999.  These costs are likely to be 
around $1.5 billion pre-tax.  
– This para elevates merger goals (fashioned in accounting 
terms) as public commitments (see Jonnsön (1998) for the 
implications of making accounting targets public).
– The ‘$2 billion pre-tax benefits of the merger’:
	Have now been front-end loaded as a commitment;
	Are at least partly a function of the pooling of interests 
accounting method adopted by the company;
	Are not specified as including or excluding ‘a substantial part’ 
of the ‘likely’ $1.5 billion ‘of the costs associated with this 
restructuring during 1999’.
All this leads to top management (‘we’), who proclaim a prior 
announcement (‘As we announced in February’), proclaiming 
again in the CEO letter (‘we now aim’) to ‘deliver’ the merger 
‘benefits’ (as defined by them in accounting performance 
measure terms) much faster ‘than originally planned’ 
→Delivering accounting performance benefits earlier than 
planned is good.  But what are the implications for the actual 
disruption due to the merger, on the ground in the real lived 
lives of employees, suppliers, customers, neighbours, etc? This 
has implications for an understanding of the Texas City and 
other cost control and safety issues faced later by BP.
1998.20
A dramatic change in corporate 
organisation is disruptive for everyone.  
We are determined to make the process of 
transition as rapid as possible to minimise 
uncertainty for all our employees and their 
families.  By the end of 1998 we had already 
announced appointments to more than 
2,500 posts.  By the end of the first quarter 
of 1999 almost all individual members of 
staff should know how they personally are 
affected by the merger.  
– The BP-Amoco ‘merger’ is creating this ‘dramatic change in 
corporate organisation’.  The first sentence in this para adopts 
a passive voice, as if to obscure the agency of what caused the 
merger and the ‘dramatic change’.  It also refers to ‘A dramatic 
change’ rather than ‘The dramatic change’, further naturalising 
the ‘dramatic change’.  The implication is that, as a result of 
natural capitalism, a necessary merger is taking placeàIn order 
for the merger to have ‘real value’ (1998.18), the merger must 
be managed well.  Part of this management of the merger is 
how to manage the ‘dramatic change’ →Top management has 
a goal ‘to minimise uncertainty for all our employees and 
their families’…the dramatic change and the accompanying 
uncertainty are natural and unavoidable features of the merger, 
and they are beyond top management’s control as events, but 
top management can manage these processes to minimise 
this uncertainty ‘for all our employees and their families’ by 
‘mak[ing] the process of transition as rapid as possible’.  Thus, 
speed in a major corporate restructuring is good for employees.
– Also, this para indicates that ‘appointments to more than 
2,500 posts’ have been announced, but what about any effects of 
downsizing? And, since ‘By the end of the first quarter of 1999 
almost all individual members of staff should know how they 
personally are affected by the merger’, what about disruption of 
the lives of individual employees and their families?
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1998.21
Both within the company and externally, 
reaction has been positive.  Despite the 
inevitable personal uncertainties, it is 
clear that our people see the merger and 
the changes it is bringing as a moment 
of great opportunity.  Their attitude is 
already helping to make BP Amoco a truly 
progressive company.  
– How is it possible that both within and external to the 
company ‘reaction has been positive’? What does this mean, 
exactly? For example, are employees who will not be downsized 
pleased? Were employees who are to be downsized or moved 
to other geographic locations or who will have their job 
descriptions changed, etc, all pleased? And who defines the 
criteria by which ‘reaction has been positive’?
– How is it possible that ‘our people’ ‘see’ such a merger and 
‘the changes it is bringing’ as a ‘moment of great opportunity’? 
In what way is this ‘clear’ to top management? And, even if true 
regarding what people ‘see’, how does such a sight result in an 
‘attitude’ that in turn ‘is already helping to make BP Amoco a 
truly progressive company’?
This para contains empty words, platitudes that should open top 
management up to scrutiny on the measures and criteria used 
and the conclusions reached.
1998.22
Over the next few months we will be 
developing our strategy for the combined 
business.  As we made clear when the merger 
was announced in August, BP Amoco will 
operate within a financial framework we 
believe is prudent and progressive: 
• our gearing – the ratio of net debt to net 
debt plus equity – will be managed with a 
target ceiling of around 30% 
• our dividend policy – of aiming to pay 
out around 50% of our estimated average 
earnings through the business cycle – will be 
maintained 
• our net capital expenditure will be set to 
grow the company, with the objective of 
increasing returns on capital employed.  
– It is top management (‘we’, ‘our’) who develops strategy (top-
down?).  The phrase ‘…we will be developing…’ signals agency, 
and ‘…our strategy…’ signals ownership.
– Top management has set the ‘financial framework’ ‘within’ 
which ‘BP Amoco’ ‘will operate’.  Top management (‘we’) 
‘believe[s] [the framework] is prudent and progressive’.
– The ‘financial framework’:
	is defined in accounting terms (it is accounting language and 
concepts which are used to define the framework);
	is described as ‘prudent’→what does this mean?
	is described as ‘progressive’→what does this mean? Also, the 
word ‘progressive’, which is used four times in the 1998 CEO, 
is again a sort of ‘ideograph’ in the sense of McGee.
Also… using the word ‘framework’ is interesting.  WORD’s 
thesaurus returns: structure, frame, scaffold, skeleton, support, 
construction.
1998.23
That financial framework is designed to be 
robust to a wide range of circumstances and 
to remain valid despite the difficult external 
environment.  The last year appears to mark 
a point of discontinuity, with oil prices 
falling below the range in which they traded 
throughout the last decade.  
– The so-called ‘financial framework’ identified in para 1998.22 
has been designed by top management ‘to be robust to a 
wide range of circumstances and to remain valid despite the 
difficult external environment’.  Thus, top management, who 
determined the framework (agency), created it (‘designed’) to 
counteract the vagaries of the external environment.  So, even 
though the external environment is beyond management’s 
control, management is skilled enough to design such a financial 
framework to be ‘robust’ and ‘valid’.
Thus, top management is a wise designer.  
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1998.24
No one can predict the future but, with our 
recent experience of weak oil prices, we are 
taking the precaution of ensuring that new 
projects are viable at $11 a barrel for Brent 
crude.  
– Even BP Amoco top management is not prescient; however, 
they learn from experience and therefore ensure that future 
projects ‘are viable’ (means what?) ‘at $11 a barrel’.  
1998.25
Performance and standards 
Our focus will be on performance, measured 
in terms of costs, return on capital and 
growth in earnings per share.  Those key 
measures of performance will form the basis 
for the remuneration of all BP Amoco’s 
senior managers.  
– A more precise identification of the accounting performance 
measures that ‘will be’ the ‘focus’ of top management’s attention: 
‘costs, return on capital and growth in earnings per share’.  What 
are the benefits and costs (to a variety of stakeholders) of such a 
narrow, reductionist ‘focus’?
– Since ‘Those key measures of performance will form the 
basis for the remuneration of all BP Amoco’s senior managers’, 
how will the behaviour of ‘all BP Amoco’s senior managers’ be 
affected (the following para 1998.26 asserts that ‘Performance 
against those key financial criteria is imperative’)? And what 
countervailing mechanisms are in place to counter the abuses of 
such a remuneration system?
– The word ‘focus’ is an interesting metaphor, and evokes images 
of a spotlight, and single-mindedness.  Performance measures – 
whether accounting-based or not – which are outside the bright 
well-marked circle of the spotlight might (will be?) ignored or 
de-emphasised?
– The assumption is that a major, complex multinational 
corporation, which has just undergone a merger which 
significantly increases the organisation’s scope and size, can be 
managed by having its ‘senior managers’ ‘focus’ on this small set 
of measures.
– How were these measures chosen? Was Amoco’s management 
compensation system very different, and thus would there be 
a learning effect for the Amoco senior managers brought on 
board?
The theme here seems to be: A select small number of vulnerable 
accounting performance measures are the centre of attention of 
top management, and (crucially) also drive top management’s 
remuneration.
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1998.26
Performance against those key financial 
criteria is imperative but we are determined 
to demonstrate that we can simultaneously 
meet the highest standard of care in all our 
dealings.  Performance must be indivisible.  
Society expects a great deal from large 
and successful companies.  To win trust 
we have to live up to those expectations 
and build a track record of delivery and 
continuous improvement on all the relevant 
performance measures.  
– This para is very curious: after announcing that ‘[p]erformance 
against’ the three accounting performance measures identified 
in the previous para was ‘imperative’ (not a mild requirement 
by any means, since WORDS’ thesaurus pops up ‘vital’, ‘crucial’, 
‘essential’), the CEO (‘we’) announces ‘but we are determined 
to demonstrate that we can simultaneously meet the highest 
standard of care in all our dealings.  Performance must be 
indivisible.’ The phrase ‘standard of care’ is explained in more 
detail in paras 1998.27 to 1998.34.  But how can ‘all BP Amoco’s 
senior managers’ (para 1998.25) simultaneously live in a 
lifeworld dominated by a compensation constructed on three 
highly-reductionist accounting performance measures targets, 
the achievement of which ‘is imperative’, and at the same time 
‘meet the highest standard of care in all our dealings’? If this is at 
all possible, the CEO letter should at the very least provide some 
detail regarding how this conundrum is to overcome.
Theme: BP Amoco senior managers are super human, since they 
can overcome the inconsistencies and rigidities of the company’s 
management control system.
1998.27
In terms of the standard of care, BP and 
Amoco have a strong track record.  In 1998 
we achieved: 
• a 30% improvement in safety (BP and 
Amoco) 
• a 15% fall in hydrocarbon emissions to 
air (BP) 
• a 6% reduction in discharges to water 
(BP).  
– This para defines, as performance measures, what ‘the standard 
of care’ means to BP Amoco top management.  The three (non-
accounting) performance measures cited here are described in 
the following para (1998.27) as indicating insofar as their 1998 
values are concerned, ‘the baseline for BP Amoco’.  Notice that 
the measures deployed in this para selectively report ‘BP and 
Amoco’ or ‘BP’…what happened with Amoco itself on the last 
two measures? Also, some indication of how these measures are 
defined should be provided, if only to refer the reader to another 
part of the company’s annual report.
1998.28
Those achievements form the baseline for 
BP Amoco.  
– See above.
1998.29
We are already taking a number of further 
steps to demonstrate that oil and natural 
gas can be used and produced without 
damaging either people or the environment.  
– How is it possible that this para can be literally true? It seems 
to be hyperbole, plain and simple.
Theme: BP Amoco top management (‘We’) are super human.
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1998.30
During 1998 BP established a long-term 
target to reduce its emissions of greenhouse 
gases by at least 10% from a 1990 baseline in 
the period up to 2010.  We have established 
a number of steps to achieve that target, 
including an internal emissions trading 
system which began operating in September 
last year.  As part of the process of 
integration following the merger, both the 
target and the trading system are now being 
extended to all BP Amoco activities.  
– This para and the following four paras up to and including 
1998.34 set out initiatives that the company is taking to achieve 
the claimed goal of para 1998.29.  While laudatory, these 
‘further steps’ (para 1998.29):
	seem to be largely intentions in the future (see the two 
appearances of ‘We believe’ in para 1998.32; the ‘We will be 
working’ in para 1998.33; the ‘our aim’ in para 1998.34); 
	are not convincing, even if realised, as a means to achieve the 
goal set out in para 1998.29.
Theme: BP Amoco’s ‘standard of care’ and environmental goals 
are subsidiary to its financial goals, both in terms of placement 
in the CEO letter, and in terms of their construction given the 
specific ‘imperative’ of achieving the company’s accounting 
targets.
1998.31
Reducing emissions is one small but 
important contribution to the challenge 
posed by climate change and global 
warming.  
– See above.
1998.32
We believe we can also use our skills 
and technology to improve air quality.  
We believe we can demonstrate that, 
with modern refining technology and 
distribution techniques, it is possible to 
give consumers a wider and cleaner choice 
of fuels.  
– See above.
1998.33
We will be working in close partnership 
with the automotive industry to ensure 
that fuel improvements match the progress 
being made in vehicle technology.  At the 
beginning of 1999 we announced a plan to 
introduce clean fuels – including unleaded 
petrol and very low-sulphur gasoline and 
diesel – to a group of cities around the 
world.  
– See above.
1998.34
That is just the beginning and, as with 
carbon dioxide emissions, our aim is to 
learn from experience and to set ourselves 
progressively higher targets which extend 
and build on these early steps as we go into 
the new century.  
– See above.
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1998.35
Conclusion 
BP Amoco has exceptional people at all 
levels.  1998 showed what they are capable 
of achieving.  
– This section reiterates and summarises the CEO’s message for 
the year.
– Hyperbole focused on the people that BP Amoco ‘has’.
1998.36
We improved our competitive performance 
despite all the difficulties of the operating 
environment.  
– Again the refrain regarding improvement in the face of 
‘difficulties of the operating environment’.
Theme: the business environment in which the company 
operates is always difficult.
1998.37
We maintained a good track record on 
safety and environmental protection 
in our operations and set ourselves the 
challenge of demonstrating that an oil, gas 
and petrochemicals company can make 
a positive contribution to the quality of 
life without damage to the world’s natural 
environment.  
– Can this be linked to the Baker Report and other reports 
regarding Texas City and Prudhoe Bay?
– Theme: the company set itself the following challenge: ‘…
an oil, gas and petrochemicals company can make a positive 
contribution to the quality of life without damage to the world’s 
natural environment.’ For ‘challenge’, WORD’s thesaurus shows: 
test, trial, contest, experiment.
1998.38
And, through the merger, we gave ourselves 
the opportunity to do more, and the 
potential to lead the process of change in the 
industry as a whole.  
– Agency of ‘we’: 
	‘we’ did the ‘merger’
	and therefore ‘we’ ‘gave ourselves the opportunity to do more’ 
[‘more’ is better than ‘less’…but exactly is ‘more’?]
	and also ‘we’ ‘gave ourselves’ [implicitly repeated] ‘the 
potential to lead the process of change in the industry as a 
whole’, Perpetual change is good; leading change is good.
1998.39
But we have no illusions.  The merger is a 
great step forward but being bigger does not 
exempt us from the challenges the industry 
faces.  Track record is important, but we are 
conscious that we have to keep delivering 
every year, year in and year out.  
–’But we have no illusions.’ Signals that ‘we’ [top management? 
CEO Browne?] are realists.  For ‘illusion’, WORD’s thesaurus 
shows: delusion, false impression, misapprehension, fantasy, 
daydream, figment of your imagination, chimera.  
–’we are conscious that we have to keep delivering every year, 
year in and year out.’ Signals a perpetual obligation.  What we 
have achieved in the past (‘Track record’), while ‘important’, is 
insufficient.
Theme: Top management must continuously ‘deliver’ going 
forward.  
1998.40
1999 shows no signs of being an easy 
year.  Oil prices remain weak, and the 
development of the world economy remains 
uncertain.  
– This frames the next year: Theme of a difficult environment is 
again the refrain…environmental items beyond management’s 
control: ‘Oil prices remain weak’; ‘the development of the world 
economy remains uncertain.’  
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(1998.3 means para #3 of the 1998 letter) 
Preliminary theme identification
(See Ryan & Bernard, 2003, for theme identification techniques)
1998.41
Our strongest asset in the face of such a 
tough environment is the quality of our 
people.  They bring the know-how and 
the standard of care which give us our 
reputation.  They have built our track record 
of performance.  It is their ability and 
commitment which convince me that, if any 
company can thrive in these difficult times, 
it is BP Amoco.
– Hyperbole re: ‘our people’ again.  A possible theme involves 
the portrayal of ‘our people’ throughout the corpus of BP CEO 
letters? (word search for ‘people’).
– Also, use of passive ‘our’ in phrase ‘our people’ (why not BP 
Amoco’s people? Or something similar?).
1998.42
Finally, may I thank you for your continued 
support, which is crucial to our success and 
a source of great encouragement.  We will do 
everything in our power to ensure that we 
continue to earn that confidence.  
– Perfunctory, empty words.
1998.43
Sir John Browne 
Group Chief Executive 
17 February 1999
Appendix 3
Single word theme identification in the 1998 BP Chief Executive’s letter
Text of 1998 BP CEO letter 
(1998.3 means paragraph #3 of the 1998 letter) 
Single word preliminary theme 
identification
1998.1 
1998 was a momentous year for the oil industry, and for BP Amoco in 
particular.
Despite the fact that oil prices ended the year 34% below their 
December 1997 level, we improved our underlying performance and 
delivered on our promises.  We also took a crucial first step in the 
restructuring of the oil and gas sector.  
 
Framing of entire CEO letter
heroic (‘we’)
1998.2 
The merger of BP and Amoco was announced on 11 August, and 
completed on 31 December.  To have secured full regulatory approval 
in just 99 working days is a tremendous credit to all those involved and 
gives us an excellent opportunity to proceed rapidly with the process of 
integration.  
Heroic (‘all those involved’)
1998.3
Although the merger creates one of the world’s largest industrial 
organisations, we are very aware that size alone is no guarantee of success. 
Size; Leadership is realistic
1998.4
All the available evidence suggests that big companies are commonly 
regarded with suspicion, and that mergers are often considered to be 
simply about the accumulation of market power.  
Size; Leadership is realistic
1998.5
To be acceptable to the consumer and to society in general, mergers 
must be progressive – enhancing rather than reducing the range of 
choices available to the customer, by combining the skills and know-how 
to achieve things which neither company could have delivered on its 
own.  That means we have to listen with great care and be continuously 
responsive to the changing pattern of customer needs and desires.  
Size; Making size acceptable; 
Leadership is realistic; 
Leadership adapts 
1998.6
In our sector in particular the challenge is to ensure that hydrocarbons 
can be found, produced, refined, distributed and used without damaging 
the natural environment.  BP Amoco will aim to provide consumers with 
the choices that make that aspiration achievable.  
Making size acceptable; 
Standard of care; Trust
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1998.7
Secondly, we have to organise and manage a huge worldwide company 
in a way which excites and empowers the people who work for us.  We 
have to avoid rigidity and bureaucracy and ensure that, within clear 
boundaries and standards, individuals have the freedom to fulfil their 
potential and to make a difference.  
Making size acceptable; Trust
1998.8
Empowerment and adopting a progressive and constructive approach 
will help ensure that we can deliver the sustained improvement in 
performance which is the primary objective of the merger.  Beyond the 
gains in terms of cost savings and the elimination of duplication, the 
real challenge of any merger is to use the new combination of people 
and assets to lift competitive performance to a new level.  That is our 
central focus as we begin to plan for the next century, and we will be 
announcing detailed targets as we go through 1999.  
Making size acceptable
1998.9
This report, which draws together the activities of the two companies for 
the first time, is an important step in the process of integration.  As well 
as setting out the facts, it aims to tell the story of an exceptional year, and 
of the people who made that year possible – the people who work for BP 
Amoco.  They provided the magic that transformed a difficult year into a 
year when we made history.  
Making size acceptable; heroic 
(magicians)
1998.10
Performance in 1998 
The difficulties of the business environment we faced in 1998 can be 
summed up in a few key statistics: 
•	average	realised	oil	prices	fell	by	34%	from	around	$18	in	1997	to	
around $12 in 1998 
•	refining	margins	remained	low,	at	under	$2	a	barrel	for	the	third	year	
out of the last four 
•	petrochemicals	margins	fell,	in	line	with	the	progression	of	the	
economic cycle.  
Business environment is difficult
1998.11
In the face of such difficulty the results delivered represent a tremendous 
achievement.  BP delivered $3.0 billion of replacement cost profit before 
exceptional items, compared with $4.6 billion in 1997.  Around $400 
million of the 1998 profit resulted from self-help, with another $100 
million contributed by Amoco as part of its total profit of $1.0 billion.  
The self-help includes gains in productivity and in volume in all our 
business streams.  
Business environment is 
difficult; heroic (BP, Amoco)
1998.12
BP’s return on capital was 11% – an industry top-tier performance.  Heroic
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1998.13
BP’s oil and natural gas production rose by 4%, and seven new 
developments came on stream, including Schiehallion, Loyal and the 
Eastern Trough Area Project (ETAP).  Amoco’s production increased 
by 3%, with output from Latin America and the North Sea more than 
offsetting declines in the USA.  
Business achievement
1998.14
Amoco’s marketing sales rose by 2%, with a particularly strong 
performance in gasoline sales, while the benefits originally foreseen from 
BP’s refining and marketing joint venture with Mobil in Europe have 
now been achieved.  
Business achievement
1998.15
In chemicals BP continued to build new business activity in Asia, as well 
as strengthening leading positions in key centres such as Grangemouth, 
Scotland.  Amoco’s chemicals business brought on stream major 
expansions in the USA, further strengthening its global leadership in 
core products.  
Business achievement; heroic
1998.16
BP’s oil and natural gas production of 1,606,000 barrels of oil equivalent 
a day (boe/d) was more than fully replaced with new discoveries in 
Angola and the Gulf of Mexico and improved recovery in the mature 
areas of the UK and USA.  Further significant discoveries in Norway and 
Venezuela are now under appraisal.  Amoco’s production of 1,444,000 
boe/d was more than replaced by new discoveries and other additions, 
principally in Trinidad and Egypt.  
Business achievement
1998.17
The newly merged group 
Commitment to performance will be the driving force of the newly 
merged group.  
We start from a position of great strength.  The merger of BP and Amoco 
has taken us into the top league of the oil industry.  The newly merged 
group: 
•	has	daily	production	worldwide	of	2.0	million	barrels	of	crude	oil	and	
5.8 billion cubic feet of natural gas 
•	is	the	largest	producer	of	oil	and	gas	in	the	USA	and	in	the	UK,	
producing respectively 1.25 and 0.74 million barrels of oil equivalent 
a day 
•	has	reserves	of	more	than	14.9	billion	barrels	of	oil	and	gas	equivalent	
•	has	15,500	service	stations	in	the	USA	and	11,500	in	the	rest	of	the	
world 
•	has	chemicals	revenues	of	$9	billion	a	year	
•	is	one	of	the	world’s	leading	businesses	in	photovoltaics	and	solar	power	
•	is	founded	on	a	secure	base	with	more	than	70%	of	its	capital	invested	
in the OECD world – in particular, in the USA and the UK.  
That is a great starting point but, of course, being big is not in itself an 
adequate response to the challenges we face.  
Heroic
We have great strength
Making size acceptable
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1998.18
The real value of the merger lies in the potential it creates.  We now 
have the strength to take substantial positions in the key resource 
developments and markets of the world and also the ability to combine 
our skills and know-how, learning from each other and applying best 
practice across the whole of our combined asset base.  
Real value is in potential; We 
have great strength; Leadership 
adapts
1998.19
As we announced in February, we now aim to deliver the $2 billion 
pre-tax benefits of the merger in around a year’s time, some nine months 
earlier than originally planned.  We also expect to bear a substantial part 
of the costs associated with this restructuring during 1999.  These costs 
are likely to be around $1.5 billion pre-tax.  
Heroic; Speed is good
1998.20
A dramatic change in corporate organisation is disruptive for everyone.  
We are determined to make the process of transition as rapid as possible 
to minimise uncertainty for all our employees and their families.  By 
the end of 1998 we had already announced appointments to more than 
2,500 posts.  By the end of the first quarter of 1999 almost all individual 
members of staff should know how they personally are affected by the 
merger.  
Heroic; Speed is good
1998.21
Both within the company and externally, reaction has been positive.  
Despite the inevitable personal uncertainties, it is clear that our people 
see the merger and the changes it is bringing as a moment of great 
opportunity.  Their attitude is already helping to make BP Amoco a truly 
progressive company.  
Heroic
1998.22
Over the next few months we will be developing our strategy for the 
combined business.  As we made clear when the merger was announced 
in August, BP Amoco will operate within a financial framework we 
believe is prudent and progressive: 
•	our	gearing	–	the	ratio	of	net	debt	to	net	debt	plus	equity	–	will	be	
managed with a target ceiling of around 30% 
•	our	dividend	policy	–	of	aiming	to	pay	out	around	50%	of	our	
estimated average earnings through the business cycle – will be 
maintained 
•	our	net	capital	expenditure	will	be	set	to	grow	the	company,	with	the	
objective of increasing returns on capital employed.  
Making size acceptable; heroic; 
Management’s enduring 
financial framework (‘prudent’; 
‘progressive’)
1998.23
That financial framework is designed to be robust to a wide range 
of circumstances and to remain valid despite the difficult external 
environment.  The last year appears to mark a point of discontinuity, 
with oil prices falling below the range in which they traded throughout 
the last decade.  
Management’s enduring 
financial framework (‘robust’; 
‘valid’); Business environment 
is difficult
1998.24
No one can predict the future but, with our recent experience of weak 
oil prices, we are taking the precaution of ensuring that new projects are 
viable at $11 a barrel for Brent crude.  
The future is risky; Prudent 
leadership
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1998.25
Performance and standards 
Our focus will be on performance, measured in terms of costs, return 
on capital and growth in earnings per share.  Those key measures of 
performance will form the basis for the remuneration of all BP Amoco’s 
senior managers. 
Key performance measures 
1998.26
Performance against those key financial criteria is imperative but we are 
determined to demonstrate that we can simultaneously meet the highest 
standard of care in all our dealings.  Performance must be indivisible.  
Society expects a great deal from large and successful companies.  To win 
trust we have to live up to those expectations and build a track record of 
delivery and continuous improvement on all the relevant performance 
measures.  
Key performance measures; 
Standard of care; Making size 
acceptable
1998.27
In terms of the standard of care, BP and Amoco have a strong track 
record.  In 1998 we achieved: 
•	a	30%	improvement	in	safety	(BP	and	Amoco)	
•	a	15%	fall	in	hydrocarbon	emissions	to	air	(BP)	
•	a	6%	reduction	in	discharges	to	water	(BP).		
Standard of care
1998.28
Those achievements form the baseline for BP Amoco.  Standard of care
1998.29
We are already taking a number of further steps to demonstrate that 
oil and natural gas can be used and produced without damaging either 
people or the environment.  
Standard of care
1998.30
During 1998 BP established a long-term target to reduce its emissions of 
greenhouse gases by at least 10% from a 1990 baseline in the period up 
to 2010.  We have established a number of steps to achieve that target, 
including an internal emissions trading system which began operating in 
September last year.  As part of the process of integration following the 
merger, both the target and the trading system are now being extended 
to all BP Amoco activities.  
Standard of care
1998.31
Reducing emissions is one small but important contribution to the 
challenge posed by climate change and global warming.  
Standard of care
1998.32
We believe we can also use our skills and technology to improve air 
quality.  We believe we can demonstrate that, with modern refining 
technology and distribution techniques, it is possible to give consumers a 
wider and cleaner choice of fuels.  
Standard of care
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1998.33
We will be working in close partnership with the automotive industry to 
ensure that fuel improvements match the progress being made in vehicle 
technology.  At the beginning of 1999 we announced a plan to introduce 
clean fuels – including unleaded petrol and very low-sulphur gasoline 
and diesel – to a group of cities around the world.  
Standard of care
1998.34
That is just the beginning and, as with carbon dioxide emissions, our 
aim is to learn from experience and to set ourselves progressively higher 
targets which extend and build on these early steps as we go into the new 
century.  
Standard of care; heroic
1998.35
Conclusion 
BP Amoco has exceptional people at all levels.  1998 showed what they 
are capable of achieving.  
Heroic
1998.36
We improved our competitive performance despite all the difficulties of 
the operating environment.  
Business achievement; Business 
environment is difficult
1998.37
We maintained a good track record on safety and environmental 
protection in our operations and set ourselves the challenge of 
demonstrating that an oil, gas and petrochemicals company can make a 
positive contribution to the quality of life without damage to the world’s 
natural environment.  
Standard of care
1998.38
And, through the merger, we gave ourselves the opportunity to do 
more, and the potential to lead the process of change in the industry as 
a whole.  
heroic
1998.39
But we have no illusions.  The merger is a great step forward but being 
bigger does not exempt us from the challenges the industry faces.  Track 
record is important, but we are conscious that we have to keep delivering 
every year, year in and year out.  
Leadership is realistic: Prudent 
leadership; The future is risky
1998.40
1999 shows no signs of being an easy year.  Oil prices remain weak, and 
the development of the world economy remains uncertain.  
Business environment is 
difficult; The future is risky
1998.41
Our strongest asset in the face of such a tough environment is the quality 
of our people.  They bring the know-how and the standard of care which 
give us our reputation.  They have built our track record of performance.  
It is their ability and commitment which convince me that, if any 
company can thrive in these difficult times, it is BP Amoco.
Business environment is 
difficult; The future is risky; 
heroic (‘our people’)
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1998.42
Finally, may I thank you for your continued support, which is crucial to 
our success and a source of great encouragement.  We will do everything 
in our power to ensure that we continue to earn that confidence.  
1998.43
Sir John Browne 
Group Chief Executive 
17 February 1999
aBout the authors
Joel Amernic is Professor of Accounting at the Joseph L. Rotman School 
of Management, University of Toronto.  He is past editor of Canadian 
Accounting Perspectives, and a recipient of the Canadian Academic 
Accounting Association’s Outstanding Educator Award.  His work has 
appeared in numerous academic and professional refereed journals, 
such as Accounting, Organizations and Society, Critical Perspectives on 
Accounting, Accounting Auditing and Accountability Journal, Human 
Relations, among many others, and he is the author or co-author of seven 
books.  His main research interests are in the accountability language 
of corporate leadership, financial reporting, management control, and 
management education.
Russell Craig is Professor of Accounting in the College of Business and 
Economics at the University of Canterbury, New Zealand.  He has held 
visiting appointments at Oxford University, Portland State University, 
the University of Toronto, and Rhodes College.  His main research 
interests include financial reporting, international accounting, and 
the accountability discourse of executives.  He is the author (with Joel 
Amernic) of CEO-Speak: The language of corporate leadership (2006) 
and over 130 research papers, research monographs and book chapters. 
His articles have appeared in a wide range of journals in accounting 
and cognate fields. He has provided policy advice to government 
departments, professional associations and public and private sector 
organizations.
Dennis Tourish is Professor of Leadership at the University of Kent and 
a fellow of the Leadership Trust Foundation.  He is the co-author or 
co-editor of six previous books. The most recent is Auditing Organizational 
aBout the authors210
Communication: A Handbook of Research Theory and Practice (2009), 
co-edited with Owen Hargie. He has also published over 60 research 
papers on leadership, management and organizational communication, 
in journals such as Human Relations, Journal of Management Studies, 
Leadership and Management Communication Quarterly. He serves as 
an Associate Editor for Management Communication Quarterly. He has 
worked with many private and public sector organizations as a consultant 
on these issues, and regularly speaks at professional conferences.
Measuring and Assessing 
Tone at the Top Using Annual 
Report CEO Letters
Researchers: Joel Amernic
 Russell Craig    
 Dennis Tourish
 
M
easuring and A
ssessing Tone at the Top U
sing A
nnual R
eport C
E
O
 Letters
Measuring and Assessing Tone at the Top Using 
Annual Report CEO Letters
Chief Executive Officers (CEOs) have a strong influence on the tone at the top of 
companies.  How they exercise this influence has the potential to affect the quality of 
financial reporting.  Consequently, it is important that auditors and other users find a 
way of examining and evaluating the tone at the top and the resultant risks to which 
companies might be exposed.
The authors contend that the CEO letter to shareholders in annual reports is one of 
the most important of the mediums used by corporate leaders to communicate their 
attitudes and values. They argue that by analysing the text of such letters, auditors and 
other interested parties can gain insight into the tone at the top of major corporations.
This book demonstrates two complementary methods for undertaking this analysis. First, 
through the use of the text analysis software package DICTION to analyse the CEO 
letters of FTSE 100 companies and the top 100 FORTUNE 500 companies. Second, 
through conducting a close reading or forensic examination of selected company letters 
(General Electric, Enron, BP and New Century Financial) to understand their inherent 
ideology, rhetoric and use of metaphors, and to highlight any silences. The two methods 
should be used in conjunction with each other to enhance ensuing understandings of 
tone at the top and its effects.
The authors contend that the combination of close reading and software analysis 
techniques can furnish valuable understandings of the culture of an organisation and 
the intentions of top management teams. The techniques they demonstrate could be 
of value to auditors.  The authors conclude that a closer scrutiny of corporate activity 
is important and that the methods they highlight should be regarded as highly useful 
tools in conducting much needed audits of corporate culture and communication.
ISBN 978-1-904574-55-2
EAN  9781904574552
Price: £15.00
CA HOUSE  •  21 HAYMARKET YARDS  •  EDINBURGH  •  EH12 5BH
TEL:  0131 347 0237  •  FAX:  0131 347 0114
EMAIL:  research@icas.org.uk  •  WEB:  www.icas.org.uk/research
Craig et al Covers - 26.2.10.indd   1 06/04/2010   16:23
